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The	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis	  
	  This	  thesis	  is	  divided	  in	  2	  broad	  sections,	  both	  of	  which	  broadly	  focus	  on	  decision	  making,	  with	   a	   particular	   focus	   on	   strategic	   interactions	   (i.e.	   inspired	   from	   the	   behavioral	   game	  theory	  approach).	  The	  1st	  section,	  “Neuro-­‐Cognitive	  Mechanisms	  Mediating	  the	  Impact	  of	  Social	  Closeness	  on	  Coordination”,	  constitutes	  the	  main	  body	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  regards	  the	  project	   I	  personally	  most	  worked	  on	  during	  my	  PhD.	   It	   contains	  2	  articles:	   a	  behavioral	  study	   (Chierchia&Coricelli,	   under	   revision)	   (comprised	   of	   3	   experiments)	   and	   an	   fMRI	  study	   (Chierchia	   et	   al.,	   in	   preparation).	   In	   these	   articles	   I	   attempt	   to	   connect	   a	   “hard	  problem”	  of	  game	  theory,	  namely	  coordination	  games,	  to	  notions	  from	  social	  psychology,	  sociology	   and	   social	   neuroscience/neuroeconomics	   within	   a	   simple	   framework.	  Experimentally,	   the	   studies	   in	   this	   section	   adopt	   one-­‐shot	   coordination	   games	   and	   thus	  focus	   on	   how	   social	   information	   affects	   initial	   expectations	   and	   outcomes	   of	   strategic	  interactions.	   	   The	   second	   section	   contains	   2	   additional	   works.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   an	   fMRI	  study	   I	   contributed	   to	   (Fouragnan	  et	  al.,	  2013),	   in	  which	  we	  extend	   the	  previous	   line	  of	  inquiry	  from	  static	  to	  dynamic	  interactions.	  Here	  we	  were	  interested	  in	  how	  reliable	  social	  information	   (reputational	   priors)	   can	   constrain	   updating	   in	   repeated	   trust	   games,	   and	  how	  this	  learning	  mechanism	  is	  articulated	  in	  the	  brain.	  The	  last	  essay	  is	  a	  review	  chapter	  I	  wrote	   (Chierchia&Coricelli,	   2011),	  which	   critically	   evaluates	   the	   capability	   of	   a	   strong	  “dual	   vs.	   unitary”	   dichotomy	   of	   cognition	   to	   account	   for	   recent	   findings	   in	  neuroeconomics.	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Section	  1	  Neuro-­‐cognitive	  Mechanisms	  Mediating	  the	  Impact	  of	  Social	  Distance	  on	  Coordination	  	  
Abstract	  To	  model	  strategic	  interactions	  standard	  game	  theory	  assumes	  that	  agents	  have	  common	  knowledge	  of	  rationality.	  This	  allows	  agents	  to	  use	  deduction	  to	  form	  expectations	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  their	  counterparts.	  In	  coordination	  games	  however,	  deduction	  fundamentally	  fails	  to	  prescribe	  a	  unique	  solution	  to	  agents,	  raising	  a	  “matching”	  problem	  in	  game	  theory.	  The	  question	  is,	  when	  deduction	  is	  of	  no	  use,	  how	  are	  agents	  to	  match	  or	  decouple	  their	  choices?	  The	  thesis	  explored	  here	  is	  inspired	  from	  the	  recent	  finding	  that	  humans	  recruit	  the	   same	   neural	   structures	   to	   reason	   about	   themselves	   and	   similar	   but	   not	   dissimilar	  others,	   and	   of	   friends	   but	   not	   strangers;	   a	   finding	  which	   has	   led	   some	   investigators	   to	  speak	   of	   self-­‐referential	   mentalizing.	   This	   meshes	   nicely	   with	   the	   widely-­‐established	  cross-­‐species	   observation	   that	   social	   beings	   usually	   exhibit	   a	   preference	   for	   similar	  others;	   as	   well	   as	   with	   the	   well-­‐known	   observation	   that	   social	   closeness	   fosters	  cooperation.	   	   However,	   as	   investigated	   by	   nearly	   all	   previous	   experiments,	   cooperation	  critically	   required	   agents	   to	   match	   their	   choices.	   My	   work	   adds	   to	   the	   experimental	  literature	  in	  several	  respects:	  i)	  it	  shows	  that	  both	  objective	  social	  closeness	  (friendship)	  and	  psychological	  closeness	  (perceived	  lab-­‐induced	  similarity)	  can	  have	  an	  opposite	  effect	  on	   strategic	   interactions,	   depending	   on	   whether	   they	   require	   to	   match	   or	   decouple	  choices;	   ii)	   that	   this	   behavior	   is	   best	   explained	  by	   synergistic	   contributions	   of	   expected	  reciprocity	  and	  altruism,	  which	  we	  show	  to	  be	  dissociable	  both	  in	  behavior	  and	  the	  brain.	  From	   a	   neural	   perspective,	   expected	   reciprocity	   relies	   on	   the	   ventromedial	   prefrontal	  cortex,	   an	   area	   previously	   implicated	   in	   reward,	   interpersonal	   similarity	   and	   depth	   of	  reasoning;	   while	   the	   temporo-­‐parietal	   junction	   is	   particularly	   important	   for	   altruism.	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Taken	   together,	   our	   results	   provide	   novel	   insight	   into	   the	   neuro-­‐cognitive	  mechanisms	  that	  facilitate	  social	  cohesion.	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Introduction	  	  
The	  strategic	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  cohesion	  	  More	   than	   2	   centuries	   ago	   Jean-­‐Jacques	   Rousseau	   (1754)	   illustrated	   a	   dilemma,	   which	  today	   re-­‐emerges	   as	   “the	  most	   difficult	   problem	   of	   game	   theory”	   (Camerer,	   2003).	   The	  dilemma	  is	  this:	  2	  hunters	  are	  trying	  to	  catch	  a	  stag.	  To	  do	  so,	   it	   is	  critical	  that	  each	  one	  keep	  his	  post	  on	  separate	  sides	  of	  the	  hunting	  grounds,	  because	  the	  stag	  cannot	  be	  caught	  alone.	  However,	   there	   is	   some	   likelihood	  of	  a	  hare	  occasionally	  passing	  by	  and	  a	  hunter	  can	   catch	   the	   hare	   alone,	  with	   certainty.	   The	   hare	   is	  worth	   less	   than	   the	   stag,	   but	   it	   is	  there1,	  and	   this	   could	   tempt	  a	  hunter	   to	  abandon	  his	  post	   to	  catch	   it.	   In	  which	  case,	   the	  other	  hunter	  will	  go	  home	  with	  nothing2.	  Crucially,	  both	  hunters	  are	  aware	  of	  this	  risk,	  so	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  temptation	  (i.e.	  the	  hare),	  a	  hunter	  could	  defect	  from	  cooperation	  only	  for	  fear	  of	  the	  defection	  of	  his	  counterpart.	  Furthermore,	  hunter	  A	  could	  also	  defect	  because	  he	  believes	  hunter	  B	  believes	  A	  will	  defect,	  and	  this	  fear	  can	  reverberate	  further.	  Indeed,	  in	  lab	  experiments	  for	  real	  money	  and	  in	  large-­‐scale	  economies,	  this	  type	  of	  “win-­‐win”	  cooperation	  has	  often	  been	  shown	  to	  fail.	  This	  story	  captures	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  cooperation:	  we	  all	  know	  that	  we	  can	  often	  achieve	  more	  by	  working	  together,	  however,	  cooperation	   forces	  us	   to	   rely	  on	  others,	  which	  makes	   it	   intrinsically	   risky.	   In	  brief,	  with	  sociality	  comes	  exposure.	  So	  the	  question	  is:	  should	  we	  live	  in	  safe	  isolation,	  and	  catch	  our	  hares	  separately,	  or	  should	  we	  stick	  together,	  and	  catch	  a	  stag?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “If	  it	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  hunting	  a	  deer,	  everyone	  well	  realized	  that	  he	  must	  remain	  faithful	  to	  his	  post;	  but	  if	  a	  hare	  happened	  to	  pass	  within	  reach	  of	  one	  of	  them,	  we	  cannot	  doubt	  	  	  	  2	  To	  make	  this	  more	  concrete,	  think	  that	  the	  stag	  is	  worth	  $1000	  to	  each	  hunter,	  and	  the	  hare	  only	  $500.	  The	  stag	  can	  be	  caught	  with	  certainty,	  but	  only	  if	  both	  hunters	  cooperate,	  the	  hare	  can	  be	  caught	  alone.	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We	   actually	   know	   the	   end	  of	   this	   story.	  Humans,	   and	   other	   animals,	   “decided”,	   through	  evolution,	  to	  live	  together,	  that	  is,	  to	  live	  close	  to	  one	  another,	  in	  a	  group.	  However,	  we	  are	  not	  uniformly	  distributed	  within	   this	  macro-­‐group,	  but	  we	  are	  clustered	   in	  subgroups	  of	  nations,	   provinces,	   neighborhoods,	   gradually	   extending	   families	   and	   households;	   of	  culture	   and	   language,	   of	   ethnicities,	   religions,	   clans,	   clubs	   and	   political	   parties.	   The	  rationale	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   that,	   to	   study	   what	   may	   have	   been	   the	   (neuro-­‐cognitive)	  processes	  that	  enabled	  humans	  to	  “decide”	  to	  live	  close	  to	  one	  another	  and	  cooperate,	  we	  can	  try	  to	  study	  what	  mechanisms	  differentiate	  the	  interactions	  of	  “closer”	  and	  “farther”	  others	   in	   terms	   of	   such	   naturally-­‐occurring	   subgroups.	   In	   other	   words,	   this	   thesis	  investigates	  the	  strategic	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  cohesion.	  	  	  With	   the	   stag	   hunt	   example	   however,	   it	   seems	   we	   have	   told	   only	   “half”	   of	   the	   story.	  Suppose	  we	  decided	  to	   live	  close	  together,	   to	  reduce	  the	  commute	  and	  go	  hunting	  every	  day	   (and	  catch	  many	   stags).	  A	  new	  problem	  emerges:	   stag	  hunts	  offer	   the	  possibility	  of	  mutually	  profiting	  from	  an	  interaction;	  but	  how	  will	  we	  avoid	  conflict	  over	  resources	  that	  aren’t	  divisible?	  It	  is	  in	  fact	  clear	  that	  the	  world	  doesn’t	  only	  offer	  “win-­‐win”	  (albeit	  risky)	  situations,	   like	   stags.	   It	   offers	   equally	   many	   profit	   opportunities	   that	   can	   only	   be	  consumed	  in	  isolation.	  However,	  this	  may	  pave	  the	  road	  to	  conflict.	  For	  instance,	  if	  we	  live	  together	   and	   a	   particularly	   attractive	   mate	   walks	   by,	   we’ll	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   engage	  competition	   (in	   monogamous	   cultures	   at	   least,	   mating	   privileges	   cannot	   be	   shared).	  Similarly,	  we	  know	  we	  can’t	  all	  talk	  at	  the	  same	  time	  during	  an	  argument,	  or	  no	  one	  will	  understand	  anything	  (attentional	  and	  perceptual	  resources	  also	  have	  a	  cap	  and	  risk	  to	  be	  over-­‐crowded);	  we	  also	  know	  that	   if	  we	  all	   take	   too	  much	  water	   from	  the	  same	  well,	  or	  take	  all	  our	  cattle	  to	  graze	  on	  the	  same	  field,	  we’ll	  finish	  both	  water	  and	  the	  grass	  (which	  are	  common	  dilemmas	  in	  the	  economic	  literature);	  that	  if	  we	  all	  take	  our	  preferred	  route	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home	  (i.e.	  the	  freeway)	  at	  same	  time	  there	  will	  be	  a	  traffic	  jam.	  In	  all	  such	  cases,	  sociality	  thus	  leads	  us	  to	  2	  possible	  inefficiencies:	  either	  we	  raise	  our	  voice,	  honk	  our	  horns,	  shove	  our	   way	   to	   the	   field	   or	   well,	   hoping	   others	   don’t	   do	   the	   same,	   or	   we	   wait	   in	   line.	   In	  economies,	   this	   known	   to	   happen	   (i.e.	   Ochs,	   1999)	   when	   agents	   would	   like	   to	   enter	   a	  particular	  market.	  They	  know	  that	  if	  too	  many	  of	  them	  do	  (and	  everyone	  starts	  producing	  the	  same	  brand	  of	  the	  same	  product)	  there	  will	  be	  a	  price-­‐war	  and	  all	  investors	  lose.	  For	  this	  reason,	  such	  situations	  have	  been	  called	  “entry	  games”.	  	  	  	  Clearly,	  all	  of	  the	  situations	  described	  above	  (both,	  stag	  hunts	  and	  entry	  games)	  could	  be	  detailed	   in	  so	  many	  ways	   that	  could	  matter	  (i.e.	   can	  agents	   talk	   things	  over?	   Is	   it	  a	  one-­‐shot	  or	  a	  repeated	  interaction?	  What	  do	  they	  know	  about	  how	  much	  they	  each	  value	  the	  same	   goods?	   Etc.).	   However,	   they	   all	   have	   at	   least	   1	   thing	   in	   common,	   that	   is,	   they	   all	  involve	  multiple	  agents	  and	  incentives.	  This	  means	  we	  can,	  as	  a	  preliminary	  simplification,	  focus	  only	  on	  these	  and	  see	  what	  we	  can	  say.	  When	  we	  do	  so,	  the	  interactions	  start	  to	  look	  like	   games.	   Below	   (Fig.	   1),	   we	   show	   such	   a	   simplified	   representation	   of	   both	   of	   the	  situations	  described	  above	  (in	  typical	  game-­‐theoretic	  notation	  matrix	  –	  see	  caption).	  	  
STAG	  HUNT	   RISK	  (stag)	   SAFE	  (hare)	  
RISK	  (stag)	   1	  ,	  1	   0	  ,	  SP	  
SAFE	  (hare)	   SP	  ,	  	  0	   SP	  ,	  SP	  	  	  	  
ENTRY	  GAME	   RISK	  (enter)	   SAFE	  (wait)	  
RISK	  (enter)	   0	  ,	  0	   1	  ,	  SP	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SAFE	  (wait)	   SP	  ,	  	  1	   SP	  ,	  SP	  	  	  Fig.	  1.	   Stag	  hunt	  games	  (SHs)	  and	  entry	  games	  (EGs)	  in	  matrix	  notation:	  2	  agents	  (one	  choosing	  a	  column,	  the	  second	  a	  row)	  make	  simultaneous	  choices	  without	  communicating.	  	  They	  choose	  between	  the	  same	  pair	  of	  options:	  a	  safe	  payoff	  (SP)	  that	  can	  be	  obtained	  with	  certainty	  and	   in	   isolation,	  and	  a	  potentially	  higher	  paying	   but	   risky	   one	   (here	   worth	   1,	   with	   0<SP<1),	   which	   depends	   on	   the	   choices	   of	   others.	   For	   each	  combination	  of	  choices	  the	  payoff	  to	  each	  of	  the	  players	  is	  shown,	  the	  payoff	  on	  the	  left	  refers	  to	  the	  player	  choosing	  between	  rows,	  the	  one	  on	  the	  right	  to	  column	  player’s	  payoff.	  In	  SHs	  agents	  would	  prefer	  to	  match	  their	  choices.	  In	  EGs,	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  decouple	  them.	  	  	  Very	   ideally,	  we	  have	  represented	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	   the	  2	  halves	  of	  what	  we	  called	  the	   sociality	   problem.	   Now,	   we	   can	   turn	   back	   to	   our	   question	   (“safe	   isolation	   or	   risky	  interdependence?”)	  and	  ask	  what	  would	  be	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  choice	  of	  sociality	  dominant	   relative	   to	   the	   choice	   of	   safe	   isolation.	   For	   social	   cohesion	   to	   be	   an	   optimal	  (evolutionary)	   solution,	   a	   (neuro-­‐cognitive)	   mechanism	   should	   realize	   2	   objectives:	   it	  should	   facilitate	   the	   successful	   exploitation	   of	   situations	   requiring	   joint	   effort	   (i.e.	  cooperating	   to	   catch	   stags)	   -­‐	   thus	   earning	   an	   advantage	   over	   safe	   isolation	   -­‐	   while	  simultaneously	   optimizing	   traffic	   over	   limited	   common	   resources.	  Within	   an	   economics	  and	   game	   -­‐theoretic	   framework,	   understanding	   what	   guides	   choices	   in	   either	   of	   these	  situations	   -­‐	   even	   when	   much	   simplified	   relative	   to	   their	   real-­‐word	   analogues	   -­‐	   has	  resulted	   to	   be	   extremely	   challenging.	   Both	   of	   the	   depicted	   scenarios	   can	   in	   fact	   be	  represented	  by	  coordination	  games,	  which	  have	  been	  said	  to	  “constitute	  the	  most	  difficult	  problem	  of	  game	  theory”	  (Camerer,	  2003),	  as	  they	  apparently	  involve	  a	  difficult	  matching	  problem.	  Our	  general	  proposal,	  which	  I	  will	  try	  to	  articulate	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  is	  that	  a	  correspondence	  between	  social	  network	  closeness,	  psychological	  closeness	  and	  neural	  closeness,	  could	  afford	  precisely	  this,	  that	  is,	  propensity	  for	  cooperation,	  and	  aversion	  to	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conflict.	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Chapter	  1	  Behavioral	  Game	  Theory	  and	  Common	  Knowledge	  
	  
1.1.	  On	  deduction	  and	  incentives	  	  Our	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  multi-­‐agent	  decision	  problems,	  that	  is,	  on	  decisions	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  decisions	  of	  others.	  In	  other	  terms,	  we	  focus	  on	  strategic	  interactions.	  Our	  departing	  point	  is	  the	  work	  from	  Von	  Morgenstern	  and	  Neumann	  (1947),	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  John	  Nash	  (1950)	   on	   the	   other.	   	   The	   former	   founded	   expected	   utility	   theory,	   which	   provided	   a	  mathematical	   framework	   for	   prescribing	   economically	   “rational”	   choices.	   To	   do	   so,	   the	  theory	   proposed	   a	   formal	   tool	   to	   predict	   the	   behavior	   of	   “toy”	   agents.	   Such	   agents	  followed	   simple	   rules:	   they	   need	   things	   (that	   is	   to	   say,	   they	   have	   preferences,	   i.e.	  food/water,	   occasions	   to	   reproduce,	  money	   etc.)	   and	   they	  will	   always	  make	   the	   choice	  that	  maximizes	  their	  chances	  of	  obtaining	  them,	  given	  the	  information/beliefs	  they	  have.	  Typically,	  to	  mimic	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  events	  are	  uncertain,	  such	  agents	  were	  viewed	  as	  always	  choosing	  between	  lotteries.	  For	  instance,	  a	  “rational”	  agent,	  as	  depicted	  above,	   should	   prefer	   a	   sure	   payoff	   of	   60	   to	   a	   50-­‐50	   bet	   of	   100	   or	   nothing,	   because	   the	  expected	  value	  of	  accepting	  the	  bet	  it	  50,	  which	  is	  less	  than	  60.	  However,	  how	  should	  such	  agents	  behave	  when	  the	  outcomes	  of	  their	  choices	  depended	  not	  on	  lotteries,	  but	  on	  the	  choices	  of	  other	  agents?	  The	  solution	  was	  a	  logical	  follow-­‐up:	  agents	  expect	  other	  agents	  to	   behave	   exactly	   like	   they	   would,	   that	   is,	   “rationally”;	   they	   also	   know	   that	   everyone	  knows	  this,	  and	  that	  everyone	  knows	  that	  everyone	  knows	  etc.	  This	  recursion	  in	  forming	  beliefs	   about	   beliefs	   (about	   beliefs…)	   is	   the	   peculiarity	   of	   strategic	   interactions	   and	   it	  constitutes	   the	   critical	   additional	   assumption	   in	   the	   passage	   from	   individual	   decision	  making	   to	   inter-­‐individual/strategic	   decision	   problems.	   Game	   theorists	   call	   this	   the	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assumption	  of	  “common	  knowledge	  of	  rationality”.	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  theory	  was	  mostly	  intended	  to	  give	  advice	  in	  economic	  decisions,	  which	  were	  often	  competitive	  (i.e.	  finding	  the	   “right”	   compromise	   in	   bargaining),	   agents	   were	   also	   assumed	   to	   be	   strictly	   self-­‐interested.	  	  Given	   such	   assumptions,	   John	   Nash	   completed	   a	   demonstration	   that,	   as	   long	   as	   agents	  have	  a	  finite	  set	  of	  options,	  then	  all	  thinkable	  interactions	  have	  an	  intriguing	  mathematical	  feature	  called	  a	  fixed-­‐point,	  or,	  as	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  it	  from	  now	  on,	  a	  Nash	  equilibrium	  (NE).	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that,	  out	  of	  all	  the	  combinations	  of	  possible	  choices	  by	  players,	  there	  is	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  them	  (which	  can	  be	  mathematically	  derived)	  in	  which	  all	  players	  are	  choosing	  their	   best	   option	   (they	   are	  maximizing	   their	   utility/payoff),	   given	   the	   choices	   of	   all	   the	  others.	  In	  such	  situations,	  since	  no	  agent	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  unilaterally	  deviate	  from	  his	  current	   choice,	   everyone	   is	   in	   equilibrium.	   Since	   then,	   a	   fundamental	   question	   of	   the	  whole	  enterprise	  of	  behavioral	  game	  theory	  and	  experimental	  economics	  (Camerer,	  2003)	  has	  been	  whether	  such	  a	  mathematical	  model	  of	  deductive	  rationality	  had	  any	  empirical	  bite,	   that	   is,	   whether	   it	   could	   yield	   valid	   predictions	   of	   the	   outcomes	   of	   strategic	  interactions.	  Intriguingly,	  in	  many	  instances	  it	  does.	  	  	  	  One	  example	  I	  find	  compelling	  is	  the	  following	  game,	  first	  alluded	  to	  by	  Keynes	  (General	  Theory	  of	  Employment	  Interest	  and	  Money,	  1936),	  then	  formalized	  and	  empirically	  tested	  by	  Nagel	   (1995).	  To	  describe	   the	   type	  of	   reasoning	   agents	   in	   the	   stock	  market	   often	   go	  through,	  Keynes	  spoke	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  newspaper	  contest,	  in	  which	  readers	  were	  to	  try	  and	  guess	  which	  of	  the	  6	  depicted	  faces,	  was	  the	  most	  beautiful.	  Of	  this	  he	  said:	  	  	  “It	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  choosing	  those	  [faces]	  that,	  to	  the	  best	  of	  one’s	  judgment,	  are	  really	  the	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prettiest,	   nor	   even	   those	   that	   average	   opinion	   genuinely	   thinks	   the	   prettiest.	   We	   have	  reached	  the	  third	  degree	  where	  we	  devote	  our	  intelligences	  to	  anticipating	  what	  average	  opinion	  expects	  the	  average	  opinion	  to	  be.	  And	  there	  are	  some,	  I	  believe,	  who	  practice	  the	  fourth,	   fifth	   and	   higher	   degrees.”	   (Keynes,	   General	   Theory	   of	   Employment	   Interest	   and	  Money,	  1936).	  	  In	  Nagel’s	  version	  (1995)	  of	  the	  “beauty	  contest”	  n	  agents	  simultaneously	  pick	  a	  number	  xi,	  with	  0	  ≤	  xi	  ≤	  100.	  Their	  objective	  is	  to	  choose	  the	  number	  that	  comes	  closest	  to	  a	  target	  number.	   This	   target	   number	   is	   equal	   to	   the	   average	   of	   all	   chosen	   numbers	   (hence	   the	  guessing	  what	  others	  choose),	  multiplied	  by	  a	  parameter	  k	  (i.e.	  ½).	  The	  winner	  obtains	  a	  dollar	  amount	  X,	  the	  others	  earn	  0	  (and	  X	  is	  split	  in	  case	  of	  ties).	  When	  k<1,	  this	  game	  has	  a	   single	  NE,	  which	   is	  0.	  To	  understand	  why,	   consider	   the	  game	  with	  k=1/2.	  The	  highest	  possible	  target	  number	  for	  this	  game	  is	  50,	  which	  would	  only	  occur	  if	  everyone	  chose	  100.	  So,	  any	  choice	  above	  50	  is	  “strictly	  dominated”	  by	  any	  choice	  below	  it,	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  pays	  off	  less	  no	  matter	  what	  numbers	   the	  other	  players	   choose.	   Critically	  however,	   if	   others	   get	  this	  (and	  since	  they	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  rational,	  they	  will),	  they’ll	  be	  choosing	  numbers	  of	  50	  or	  below,	  which	  lowers	  the	  mean	  and	  thus	  the	  target	  number,	  to	  at	  least	  25	  or	  lower.	  The	   same	   reasoning	   is	   iterated	  until	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  do	   so	   further,	   that	   is,	   at	  0.	   	  This	  game	   shows	   many	   interesting	   characteristics	   in	   action.	   One	   of	   them	   is	   that	   deductive	  rationality	  may	  not	   always	  be	   an	  optimal	   strategy.	  Here	   for	   instance,	   agents	   choosing	  0	  can	  lose	  (as	  Camerer	  puts	  it,	  “they’re	  smart	  and	  poor”),	   if	  the	  other	  players	  are	  choosing	  higher	  numbers.	  However,	  when	  this	  game	  is	  repeated,	  and	  players	  are	  told	  the	  outcome	  of	   each	   successive	   round,	   they	   quickly,	   as	   a	   group,	   lower	   their	   choices,	   until	   almost	  everyone	  is	  choosing	  0	  (Fig.	  2).	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  Fig.	   2.	   Frequency	   of	   choices	   in	   a	   beauty	   contest	   (with	   parameter	   k=2/3):	   in	   period	   1,	   choices	   are	   rather	  randomly	  dispersed,	  by	  period	  9,	  nearly	  everyone	  is	  choosing	  the	  NE.	  	  	  It	   follows	  that,	  while	   in	   the	  short	  run	  a	  game-­‐theoretic	  approach	  may	  not	  always	  do	  too	  well	   (not	   in	   this	  game	  at	   least)	  –	   though,	  even	   in	   the	  1st	   round,	  some	  agents	  are	  already	  selecting	   the	   theoretic	   solution	   of	   the	   game	   -­‐,	   in	   the	   longer	   run,	   it	   seems	   to	   capture	   a	  fundamental	  aspect	   the	  game,	  namely,	   the	  direction	  of	   its	  unraveling:	   indeed	  (at	   least	   in	  beauty	  contests)	  eventually,	  subjects	  do	  tend	  to	  equilibrium3.	  The	  interesting	  thing	  is	  that	  incentives	  may	   be	   doing	  much	   of	   the	   work:	   though	   some	   subjects	   immediately	   play	   at	  equilibrium,	  or	  may	   learn	   to	  do	   so	   through	   introspection	   (Weber,	   2003),	   not	   all	   subject	  need	  to	  “be	  rational	  to	  behave	  rationally”.	  For	  instance,	  they	  needn’t	  all	  learn	  to	  reason	  in	  greater	  depth	  –	  thinking	  about	  what	  others	  think	  they	  think	  etc.	  -­‐	  (indeed,	  Nagel	  provides	  some	  evidence	   that	   they	  don’t);	   rather,	   it	   is	   sufficient	   that	   they	  be	  sensible	   to	  gains	  and	  losses	   –	   as	   in	   reinforcement	   learning	  –	   to	  notice	   that	  high	  numbers	  don’t	   pay,	   and	   thus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Whereas	   critics	   have	   often	   stressed	   failures	   or	   “rationality”	   in	   one-­‐shot	   decisions	   or	  interactions,	   I	   find	   that	   its	   potential	   pragmatic/predictive	   appeal	   is	   stronger	   under	  repeated	   conditions,	   that	   is,	   in	   the	   long	   run.	   	   	   Camerer	   says,	   “in	   the	   modern	   view,	  equilibrium	   should	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   the	   limiting	   outcome	   of	   an	   unspecified	   learning	   or	  evolutionary	  process	  that	  unfolds	  over	  time”	  (Camerer	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  Apparently	  Nash	  had	  similar	   ideas:	   “In	  his	   thesis	   proposing	   a	   concept	   of	   equilibrium,	  Nash	  himself	   suggested	  that	  equilibrium	  might	  arise	  from	  some	  ‘mass	  action’	  that	  adapted	  over	  time”.	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gradually	  reunite	  with	  the	  “higher	  level”	  thinkers	  in	  equilibrium	  (though,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  see	  Erev&Roth,	  1998).	  As	  Aumann	  puts	  it:	  	  	  “One	  of	  the	  simplest,	  yet	  most	  fundamental	  ideas	  in	  bounded	  rationality	  -­‐	  indeed,	  in	  game	  theory	  as	  a	  whole	  -­‐	  is	  that	  no	  rationality	  at	  all	  is	  required	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  Nash	  equilibrium;	  insects	  and	  even	  flowers	  can	  and	  do	  arrive	  at	  Nash	  equilibria,	  perhaps	  more	  reliably	  than	  human	  beings.”	  (Aumann,	  1997)	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  matching	  pennies	  game,	  2	  agents	  have	  to	  decide	  between	  2	  options,	  say	  “heads”	  or	  “tails”.	  One	  agent	  gets	  paid	  if	  both	  player	  match	  their	  choices,	  the	  other	  if	  they	  mismatch.	   In	   such	   a	   competitive	   (0-­‐sum)	   game	   any	   “pure	   strategy”	   (i.e.	   “always	   choose	  heads”,	  or	  “always	  choose	  tails”)	  can	  be	  exploited	  by	  one’s	  opponent.	  Indeed,	  in	  this	  game,	  there	   is	   no	   equilibrium	   in	   pure	   strategies.	   There	   is	   however	   an	   equilibrium	   in	  mixed	  
strategies	   which	   dictates	   that	   both	   agents	   should	   mix	   between	   options	   with	   a	   given	  probability,	  specifically,	  with	  probability,	  p=0.5,	  which	  is	  roughly	  what	  occurs.	  In	  line	  with	  Aumann’s	  words	  however,	  this	  doesn’t	  require	  rationality,	  but	  only	  that	  agents	  adapt	  their	  choices.	  	  Incidentally,	  non-­‐human	  primates	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  behave	  closer	  to	  Nash	  in	  a	  subset	   of	   interactions,	   such	   as	   “matching	   pennies	   games”	   (Martin	   et	   al.,	   2012)	   and	  Ultimatum	  Games	  (Jensen	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Sanfey	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  	  Thus,	   in	   some	   empirical	   cases,	   incentives	   and	   deductive	   rationality	   seem	   to	   work	  synergistically	   in	   constraining	   choices	   towards	   equilibrium:	   where	   some	   agents	   may	  “understand”	  the	  solution	  by	  introspection,	  and	  adopt	  it,	  the	  others	  should,	  as	  interactions	  unravel,	  get	  “hammered	  into	  it”	  by	  the	  payoff	  structure	  itself.	  Later	  on	  (in	  the	  discussion	  on	  entry	  games),	  we	  will	  also	  see	  how	  game	  theoretic	  predictions	  can	  be	  accurate	  even	  in	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the	  short	  run	  for	  some	  games,	  in	  which	  subjects	  reach	  equilibration,	  immediately,	  without	  communication,	   or	   feedback.	   “To	   a	   psychologist”,	   Daniel	   Kahneman	   said,	   “it	   looks	   like	  magic”	  (Kahneman,	  1988).	  	  	  
1.2.	  The	  failures	  of	  deduction	  	  	  In	   many	   instances,	   however,	   game-­‐theoretic	   predictions	   and	   deductive	   rationality	   are	  grossly	  off.	  One	  particularly	  strident	  example	   is	   the	   “centipede	  game”	   (Rosenthal,	  1981)	  (Fig	  3).	  Here,	  2	  players	  have	  in	  front	  of	  them	  2	  unequal	  piles	  of	  dollars;	  lets	  say,	  $4.00	  in	  one	  pile,	   and	   a	   single	   $1.00	  bill	   in	   the	  other.	   They	   then	   take	   turns	   choosing	  whether	   to	  “stop”	  or	   “continue”.	  Player	  1	   starts.	   If	  he	   stops	  he	  keeps	   the	  bigger	  pile,	  while	  player	  2	  gets	  the	  smaller	  pile.	  If	  he	  continues,	  the	  2	  piles	  are	  doubled	  and	  passed	  to	  player	  2	  (who	  thus	  receives	  2	  piles	  of	  $8.00	  and	  $2.00)	  who	  is	  in	  turn	  to	  decide	  whether	  stop	  (and	  keep	  the	  bigger	  pile),	  or	  pass	  back	  to	  1	  (getting	  both	  piles	  doubled	  again).	  Whoever	  stops	  gets	  the	   bigger	   pile,	   which	   is	   however	   doubled	   at	   each	   continuation.	   If	   at	   round	   6,	   the	   last	  round,	  player	  2	  continues,	  then	  player	  1	  obtains	  $256.00	  and	  player	  2	  gets	  $64.00.	  	  
	  Fig	  3.	  The	  centipede	  game	  (Rosenthal,	  1981)	  	  The	  paradox	  of	  this	  game	  is	  that	  both	  players	  should	  prefer	  the	  last-­‐period	  outcome	  to	  the	  1st	  period	  one.	  However,	  game	  theory	  sais	  that	  if	  they’re	  rational,	  they’ll	  never	  get	  to	  the	  last	  round,	  because	  the	  unique	  NE	  of	  this	  game	  is	  for	  the	  1st	  player	  to	  stop	  in	  the	  1st	  round.	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The	   reasoning	   is	   that	   in	   sequential	   games	   like	   this	   one	   -­‐	   in	  which	   agents	   take	   turns	   in	  making	   their	   choices,	   rather	   than	   choosing	   simultaneously	   -­‐	   game	   theoretic	   analysis	  prescribes	  player	  1	  to	  use	  “backward	  induction”	  (Gibbons,	  1992)	  and	  start	  examining	  the	  game	  by	   its	   final	   stage,	  when	  player	  2	   is	  deciding	  whether	   to	  pass	  or	  continue.	  Player	  1	  should	   in	   fact	   notice	   that,	   in	   his	   last	   decision,	   player	   2	   would	   essentially	   be	   choosing	  between	  stopping,	  and	  getting	  $128.00	  or	  continuing	  and	  getting	  $64.00.	  So,	  if	  player	  2	  is	  rational,	  he	  will	  never	  continue	  in	  the	  last	  stage.	  Thus,	  knowing	  that	  the	  last	  stage	  is	  “lost”,	  player	   1	   should	   stop	   in	   the	   2nd	   to	   last	   stage,	   to	   earn	   $64.00,	   rather	   than	   $32.00	   (his	  second-­‐best	  option).	  However,	  again,	  if	  player	  1	  thinks	  player	  2	  is	  rational,	  then	  player	  2	  should	  anticipate	  that	  player	  1	  will	  stop	  in	  the	  2nd	  to	   last	  stage	  and	  should	  thus	  not	  give	  him	   the	   possibility	   to	   do	   so,	   by	   stopping	   at	   the	   3rd	   to	   last	   stage.	   This	   correct	   reasoning	  unravels	  backwards	  towards	  an	  apparently	  incorrect	  ending,	  where	  player	  1	  stops	  at	  the	  1st	   turn	   and	   earns	   $4.00.	   Such	   a	   result	   is	   so	   strongly	   counterintuitive	   that	   for	   many	  players,	  Aumann	  said	  (1992)	  “if	   this	   is	  rationality,	   they	  want	  none	  of	   it”.	   Indeed,	   though	  learning	   has	   an	   effect	   in	   this	   game	   as	   well,	   NE-­‐play	   is	   still	   rarely	   observed	   (Palacios-­‐Huerta&Volij,	  2008).	  	  	  This	   paradox	   has	   led	   to	   a	   tremendous	   amount	   of	   work,	   and	   several	   accounts	   have	  emerged	  as	  to	  why	  these	  sorts	  of	  inconsistencies	  emerge.	  We	  talk	  about	  them	  here,	  not	  so	  much	  for	  this	  specific	  game	  –	  since,	  usually,	  if	  any	  “refinement”	  has	  received	  attention	  it	  is	  because	  it	  accommodates	  deviations	  from	  NE	  in	  many	  games	  -­‐	  rather,	  to	  show	  what	  type	  of	  adjustments	   seem	  necessary,	   if	  we	  want	   the	   “toy”	  agents	  of	  EUT	  and	  game	   theory,	   to	  look	  a	  little	  more	  like	  us.	  	  	  One	   of	   the	   largest	   classes	   of	   such	   explanations	   involve	   “social	   preferences”	   (i.e.	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Fehr&Camerer,	   2007).	  What	   such	  models	   have	   in	   common	   is	   that	   they	   relax	   the	   game-­‐theoretic	  assumption	  of	  self-­‐interest:	  players	  are	  no	   longer	  only	  motivated	  by	  their	  own	  payoffs,	  but	  they	  can	  “care”	  about	  others	  (i.e.	  about	  others’	  payoffs);	  where	  such	  “caring”	  can	   be	   declined	   in	   many	   different	   ways:	   a	   competitive	   subject	   will	   be	   happy	   to	   see	   a	  counterpart	  lose,	  an	  altruistic	  one,	  to	  see	  another	  win,	  others	  still	  could	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  ratio,	   the	   difference	   or	   other	   relations	   between	   payoffs	   (i.e.	   they	   make	   choices	   that	  maximize	  fairness)	  (Fehr&Schmidt,	  1999).	  In	  all	  such	  models,	  players	  remain	  for	  the	  rest	  “rational”,	   that	   is,	   they	   keep	  maximizing	   the	   utility,	   however,	   what	   has	   changed	   is	   that	  their	   payoffs	   become	   interdependent.	   In	   the	   centipede	   game	   for	   instance,	   the	   mere	  possibility	  that	  altruists	  exist	  can	  change	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  game,	  and	  its	  NE	  (McKelvey&	  Palfrey,	  1992).	  Since	  an	  altruist	  would	  place	  a	  positive	  weight	  on	  my	  own	  payoff,	  he	  could	  choose	  to	  “continue”	  just	  to	  benefit	  me.	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  rational	  self-­‐interested	  player	  could	  continue	   in	   turn,	   proportionally	   to	  his	   estimated	  probability	   (his	  belief)	   of	   having	   to	  do	  with	  an	  altruist.	  If	  both	  players	  were	  mutually	  altruistic,	  this	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  very	  different	  types	  of	  models	  argue	  that	  social-­‐preferences	  may	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  paradox,	  which	  may	  instead	  emerge	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  game	  theory	  implicitly	  assumes	  its	  agents	  to	  have	  unlimited	  computational	  abilities,	  which	  is	  generally	  not	   true	   for	   humans	   (i.e.	   Simon,	   1957).	   	   Indeed,	   games	   like	   the	   centipede	   game,	  which	  involve	  backward	  induction,	  and	  games	  like	  the	  beauty	  contest,	  involving	  iterated	  beliefs,	  can	   undoubtedly	   be	   computationally	   demanding	   (i.e.	   in	   terms	   of	   working	   memory).	  Indeed,	  mouse-­‐lab	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  agents	  that	  fail	  to	  converge	  to	  NE	  often	  don’t	  apprehend	   the	   necessary	   information	   to	   do	   the	   required	   backward	   induction	   (i.e.	   they	  don’t	  even	  look	  at	  what	  happens	  in	  hypothetical	  stages	  of	  the	  game	  –	  such	  as	  the	  last	  stage	  of	   centipede	   games)	   (Johnson	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Carrillo	   et	   al.,2008).	   Recent	   models	   of	   NE	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(“quantum	  response	  equilibria”)	  relax	  the	  assumption	  of	  unlimited	  cognitive	  resources	  by	  allowing	   agents	   to	   make	   small	   mistakes	   in	   their	   decision	   process	   (McKelvey&Palfrey,	  1995).	   Importantly,	   such	   mistakes	   are	   not	   random,	   but	   they	   will	   be	   attracted	   towards	  choices	   that	   can	   yield	   a	   higher	   payoff,	   as	   is	   choosing	   to	   “continue”	   in	   centipede	   games.	  Indeed,	   such	   models	   do	   predict	   that	   the	   probability	   of	   agents	   “stopping”	   in	   centipede	  games	  increases,	  as	  the	  game	  progressively	  approaches	  its	  end	  (McKelvey&Palfrey,	  1998),	  and	   they	   also	   yield	   better	   predictions	   in	   a	   number	   of	   other	   cases	   in	   which	   behavior	  apparently	   departed	   from	   NE.	   Critically,	   such	   models	   remain	   equilibrium	  models,	   they	  simply	   account	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   approach	   towards	   NE	   is	   probabilistic,	   rather	   than	  deterministic4.	  	  	  Finally,	   an	   intriguing	   literature	   on	   the	   “epistemic	   conditions	   for	   NE”	  (Aumann&Brandenburger,	   1995)	   calls	   into	   question	   what	   it	   means	   to	   have	   common	  knowledge	  of	  rationality,	   thus	  what	  players	  know	  about	  each	  other,	   their	   intentions	  and	  beliefs.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   idea	  out-­‐of-­‐equilibrium	  choices	   in	   centipede	  games	  are	  due	   to	  subjects	   hitting	   the	   roof	   of	   their	   cognitive	   limitations,	   such	   models	   suggest	   that	   an	  important	   role	   could	   be	   played	   by	   the	   uncertainty	   that	   subjects	   may	   have	   about	   the	  “limitations”	  of	  others.	  An	  interesting	  study	  by	  Palacios-­‐Huerta&Volij	  (2009)	  showed	  that	  agents	  that	  have	  no	  problems	  with	  backwards	  induction,	  such	  as	  chess	  players,	  choose	  the	  NE	  in	  centipede	  games	  70%	  of	  the	  time	  when	  playing	  with	  other	  chess	  players,	  and	  by	  the	  5th	  repetition	  of	  the	  game,	  they	  have	  learned	  to	  pick	  it	  always.	   If	   the	  players	  were	  grand	  masters,	  they	  chose	  it	  100%	  of	  the	  time	  on	  their	  first	  shot.	  These	  percentages	  however	  go	  down	  when	  chess	  players	  played	  with	  students.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  college	  students	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Camerer	  (2003)	  says	  that	  if	  Nash	  had	  been	  a	  statistician,	  rather	  than	  a	  mathematician,	  he	  would	  have	  invented	  quantal	  response	  equilibrium.	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play	  against	  other	  college	  students	  (the	  typical	  pool	  of	  behavioral	  economics	  studies),	  NE	  play	  was	  as	  low	  as	  3%,	  with	  no	  sign	  of	  convergence	  over	  repetition.	  The	  interesting	  thing	  however	  is	  that	  such	  a	  percentage	  was	  multiplied	  3-­‐fold	  -­‐	  that	  is	  students	  picked	  the	  NE	  immediately	  30%	  of	   the	  time	  –	  when	  students	  played	  against	  chess	  players,	  and	  70%	  of	  the	  time	  when	  they	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  learn.	  This	  is	  a	  clear	  indication	  that	  knowledge	  on	  the	  rationality	  of	  others	  can	  strongly	  affect	  strategizing	  and	  NE-­‐play	   in	   interactions.	  Though	  human	  abilities	  are	  limited,	  and	  these	  certainly	  play	  a	  role	  in	  many	  “irrational”	  behaviors,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that,	  more	  often	  than	  we	  think,	  humans	  seek	  to	  adapt	  their	  “rationality”	  and	   strategic	  behavior	   to	  what	   they	  perceive	  of	   the	   rationality	  of	   others.	   In	   a	   centipede	  game,	  if	  I	  believe	  my	  counterpart	  is	  rational,	  I	  could	  still	  have	  the	  doubt	  that	  he	  thinks	  I’m	  not.	   In	  which	  case,	  my	  counterpart	  could	  have	  the	  temptation	  to	  “continue”,	  which	  gives	  me	   some	   incentive	   to	   “continue”	   as	  well.	   It	   follows	   that,	   on	   top	  of	   talent	   or	  practice,	   an	  important	   factor	   in	   inducing	   the	   recursive	   thinking	   that	   unravels	   towards	   Nash,	   as	  Palacios-­‐Huerta&Volij	   (2009)	  put	   it	   -­‐	  and	  Aumann&Brandenburger	  (1995)	   formalize	   -­‐	   is	  neither	   that	  you	  are	   rational,	  nor	   that	   I	   am,	  and	  not	  even	   that	  we	  are	  both	   rational,	  but	  common	  knowledge	  of	  rationality	  is	  the	  key.	  	  	  In	   the	   examples	   we	   showed	   so	   far	   however	   we	   focused	   on	   games	   with	   a	   specific	  characteristic:	  they	  have	  a	  unique	  NE.	  This	  gives	  the	  “common	  knowledge”	  assumption	  a	  specifically	  deductive	  connotation	  (i.e.	  students	  and	  chess	  players	   in	  the	  centipede	  game	  were	  interested	  in	  how	  “smart”	  their	  counterparts	  were	  likely	  to	  be);	  that	  is,	  the	  only	  way	  subjects	   had	   to	   infer	   the	   choices	   of	   others	  was	   to	   believe	   they	  were	   rational	   and,	   so	   to	  speak,	   deduction	   was	   the	   only	   “common	   language”.	   However,	   what	   happens	   when	  deduction	   seems	   to	   lead	   nowhere,	   how	   are	   agents	   supposed	   to	   infer	   beliefs	   then?	   This	  problem	  emerges	  in	  games	  with	  multiple	  equilibria,	  in	  which,	  with	  no	  deductive	  common	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knowledge	  available,	  agents	  must	  find	  some	  other	  common	  form	  of	  knowledge	  that	  may	  allow	  them	  to	  coordinate	  their	  choices	  and	  infer	  their	  beliefs.	  	  
1.3.	  Coordination	  games	  	  	  For	   the	   games	   we	   described	   so	   far,	   we	   said	   that	   NE	   does	   prescribe	   a	   unique	   solution,	  though	   agents	   may	   or	   may	   not	   “get	   it”	   (i.e.	   because	   they	   have	   limited	   computational	  abilities),	  or	  they	  may	  think	  others	  don’t	  get	  it	  (or	  that	  others	  think	  they	  won’t	  get	  it).	  In	  games	  with	  multiple	  equilibria	  it’s	  often	  the	  contrary:	  deductive	  rationality	  says	  nothing,	  and,	  if	  anything,	  humans	  are	  often	  able	  to	  tacitly	  coordinate	  their	  choices.	  The	  2	  games	  we	  opened	  with,	  SHs	  and	  EGs,	  are	  games	  of	  this	  type.	  So	  to	  answer	  our	  question	  about	  social	  cohesion,	  we	  must	  understand	  what	  mechanisms	  can	  guide	  coordination.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  assumption	  of	  game	  theory,	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  common	  knowledge	  is	  critical	  for	  this,	  and	  we	   will	   begin	   to	   highlight	   the	   apparently	   intricate	   connections	   between	   common	  knowledge	  and	  similarity.	  	  	  
1.3.1.	  Coordination	  and	  intuition	  	  Coordination	   in	   its	   purest,	   and	   the	   clear	   failure	   of	   deduction,	   can	   be	   demonstrated	   by	  “pure	   matching	   games”	   (Schelling,	   1960).	   Consider	   a	   game	   in	   which	   2	   agents	   choose	  between	   “heads”	   and	   “tails”.	   If	   they	  match	   they	  win	   (i.e.	   $100),	   if	   they	   don’t,	   they	   lose	  ($100).	  This	  game	  has	  2	  equilibria	  in	  pure	  strategies:	  if	  both	  players	  choose	  A,	  neither	  has	  incentive	   to	  deviate;	   the	  same	  holds	   if	  both	  choose	  B	   (and	   there’s	  also	  a	  mixed	  strategy	  equilibria	   in	  which	  both	  players	  randomize	  with	  probability	  p=1/2).	  That’s	  all	  economic	  deduction	  can	  say,	  since	  the	  payoffs	  alone	  do	  not	  make	  any	  distinction	  between	  strategies.	  However,	  the	  labels	  do,	  and	  subjects	  have	  been	  shown,	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  this	  very	  easily,	  by	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choosing	  “heads”	  87%	  of	  the	  time	  (Mehta	  et	  al.,	  1994),	  by	  choosing	  “Everest”	  among	  the	  set	  of	  mountains	   and	  Ford	  among	   the	   set	  of	   cars.	  The	   failure	  of	  deductive	   rationality	   in	  such	  games	  is	  clear,	  as	  Schelling	  pointed	  out:	  	  “One	  cannot,	  without	  empirical	  evidence,	  deduce	  what	  understandings	  can	  be	  perceived	  in	  a	   nonzero-­‐sum	   game	   of	   maneuver	   any	   more	   than	   one	   can	   prove,	   by	   purely	   formal	  deduction,	  that	  a	  particular	  joke	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  funny"	  (Schelling,	  1960,	  p.	  140).	  	  	  What	  is	  remarkable	  of	  such	  games,	  is	  the	  flexibility	  and	  resilience	  with	  which	  humans	  find	  novel	  dimensions	  of	  stimuli	   to	  use	  as	  coordination	  devices.	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	  example	  above,	  suppose	  we	  wanted	  to	  try	  and	  break	  coordination	  by	  calling	  the	  labels	  “heads”	  and	  “heads”,	   rather	   than	   “heads”	   and	   “tails”.	   Now	   not	   even	   the	   labels	   differentiate	   between	  strategies.	   Yet,	   subjects	  will	   still	   be	   able	   to	   coordinate	   on	   the	   top-­‐left	   strategy,	   because	  “upper-­‐leftness”	   now	   appears	   psychologically	   prominent	   	   –	   at	   least	   in	  western	   cultures	  that	  read	  from	  left	  to	  right.	  One	  could	  try	  further,	  by	  removing	  even	  the	  graphical	  display	  and	   presenting	   the	   matching	   problem	   orally	   (and	   with	   the	   same	   names	   for	   both	  strategies).	   Still,	   I	   think	   subjects	  would	   coordinate	  on	   the	  1st	   of	   the	  2	  proposed	  options,	  because	   temporal	   antecedence	   is	   salient	   (the	   “logic”	   of	   “finders	   keepers”).	   Similarly,	   a	  game	  requiring	  to	  match	  numbers,	  out	  of	  the	  set	  of	  numbers	  has	  infinite	  NE,	  however	  the	  number	   “1”	   was	   chosen	   29%	   of	   the	   times.	   Schelling	   calls	   these	   characteristics	   “focal”	  (1960),	  where	  the	  ability	  to	  establish	  focality	  is	  clearly	  far	  from	  the	  type	  of	  deduction	  we	  spoke	  of	  in	  the	  games	  with	  a	  single	  NE	  seen	  above.	  	  	  
1.3.2.	  Coordination	  and	  common	  knowledge	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However,	   focality	   is	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   our	   ability	   to	   establish	   salience.	   It	   is	  about	   understanding	  what	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  mutually	  understood	   as	   salient.	   A	   rather	   clear	  example:	  a	  matching	  game	  in	  which	  agents	  are	  to	  coordinate	  their	  choices	  by	  choosing	  a	  common	   year	   has	   also	   infinite	   NE.	   However,	   when	   this	   experiment	   was	   ran,	   in	   1990	  (Mehta	   et	   al.,	   1994),	   61%	  of	   subjects	   chose	  1990.	   Indeed,	   the	  present	   is	   another	   strong	  element	  of	  focality,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  shared	  by	  all.	  However,	  when	  the	  same	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	   simply	   pick	   a	   year,	   without	   the	   objective	   of	   coordinating,	   43	   different	   years	   were	  chosen:	  1971	  was	  picked	  8%	  of	  the	  time,	  plausibly	  since	  most	  of	  the	  subjects	  in	  that	  pool	  were	  born	  that	  year,	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  picking	  1990	  dropped	  to	  6.8%.	  What	  this	   says	   is	   that	   salience	   is	   personal,	   focality	   is	   shared,	   and	   it	   is	   focality	   that	   drives	  coordination:	   it	   isn’t	  what	   subjects	  personally	  prefer,	  but	  what	   they	   think	   they	  could	  all	  
agree	  on	  preferring.	  Again,	  it	  follows	  that	  common	  knowledge	  is	  key,	  however,	  in	  contrast	  with	  games	  with	  a	  single	  NE,	  it	  cannot	  be	  based	  on	  rationality	  in	  strictly	  deductive	  sense.	  
The	  ability	  to	  coordinate	  relies	  on	  the	  extent	  in	  which	  we	  believe	  others	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  
as	  we	  do,	  that	  is,	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  there	  is	  common	  knowledge.	  	  	  For	   instance,	   people	   coordinate	   on	   “heads”	   rather	   than	   tails,	   but	   is	   it	   intrinsically	  more	  rational	   than	   tails?	   Clearly	   not.	   A	   different	   cultural	   system,	  with	   a	   different	   established	  convention	  of	  expressing	  the	  notion	  of	  “heads	  or	  tails”	  (i.e.	  “tails	  or	  heads”),	  could	  have	  as	  successfully	   coordinated	   on	   tails.	   Furthermore,	   were	   2	   agents	   of	   2	   such	   different	  (hypothetical)	   cultures	   to	   interact,	  we	  could	  predict	   that	   they	  would	  miscoordinate,	  and	  conflict	  could	  emerge.	  This	  was	  studied	  by	  Weber&Camerer	  (2003).	   In	   their	  experiment	  subjects	   looked	  at	  a	  photograph	  depicting	  many	  objects.	  One	  subject,	   the	  speaker,	  had	  a	  list	  of	  such	  objects	  and	  had	  to	  tell	   the	  other	  to	  point	  at	   the	  corresponding	  objects	   in	   the	  picture	  with	  a	  penalty	  for	  being	  slow.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  experiment	  it	  could	  take	  the	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speaker	  as	   long	  as	  30s	  to	  direct	  attention	  towards	  a	  man	  gesticulating	  with	  his	  hands	  in	  front	  of	  the	  desk.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  the	  speaker	  readily	  said	  “Macarena”	  and	  this	   was	   immediately	   understood.	   When	   subjects	   from	   different	   pairs	   were	   mixed,	  response	   times	   shot	   back	   up	   again,	   because	   speakers	   kept	   using	   their	   previously	  established	  conventions	  with	  listeners	  who	  had	  developed	  different	  ones.	  Both	  agents	  of	  the	   new	   dysfunctional	   firm	   also	   blamed	   one	   another,	   rather	   than	   the	   contingent	  difficulties	   of	   “inter-­‐cultural”	  mediation.	   Though	   some	   conventions	  may	   seem	   smart,	   in	  coordination	  games,	  it	  isn’t	  deductive	  rationality	  that	  leads	  to	  agreement,	  it	  is	  agreement	  that	  makes	  outcomes	  rational.	  Camerer	  appropriately	  cites	  Pascal,	  “Why	  do	  we	  follow	  old	  laws	   and	   old	   opinions?	   Because	   they	   are	   better?	   No,	   but	   they	   are	   unique,	   and	   remove	  sources	  of	  diversity”.	  	  
1.3.3.	  Games	  with	  Pareto-­‐ranked	  equilibria:	  an	  efficiency	  problem	  	  This	   doesn’t	   seem	   to	   be	   exactly	   the	   case	   for	   games	   with	   pareto-­‐ranked	   equilibria	   (see	  below),	   such	   as	   SHs.	   Agreeing	   on	   a	   convention	   would	   be	   uncontroversial	   if	   agents	   are	  completely	   indifferent	   between	   the	   convention	   alternatives.	   However,	   in	   games	   with	  pareto-­‐ranked	  equilibria	   the	   alternatives	   left	   open	  by	  deduction	  are	   different:	   in	   the	  SH	  case,	  one	  of	  the	  2	  equilibria	  is	  (Pareto-­‐)	  efficient,	  as	  both	  players	  earn	  more,	  the	  other	  is	  not5.	   In	  spite	  of	   this,	  coordination	  failure	  was	  found	  to	  be	  extremely	   frequent6.	  This	  was	  first	   observed	   by	   Cooper	   et	   al.	   1990.	   Below	   (Fig.	   4)	  we	   show	   the	  matrix	   of	   the	   group’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  When	  I	  was	  first	  told	  the	  SH	  payoffs,	  I	  found	  it	  completely	  trivial:	  I	  was	  going	  to	  go	  for	  the	  high	   payoff,	   and	   I	   was	   virtually	   100%	   sure	   that	   my	   counterpart	   would	   have	   done	   the	  same.	  I	  clearly	  noticed	  that,	  on	  paper,	  the	  higher	  payoff	  was	  also	  risky,	  but	  I	  held	  it	  to	  be	  a	  risk	  under	  our	  complete	  control.	  	  	  6	  By	   coordination	   failures,	   accepting	   the	   suggestion	   of	   Devetag&Ortmann,	   we	   intend	  failures	  to	  coordinate	  on	  the	  pareto-­‐efficient	  outcome,	  though	  it	  could	  also	  mean	  failure	  to	  coordinate	  on	  any	  of	  the	  2	  equilibria.	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replication	  in	  1992,	  the	  column/row	  labels	  are	  here	  modified	  to	  align	  with	  the	  stag/risk	  story7.	  	  
STAG	  HUNT	  	   Stag	  (risk)	   Hare	  (safe)	  
Stag	  	   1000,	  1000	  	   0,	  800	  
Hare	  	   800,	  0	   800,	  800	  Fig.	  4.	  Payoffs	  of	  one	  of	  the	  first	  incentive-­‐compatible	  laboratory	  stag	  hunt	  games	  conducted	  by	  Cooper	  et	  al.	  (1990,	  1992).	  Points	  were	  probability	  points,	  with	  1000	  points	  leading	  to	  $1.00	  with	  certainty.	  The	  game	  has	  2	  equilibria	   in	  pure	   strategies:	   if	  both	  players	  are	   choosing	   to	   risk,	  neither	  has	  an	   incentive	   to	  deviate,	   as	  occurs	  if	  they	  both	  choose	  to	  stay	  safe,	  thus	  the	  strategy	  profiles	  (that	  is,	  the	  combinations	  of	  choices	  by	  all	  players)	   {stag,	   stag}	   and	   {hare,	   hare}	   are	   the	   2	   pure-­‐strategy	   NE	   of	   the	   game.	   There	   is	   also	   a	   very	  counterintuitive	  mixed	  strategy	  equilibria	  which	  we	  don’t	  talk	  about	  here	  (and	  which	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  work	  at	  all).	  	  In	  that	  study	  (Cooper	  et	  al.,	  1992),	  when	  collapsing	  over	  the	  last	  11	  periods	  of	  the	  game,	  97%	  of	  subjects	  (out	  of	  165)	  chose	  the	  secure	  option.	  Nearly	  simultaneously,	  Van	  Huyck	  et	  al.	   (1990,	   1991)	   showed	   that	   similar	   inefficient	   outcomes	   occurred	  when	   the	  multiple-­‐equilibria	   were	   more	   than	   2,	   such	   as	   in	   “weak-­‐link”	   or	   “median”	   games.	   This	   was	  unsettling,	  as	  games	  with	  pareto-­‐ranked	  equilibria	  appeared	  to	  have	  a	  2-­‐fold	  problem:	  not	  only	  game	  theory	  appeared	  unequipped	  to	  analyze	  them	  (like	  for	  the	  other	  coordination	  games)	  (though,	   for	  a	  notable	  exception,	  see	  the	  global	  games	  framework,	  Carlssen&Van	  Damme,	   1993);	   but	   outcomes	   were	   also	   inefficient	   (and	   rather	   unsocial).	   Indeed,	   such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Here,	  we	  call	  the	  available	  options	  with	  the	  name	  of	  the	  stag	  story,	  though	  we	  will	  often	  call	   the	   stag	   option	   the	   “risky”	   one,	   and	   the	   hare	   option	   the	   “safe”	   one.	   In	   other	  experiments,	   the	   stag	   option	   is	   often	   treated	   as	   “effort”	   levels.	   This	   terminology	   is	  incorrect	  in	  economics,	  for	  which	  the	  term	  “risk”	  uniquely	  indicates	  forms	  of	  uncertainty	  with	  known	  probabilities.	  Harsanyi&Selten	  (1988)	  do	  speak	  of	  risk	  in	  the	  context	  of	  SHs,	  but	   their	   definition	   regards	   the	   equilibria,	   not	   the	   strategies.	   The	   stag	   option	   should	  be	  called	   the	   Pareto-­‐dominant,	   Pareto-­‐superior	   or	   efficient	   equilibrium.	   However,	   for	   non-­‐economists,	   I	  believe	   the	   term	  “risk”	   is	  more	  appealing	   to	  describe	   the	   tension	  between	  safety	  and	  efficiency	  which	  is	  typically	  observed	  in	  order-­‐statistic	  games.	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findings	  sparked	  a	  wave	  of	  follow-­‐up	  studies	  (reviewed	  in	  Devetag&Ortman),	  the	  majority	  of	  which	  probed	  the	  reasons	  for	  such	  inefficiency.	  	  	  A	   first	   important	   idea	   seemed	   to	   justify	   indifference	   between	   conventions.	   Indeed,	   an	  important	  realization	  is	  that	  inefficiency	  doesn’t	  always	  occur:	  one	  can	  easily	  imagine	  that	  as	   the	   SP	   value	   approaches	   0,	   agents	   should	   be	   more	   and	   more	   willing	   to	   risk.	  Harsanyi&Selten	  (1988)	  formalized	  this	  concept	  and	  suggested	  the	  existence	  of	  2	  criteria	  for	  equilibrium	  selection	  in	  SHs:	  payoff	  dominance	  and	  risk	  dominance.	  In	  SHs,	  the	  {stag,	  stag}	   outcome	   always	   constitutes	   the	   payoff	   dominant	   equilibrium,	   while	   the	   risk-­‐dominant	  equilibria	  depends	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  hare,	  that	  is,	  of	  SP:	  if	  the	  value	  of	  risking	  is	  sufficiently	  higher	   than	   the	  value	  of	   security,	   then	  both	  criteria	  coincide,	  and	   the	   theory	  predicts	  that	  subjects	  should	  choose	  the	  efficient	  outcome;	  if,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  can	  be	  only	  marginally	  profit	  by	  risking,	  then,	  faced	  with	  the	  failure	  of	  deduction,	  agents	  may	  choose	   the	   risk-­‐dominant	   SP.	   For	  our	   symmetric	   SH	  games	   (Fig.	   1),	  where	   the	   stag	  was	  worth	   1,	   risk-­‐dominance	   predicts	   that	   agents	   should	   risk	   when	   SP<1/2,	   mix	   strategies	  when	  SP=1/2,	  and	  stop	  risking	  for	  values	  of	  SP>1/2,	  which	  is	  (only	  very)	  roughly	  what	  is	  observed	  (i.e.	  Rankin	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  This	  meant	  that,	  in	  some	  cases,	  agents	  could	  behave	  as	  
if	  they	  were	  playing	  against	  a	  chance8.	  It	  remained	  disturbing	  that	  they	  should	  be	  unable	  to	   behaviorally	   agree	   on	   an	   outcome	   that	   is	   favorable	   to	   both	   and	   that	   they	   tended	   to	  choose	  security	  when	   they	  had	   to	  expect	   from	  one	  another	  anything	  more	   than	  random	  behavior	  (that	  is	  when	  SP>1/2).	  	  Rankin,	  Huyck&Battalio	   (2000)	  made	   an	   interesting	   alternative	   suggestion:	   perhaps	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  As	   Aumann&Dreze	   (2004)	   put	   it,	   “…	   games	   against	   nature	   and	   strategic	   games	   are	   in	  principle	  quite	  similar,	  and	  can	  –perhaps	  should–	  be	  treated	  similarly”.	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problem	   had	   to	   do	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   players	   were	   “getting	   stuck”	   in	   consistent	   but	  unfavorable	  conventions.	  Indeed,	  a	  feature	  that	  seems	  to	  stick	  out	  in	  SHs	  is	  that,	  whereas	  learning	  often	  leads	  to	  increased	  “rationality”	  in	  some	  games	  with	  unique	  NE	  (as	  we	  saw	  earlier	   for	  beauty	  contexts,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	   for	  the	  centipede	  game),	   it	  seemed	  to	  do	  the	   contrary	   in	   SHs:	   it	   appeared	   to	   drive	   towards	   inefficiency.	   While	   the	   majority	   of	  subjects	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  coordinate	  on	  the	  secure	  options	  in	  early	  trials,	  during	  the	  last	  ones,	   safety	  appeared	  by	   far	   to	  be	   the	  prominent	  strategy	   (Battalio,	  1997).	  Rankin	  et	  al.	  had	   the	   intriguing	   intuition	   that	   this	  was	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  miscoordination	   on	   early	  trials	  may	  have	  been	  anchored	  to	  non-­‐strategic	  details	  of	  the	  game	  presentation,	  such	  as	  specific	  payoffs	  or	  strategy	  labels.	  They	  thus	  attempted	  to	  “perturb	  learning”	  by	  pseudo-­‐randomly	   changing	   SH	   payoffs	   and	   scrambling	   labels,	   to	   see	   what	   convention	   would	  emerge	  when	  the	  only	  commonality	  between	  games	  was	  their	  “strategic	  similarity”,	   that	  is,	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   all	   involved	   a	   choice	   between	   security	   and	   efficiency.	   To	   allow	   for	  different	   possible	   culture-­‐specific	   conventions	   to	   emerge,	   subjects	   played	   in	   segregated	  groups	   of	   8,	   and	  were	   randomly	   re-­‐matched,	  within	   their	   group,	   at	   each	   round.	   Group-­‐conventions	   did	   emerge,	   and	   they	   all	   tended	   towards	   efficiency:	   even	  when	   the	   SP	  was	  larger	  than	  ½,	  subjects	  kept	  cooperating.	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  this	  SH	  setting	  and	  others	   appears	   to	   be	   that	   here	   there	   were	   many	   games	   with	   rather	   low	   SPs.	   Its	   as	   if	  subjects	   had	   to	   learn	   how	   to	   rely	   on	   one	   another	   in	   situations	   in	   which	   coordination	  failure	  was	  less	  costly	  (i.e.	  learning	  how	  to	  swim	  in	  shallow	  water).	  Then,	  seeing	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  do	  so	  successfully	  created	  a	  common	  history	  or	  convention	  for	  cooperation,	  which	  was	   then	  more	  easily	  extendable	   to	  games	  with	  greater	  risk.	  Similar	  results	  were	  shown	   by	   Brandts&Cooper	   (2004).	   They	   showed	   that	   groups	   that	   had	   got	   “stuck”	   in	  inefficient	   equilibria/conventions	   could	   get	   “unstuck”	   by	   a	   sudden	   increase	   in	   the	  incentive	  to	  cooperate.	  Once	  such	  incentives	  were	  subsequently	  decreased,	  changing	  back	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to	   the	   way	   they	   were,	   agents	   didn’t	   change	   back	   with	   them.	   All	   this	   suggests	   that	   the	  tradeoff	   between	   social	   efficiency	   and	   security	   is	   indeed	   fragile,	   but	   that	   agents	   do	   not	  seem	  indifferent	  between	  these	  2	  conventions,	  they	  also	  all	  seem	  to	  prefer	  the	  same	  one.	  However,	   though	   they	   seem	   to	   require	   some	   common	   history	   of	   successes	   in	   order	   to	  realize	  this.	  	  	  
1.3.4.	  SHs	  and	  communication	  	  The	   strongest	   suggestion	   that	   there	   is	   common	   knowledge	   on	   whether	   the	   efficient	   or	  secure	  convention	  is	  preferable	  in	  SHs	  is	  that	  agents	  quickly	  agree	  when	  they	  are	  allowed	  to	  communicate,	  as	  shown	  by	  Cooper	  et	  al.	  (1992).	  Indeed,	  in	  their	  experiment,	  relative	  to	  the	   normal/tacit	   SH,	   in	   which	   successful	   coordination	   never	   occurred,	   when	   1-­‐way	  communication	  was	  allowed	  (so	  that	  1	  player	  could	  announce	  his/her	  announce	  decision	  to	   the	   other),	   53%	   of	   the	   agents	   reached	   efficient	   coordination.	   However,	   when	   2-­‐way	  communication	   was	   allowed,	   coordination	   was	   almost	   at	   roof,	   at	   91%.	   SHs	   are	   very	  particular	  in	  this	  sense.	  	  	  For	  instance,	  consider	  a	  close	  relative	  of	  the	  SH	  also	  involving	  potential	  cooperation:	  the	  notorious	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  (PD)9.	  	  	  
Prisoner’s	  Dilemma	   Cooperate	   Defect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Like	  the	  SH,	  PDs	  have	  a	  story:	  2	  suspects	  are	  being	  held	  in	  custody	  for	  interrogation	  in	  separate	  rooms	  and	  they	  both	  have	  2	  options.	  If	  they	  cooperate	  by	  not	  confessing	  they	  get	  3	  years	  of	  prison	  each	  (because	  of	  insufficient	  proof).	  If	  they	  both	  confess	  they	  get	  4	  years.	  If	  however,	  one	  confesses	  and	  the	  other	  doesn’t	  the	  one	  who	  does	  gets	  a	  “get	  out	  jail	  free	  card”	  (0	  years	  of	  prison).	  If	  we	  now	  change	  the	  payoffs	  from	  losses	  (time	  in	  jail)	  to	  gains	  (i.e.	  by	  simply	  adding	  10	  to	  all	  the	  payoffs),	  we	  can	  preserve	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  PD,	  and	  confront	  it	  to	  the	  SH.	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Cooperate	   7	  ,	  7	   0	  ,	  10	  
Defect	   10	  ,	  0	   6	  ,	  6	  	  
Stag	  Hunt	   Cooperate	   Defect	  
Cooperate	   7	  ,	  7	   0	  ,	  6	  
Defect	   6	  ,	  0	   6	  ,	  6	  	  
Battle	  of	  the	  Sexes	   Box	   Ballet	  
Box	   10	  ,	  6	   0	  ,	  0	  
Ballet	   0	  ,	  0	   6	  ,	  10	  	  The	  critical	  difference	  is	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  SHs,	  PDs	  have	  a	  unique	  NE	  (in	  pure	  strategies),	  which	   is	   to	   defect	   (defecting	   strictly	   dominates	   cooperating,	   because	   it	   pays	   off	   more	  whatever	  one’s	  counterpart	  does).	  The	  apparently	  modest	  change	  in	  payoffs	  can	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  communication	  because	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  interactions	  are	  competitive	  they	  can	  generate	   an	   incentive	   to	   lie	   (i.e.	   bluffing	   in	   poker	   or	   price	   shading).	   Indeed,	   though	  communication	  does	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  in	  PDs,	  meta-­‐analytic	  reviews	  suggest	  that	  the	  increase	   in	   cooperation	   is	   around	   40%	   (Sally,	   1995;	   though	   see	   Balliet	   2009	   for	  moderating	  effects),	  far	  less	  than	  in	  SHs.	  Indeed,	  communication	  seems	  to	  even	  add	  some	  drama	  to	  the	  game	  and	  a	  number	  of	  TV	  game	  shows	  –	  i.e.	  “golden	  balls”	  –	  had	  participants	  talk	  their	  choices	  over	  for	  large	  monetary	  stakes	  in	  what	  were	  actually	  PD	  variants.	  It	  was	  probably	   considered	   entertaining	   to	  watch	  many	   participants	   solemnly	   give	   their	  word	  that	   they	  would	  cooperate,	  only	   to	  subsequently	  defect,	  either	  alone	  or	   together.	  This	   is	  also	  suggested	  by	  the	  different	  subjective	  impact	  lies	  have	  once	  they	  are	  revealed:	  in	  SHs,	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if	  one	  announces	  to	  cooperate	  and	  then	  doesn’t,	  he/she	  might	  simply	  be	  viewed	  as	  obtuse	  or	   excessively	   fearful.	   Lying	   in	   PDs	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   most	  manipulative	  and	  spiteful	  betrayal,	  since	  agents	  benefit	  from	  convincing	  lies.	  10	  For	  similar	  reasons	  economists	  call	  non-­‐binding	  communication	  “cheap-­‐talk”.	  The	  reason	  why	  cheap-­‐talk	   seems	   to	   work	   so	   well	   in	   SHs,	   is	   that	   SHs	   are	   the	   “building	   blocks	   of	   strategic	  complementarities”	  (Camerer,	  2003):	  situations	  in	  which	  increased	  effort/risk/action	  on	  the	  part	  of	  one	  party	  generates	  incentive	  for	  another	  party	  to	  do	  the	  same	  (I.e.	  a	  company	  increasing	   production	   and	   sales	   in	   cars,	   generates	   a	   another	   company	   to	   increase	  production	   of	   fuel),	   with	   no	   incentive	   to	   defect.	   Indeed,	   by	   introducing	   “half-­‐way”	  differences	   in	  agents’	  goals,	   the	  effects	  of	  communication	  change	  as	  well.	   In	  the	  battle	  of	  the	  sexes	  game	  (BOS),	  2	  agents,	   John	  and	  Mary,	  would	  both	   like	   to	  go	  out	   together,	  and	  this	   is	   their	   main	   objective.	   However,	   (to	   invert	   the	   standard	   gender-­‐stereotype)	   John	  would	  prefer	  to	  go	  see	  a	  ballet	  show,	  while	  Mary	  prefers	  the	  boxing	  match.	  Like	  for	  the	  SH,	  BOS	  has	  2	  equilibria	   in	  pure	   strategies	   (and	  1	  mixed	   strategy	  NE)	   in	  which	  both	  agents	  either	   choose	   “box”	   or	   both	   choose	   “ballet”.	   Thus,	   agents	   have	   a	   common	   set	   of	   goals.	  However,	   critically,	   they	  disagree	  on	  which	  of	   the	   two	   should	  be	   chosen.	  Uncertainty	   in	  such	  situations	  is	  very	  high,	  as	  one	  should	  concur	  by	  trying	  to	  make	  a	  “rational”	  choice	  in	  the	  payoff	  matrix	  shown	  above	   (Fig.	   ).	   In	   line	  with	   this,	   choice	  percentages	  observed	  by	  Cooper	   et	   al.,	   1994	   were	   close	   to	   the	   mixed	   equilibria	   of	   the	   game:	   59%	   chance	   of	  miscoordination.	  Like	  for	  the	  SHs,	  Cooper	  et	  al.	  confronted	  the	  effects	  of	  1-­‐way	  and	  2-­‐way	  communication	   on	   the	   BOSs.	   The	   revealed	   pattern	   was	   different:	   like	   for	   SHs,	   1-­‐way	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Interestingly	  however,	  the	  same	  reverberant	  fear	  of	  SHs,	  could	  easily	  be	  playing	  a	  role	  in	   PDs.	   For	   instance,	   maybe	   agent	   are	   not	   lying	   when	   they	   profess	   their	   intentions	   to	  cooperate	  but	  they	  get	  scared	  at	  the	  last	  moment,	  thinking	  that	  others	  may	  have	  lied,	  or,	  because	  they	  think	  the	  other	  may	  doubt	  their	  trustworthiness	  at	  the	  last	  minute.	  Indeed,	  there	  are	  many	  commonalities	  between	  SHs	  and	  PDs.	  For	  instance,	  Camerer	  (2003)	  notes	  that	  when	  PDs	   are	   repeated	  under	   certain	   conditions	   (with	  high	   enough	  discounting	  or	  altruism	  parameters)	  they	  mathematically	  become	  SHs.	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communication	   facilitated	   coordination,	   agents	   tended	   to	   announce	   their	   preferred	  equilibria	   (i.e.	   the	   John-­‐players	   announced	   they	   would	   be	   going	   to	   ballet)	   and	   their	  counterparts	  (the	  “Marys”)	  tended	  to	  accommodate,	  yielding	  a	  coordination	  rate	  of	  95%.	  Interestingly	   however,	   in	   contrast	   to	   SHs,	   adding	   2-­‐way	   communication	   didn’t	   further	  better	   coordination	   rates,	   instead,	   it	   brought	   them	   back	   down	   to	   roughly	  where	   it	  was	  before	  (Cooper	  et	  al.	  1992,).	  It	  seems	  that	  1-­‐way	  communication	  worked	  as	  a	  “tie-­‐breaker”	  (Camerer,	  2003)	  offering	  some	  way	  to	  coordinate	  choices,	  however	  2-­‐way	  communication	  simply	   re-­‐instantiated	   the	   conflict.	   In	   few	   games,	   the	   cumulative	   effect	   of	   common	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  in	  1-­‐way	  and	  2-­‐way	  communication,	  reduces	  uncertainty	  as	  in	  SHs.	  	  	  Often,	  people	  tend	  to	  not	  think	  much	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  strategic	  interactions	  because	  they	  think,	  “well,	  that’s	  what	  language	  is	  for”:	  its	  easy	  to	  know/predict	  the	  intentions	  of	  others	  because	  we	  talk	  about	  them	  all	  the	  time.	  We	  already	  saw	  that	  1	  fundamental	  flaw	  of	  this	  argument	   is	   that	   it	   doesn’t	   hold	   in	   competitive	   situations,	   where	   communication	   and	  mutually	   increased	   predictability	   (i.e.	   common	   knowledge)	   seem	   to	   lead	   to	   an	   increase	  rather	  than	  an	  increase	  in	  uncertainty.	  A	  second	  flaw	  is	  that	  there	  are	  so	  many	  situations	  in	  which	  agents	   logistically	  cannot	  all	   talk	  to	  one	  another	  (indeed,	  all	   large	  scale	  market	  interactions	  are	  of	  this	  type).	  However,	  the	  counter-­‐argument	  that	  I	  find	  most	  intriguing,	  is	   that	   communication	   too	   seems	   to	   require	   common	   knowledge.	   The	   question	   here	  becomes:	  how	  can	  we	  be	  fully	  sure	  of	  what	  others	  understand	  of	  our	  utterances,	  unless	  we	  admit	  some	  common	  back	  ground	  knowledge.	  Think	  of	  teaching:	  if	  conveying	  knowledge	  was	   simply	   about	   communicating,	   then	   teaching	  would	   always	   be	   snap,	  while	   it	   is	   not.	  Indeed,	   this	   is	   plausibly	   why	   its	   success	   is	   evaluated	   by	   counter-­‐interrogation	   of	   the	  teacher	   to	   the	   student	   (i.e.	   tests).	   Indeed,	   it	   appears	   that	   2-­‐way	   and	   not	   1-­‐way	  communication	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  successful	  communication;	  if	  doubts	  still	  remain,	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more	  communication	  and	   “testing”	  may	  be	  necessary,	  and	  we	  may	  well	  have	   to	  go	  back	  and	  forth	  several	  times,	  to	  make	  sure	  we	  mean	  the	  same	  thing	  by	  a	  given	  proposition.	  	  This	  back	   and	   forth	   assuring	   however	   is	   a	   burden	   in	   terms	   of	   time.	   Non-­‐linguistic	   “mind-­‐reading”	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  would	  be	  costless,	  and,	  in	  a	  sense,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  nothing	  mysterious	   about	   it:	   it	   could	   easily	   occur	   to	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  we	   assume	   that	   others	  know	   what	   we	   do.	   For	   instance,	   a	   doctor	   would	   probably	   take	   much	   less	   to	   explain	   a	  medical	  problem	  to	  another	  doctor	  than	  to	  a	  non-­‐doctor	  (i.e.	  a	  patient).	  This	  “making	  sure”	  is	  what	  many	   feel	   is	   the	   crux	   of	   SHs,	  which	   also	   called	   the	   “assurance	   game”	   (Camerer,	  2003).	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  SH	  payoff	  matrix	  (that	  is,	  the	  mere	  incentives	  of	  the	  game)	  would	  seem	  to	  speak	  for	  itself,	  it	  could	  be	  thus	  be	  held	  to	  parallel	  the	  utterance,	  however	  others	  may	   not	   interpret	   the	   matrix/utterance	   in	   the	   exact	   same	   way	   we	   do.	   In	   strategic	  interactions,	   this	   seed	  of	  potential	  diversity,	  may	   then	  generate	  what	  Hofstadter	   (1985)	  calls	  “reverberant	  doubt”	  and	  mutual	  suspicion,	  which	  we	  opened	  with;	  and	  this,	  we	  will	  argue,	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  we	  generally	  “like”	  similar	  others.	  I	  would	  next	  like	  to	   conclude	   this	   section	  on	   common	  knowledge	  and	  behavioral	   game	   theory	  with	  a	   last	  philosophical	   argument,	   which	   I	   believe	   makes	   the	   same	   point	   from	   the	   opposite	  perspective:	  not	  that	  similarity	  can	  favor	  communication,	  but	  that	  communication	  cannot	  emerge	  from	  complete	  diversity.	  	  	  In	  what	  has	  been	  said	  (Wright,	  1999)	  to	  be	  one	  of	   the	  most	  discussed	  arguments	  of	   this	  century,	   Quine	   made	   the	   following	   example:	   suppose	   we	   were	   confronted	   with	   an	  unknown	  utterance	  by	   an	   indigenous	   speaker,	  who,	  pointing	   at	   a	   rabbit,	   said	   “Gavagai”.	  We	  would	  be	  strongly	  tempted	  to	  conclude	  that	  what	  the	  speaker	  means	  by	  “gavagai”	   is	  what	  we	  mean	  by	   “rabbit”,	  and	  be	  happy	  with	   the	   idea	   that	  we’ve	  obtained	  a	  successful	  translation,	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  communication	  and	  perhaps	  future	  cooperation.	  However,	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the	  meanings	  of	  words	  are	  derived	  from	  their	  context,	  and	  here	  there	  is	  no	  such	  mutually	  accepted	   context.	   Thus,	   given	   the	   evidence	   at	   hand,	   we	   could	   equally	   suppose	   that	   the	  native	   means	   “food”,	   “lets	   go	   hunting”,	   “a	   rabbit	   ear”,	   “it’ll	   rain	   tonight”	   (if	   he’s	  superstitious),	   “look,	   the	   ground”	   (if	   he	   doesn’t	   care	   about	   the	   rabbit	   at	   all)	   and,	   under	  complete	  diversity,	  the	  utterance	  could	  virtually	  mean	  anything.	  However,	  to	  the	  degree	  in	  which	  we	  think	  the	  stranger	  perceptually	  divides	  the	  world	  in	  similar	  chunks	  as	  ourselves	  (i.e.	   making	   a	   division	   between	   rabbit	   and	   background	  more	   likely	   between	   particular	  portions	   of	   the	   rabbit’s	   ear),	   to	   the	   degree	   in	   which	   we	   believe	   that	   he,	   like	   us,	   could	  consider	  the	  rabbit	  as	  a	  possible	  form	  of	  sustenance,	   in	  short,	  to	  the	  degree	  in	  which	  we	  assume	  similarity	  and	  some	  fundamental	   likemindedness,	  we	  can	  proportionally	  restrict	  the	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  translate	  the	  word	  “Gavagai”,	  excluding	  at	  least,	  the	  wildest	  ones.	  Indeed,	  Quine’s	  problem	  appears	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  of	  multiple	  NE	  in	  games,	  as	  Gibson	  puts	  it,	  the	  problem	  for	  Quine	  “is	  not	  that	  successful	  translation	  is	  impossible,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  multiply	  possible”.	  Our	  idea	  is	  that,	  to	  the	  degree	  in	  which	  we	  can	  refer	  the	  beliefs	  of	  others	  to	  our	  own	  system	  of	  beliefs,	  we	  can	  restrict	  the	  amount	  of	  multiple	  possibilities,	  and	  thus	  reduce	  our	  uncertainty.	   In	  brief,	  my	  take	  on	  Quine’s	  story	   is	   that,	   if	   there	   is	  no	  pre-­‐existing	   commonly	   accepted	   bundle	   of	   knowledge,	   then	   mutual	   understanding	  appears	  to	  be	  logically	  indeterminable.	  	  	  
1.4.	  Synthesis	  	  	  We	   opened	   by	   posing	   a	   rather	   ominous	   question	  which	  we	   use	   as	   a	   general	   guideline:	  what	   type	   of	   (neuro-­‐cognitive)	   mechanism	   could	   make	   cooperation	   efficient	   and	  competition	   difficult?	   We	   thus	   turned	   to	   a	   game	   theoretic	   analysis	   of	   strategic	  interactions,	   because	   of	   its	   formalized	   framework,	   and	   because	   it	   sometimes	   seems	   to	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capture	  something	  of	  how	  people	  actually	  behave	  (or	  end	  up	  behaving	  in	  the	  long	  run).	  	  	  The	   theory	   tells	   us	   that	   an	   assumption	   of	   common	   knowledge	   is	   fundamental	   when	  passing	  from	  individual	  to	  inter-­‐individual	  or	  interdependent	  decision-­‐making.	  It	  enables	  agents	  to	  recursively	  form	  beliefs	  (about	  beliefs	  about	  beliefs…)	  of	  what	  others	  will	  do	  and	  thus	   best-­‐respond	   to	   their	   beliefs,	   which	   is	   the	   central	   aspect	   of	   strategizing.	   In	   other	  words,	   common	   knowledge	   is	  what	   seems	   to	   allow	   predictability.	   However,	   (at	   least	   in	  game	  theory)	  it	  does	  so	  rigorously	  through	  deduction.	  	  	  In	   games	   with	   multiple	   NE	   this	   logic	   breaks	   down	   as	   deduction	   leaves	   open	   multiple	  viable	   alternatives.	   Rational	   agents	   must	   then	   rely	   on	   some	   other	   form	   of	   common	  knowledge	   in	   order	   to	   coordinate	   their	   choices.	   One	   obvious	   solution	   is	   to	   create	   such	  common	   knowledge,	   by	   founding	   arbitrary	   conventions.	   Perhaps	   as	   a	   result	   of	   such	  arbitrariness,	  we	  saw	  examples	  (i.e.	  Weber&Camerer,	  2003)	  of	  how	  different	  conventions	  can	   emerge	   in	   different	   groups,	   seemingly	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   situational	   contingencies	   or	  “historical	   accidents”.	   However,	   in	   other	   cases,	   groups	   seem	   to	   establish	   less-­‐arbitrary	  conventions,	  in	  that	  they	  all	  seem	  to	  flow	  in	  the	  same	  direction.	  For	  instance,	  we	  saw	  that	  when	  shallow	  learning	  is	  perturbed	  (Rankin	  et	  al.,	  2000),	  most	  groups	  tend	  to	  coordinate	  on	  an	  efficient,	  rather	  than	  a	  secure	  equilibrium;	  similarly,	  that	  increasing	  and	  decreasing	  economic	  incentives	  to	  cooperate	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  affect	  cooperation	  in	  a	  symmetric	  way	  (Brandts&Cooper,	  2004);	  and	   that	  certain	  characteristics	   (i.e.	   temporal	  antecedence,	   the	  present	  etc.)	  have	  a	  special	  property	  of	  focality,	  that	  is,	  they	  seem	  salient	  to	  all.	  	  In	  the	  first	  case,	   common	   knowledge	   of	   shared	   historical	   accidents	   seems	   to	   generate	   behavioral	  similarity	  and	  efficiency	  (as	  well	  as	  potential	  inter-­‐cultural	  clashes),	  in	  the	  latter	  it	  seems	  that	   actual	   similarity	   may	   engender	   a	   sense	   of	   common	   knowledge.	   In	   both	   cases,	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whatever	  the	  origin,	  similarity	  and	  common	  knowledge	  seem	  to	  be	  tightly	  bound.	  	  	  	  Finally,	   we	   considered	   language	   as	   a	   potential	   coordination	   device.	   Indeed,	   language	   is	  meant	   precisely	   to	   “share”	   knowledge.	   Furthermore,	   we	   showed	   that	   verbal	  communication	   can	   potentially	   comply	   to	   our	   purported	   dual	   function	   of	   a	   “cohesion	  mechanism”,	   in	   that	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   drastically	   increase	   efficient	   (cooperative)	  coordination	   and	   to	   potentially	   muddle	   competition.	   However,	   with	   the	   example	   on	  teaching,	  we	  hinted	  at	   the	   suspicion	   that	   language	  may	   too	   require	   common	  knowledge	  (Cooper	  et	  al.,	  1992).	   I	  will	   review	  some	  empirical	   literature	  (this	   time	   from	  psychology	  and	  sociology),	  further	  strengthening	  the	  link	  between	  similarity	  and	  common	  knowledge.	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Chapter	  2	  Homophily	  	  Similarity	   has	   been	   said	   to	   be	   the	   fundamental	   laws	   of	   interpersonal	   attraction	   (Byrne,	  1971):	   generally	   speaking,	   it	   is	   commonly	   accepted	   that,	  we	   like	   and	   tend	   to	   approach,	  interact	   and	   form	   ties	   with	   people	   who	   we	   feel	   similar	   to	   ourselves	   (Morry,	   2007).	  However,	  a	  problem	  immediately	  emerges.	  	  “Any	  event	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  organism	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  unique.	  Consequently,	  recognition,	  learning,	  and	  judgment	  presuppose	  an	  ability	  to	  categorize	  stimuli	  and	  classify	  situations	  by	   similarity.	   As	   Quine	   (1969)	   puts	   it:	   "There	   is	   nothing	   more	   basic	   to	   thought	   and	  language	   than	   our	   sense	   of	   similarity;	   our	   sorting	   of	   things	   into	   kinds”.	   (Tversky&Gati,	  1978).	  	  The	  apparently	  “good”	  thing	  about	  similarity	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  very	  intuitive	  concept	  that	  can	  be	   applied	   to	   nearly	   all	   levels	   of	   perception	   and	   cognition.	   This	   is	   also	   its	   fundamental	  limitation,	  that	   is,	   that	   it	  seems	  to	  apply	  to	  everything.	  For	  instance,	   it	  appears	  that	  no	  2	  elements	  are	  so	  diverse,	   that	  no	  similarity	  at	  all	   could	  be	   found	  between	   them.	  Then,	   to	  make	  similarity	  of	  any	  possible	  use,	  some	  separate	  mechanism	  would	  seem	  necessary	  to	  restrict	  among	  the	  possible	  inputs	  to	  a	  putative	  similarity-­‐computing	  device.	  However,	   if	  such	  a	  mechanism	  existed,	  then	  it	  remains	  unclear	  why	  the	  same	  mechanism	  couldn’t	  sort	  out	  the	  similarity	  outputs	  as	  well,	  thus	  eliminating	  similarity	  all	  together.	  In	  their	  edition	  of	   articles,	   Sloman&Rips	   (1998)	   frame	   the	   problem	   as	   one	   regarding	   an	   apparent	  contraposition	   between	   2	   general	   explanations	   of	   cognition:	   those	   based	   on	   similarity	  (association)	  and	  those	  based	  on	  rules.	  Suspiciously	  similar	  contrapositions	  appear	  open	  in	  neuroscience	   -­‐	  such	  as	   the	  one	  between	  the	  procedural	  vs.	   representational	  nature	  of	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computations	  in	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (Wood	  et	  al.,	  2003)	  –	  as	  well	  as	  classical	  debates	  in	  epistemology	   -­‐	   such	   as	   the	   one	   between	   empiricism	   (i.e.	   Mach)	   and	   rationalism	   (i.e.	  Planck)	  (Fuller,	  2005).	  I	  hope	  to	  be	  able	  to	  steer	  clear	  of	  such	  debates	  in	  this	  thesis,	  though	  I	  probably	  won’t	  fully	  be	  able	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  the	  attempt,	  I	  start	  from	  a	  rather	  different	  track,	  involving	  similarity	  in	  attraction,	  rather	  than	  categorization.	  	  	  
2.1.	  Similarity,	  repetition	  and	  attraction	  in	  non-­‐social	  domains	  	  
	   “People	  love	  those	  who	  are	  like	  themselves”	  (Aristotle)	  “Similarity	  begets	  friendship”	  (Plato)	  
	  In	  classic	  reinforcement	  learning	  organisms	  "repeat"	  those	  behaviors	  that	  led	  to	  rewards	  (and	  “stop	  repeating”	  those	  that	  led	  to	  punishments).	  It	  seems	  likely	  then	  that	  they	  might	  tend	  to	  "invert	  the	  causal	  chain",	  not	  limiting	  themselves	  to	  repeating	  what	  is	  “good”	  but	  also	  taking	  what	  is	  repeated	  to	  be	  "good”.	  Indeed,	  repeated	  exposure	  and	  reward	  seem	  to	  share	   an	   intimate	   connection.	   One	   possible	   declination	   of	   this	   phenomenon	   is	   perhaps	  captured	   in	   the	  mere	  exposition	  effect	   (Zajonc,	  2001),	  which	  consists	   in	   the	  observation	  (we	  give	  an	  example	  below)	  that	  simple	  repeated	  exposure	  to	  previously	  neutral	  stimuli	  increases	   their	   perceived	   attractiveness.	   In	   lay	   words,	   we	   prefer	   the	   familiar	   to	   the	  unfamiliar.	  Similarity	  then	  might	  result	  rewarding	  because	  it	  logically	  implicates	  a	  form	  of	  repetition:	   i.e.	   to	   recognize	   that	   2	   or	   more	   entities	   are	   similar	   we	   must	   be	   repeatedly	  exposed	  to	  the	  common	  feature	  that,	  by	  definition,	  they	  share.	  	  The	  mere	  exposure	  effect	   is	  very	  well	  rooted	  as	   it	  has	  been	  observed	  across	  an	  array	  of	  domains	   and	   in	   different	   species	   (Zajonc,	   2001).	   It	   has	   even	   been	   shown	   to	   generate	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approach	  behavior	  prenatally.	  For	  example,	  newly	  hatched	  chicks	  would	  move	  towards	  a	  tone	   that	   they	   had	   prenatally	   been	   exposed	   to,	   but	   not	   towards	   novel	   tones	   (Rajecki,	  1974).	   A	   study	   on	   humans	   for	   instance	   (Monahan	   et	   al.,	   2000),	   subliminally	   exposed	   2	  groups	  of	  subjects	  to	  either	  5	  repetitions	  of	  5	  previously	  neutral	  Chinese	  ideographs,	  or	  of	  25	  different	  ideographs.	  The	  "repetition"	  group	  subsequently	  rated	  more	  positively	  (with	  respect	  to	  the	  non-­‐repetition	  group)	  the	  observed	  ideographs.	  This	  effect	  appears	  to	  tap	  on	   affect	   rather	   than	   cognition,	   as	   it	   is	   stronger	  when	   subliminal.	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   rather	  unspecific,	  as	  it	  contaminates	  easily	  to	  "similar"	  but	  novel	  stimuli	  (similar	  to	  the	  repeated	  ones),	  and	  to	  dissimilar	  but	  still	  adjacent	  stimuli.	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  evidence	  showing	  that	  not	  only	  we	  like	  what	  weʼve	  been	  repeatedly	  exposed	   to,	   but	   we	   also	   feel	   that	   what	   we	   like	   is	   familiar,	   as	   if	   we	   had	   already	   been	  exposed	   to	   it	   (Monin,	   2003).	  This	  phenomenon	   is	  partially	   explained	  by	  prototypicality.	  For	   instance,	   faces	   that	   have	   been	   artificially	   generated	   as	   the	   geometric	   mean	   of	   a	  number	   of	   faces	   are	   rated	   to	   be	   both	   more	   attractive	   and	   more	   familiar	  (Langlois&Roddman,	  1990),	  where	  similar	  results	  hold	  for	  non-­‐social	  stimuli	  such	  as	  birds	  or	  watches	  (Halberstadt&Rhodes,	  2000).	  Prototypical	  objects	  are	  the	  more	  representative	  exemplars	  of	  their	  category,	  they	  constitute	  the	  “average	  exemplar”,	  and	  as	  such	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  somehow	  similar	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  exemplars	  of	  their	  category,	  to	  contain	  that	  mix	   of	   features	   that	  we	   seem	   to	   find	   “repeated”	   in	   all	   of	   them.	   Indeed,	   even	   if	   subjects	  haven’t	  been	  exposed	  to	  a	  prototypical	  object,	  but	  only	  to	  non-­‐prototypical	  samples	  of	  it,	  they	  feel	  it	  to	  be	  familiar,	  possibly	  because	  we	  spontaneously	  generate	  prototypes	  (Rosch,	  1978)	  and	  mistake	  this	  for	  prior	  exposure	  (Strauss,	  1979).	  	  How	   exactly	   the	   above	   phenomena	   are	   connected	   and	  why	  we	   should	   like	  prototypical	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objects,	   familiarity	   and	   repetition	   is	   still	   a	  matter	   of	   debate:	   some	   investigators	   suggest	  that	   perceptual	   fluency	   may	   underlie	   them	   all	   (Bornstein&DʼAgostino,	   1994);	   Zajonc	  argues	  (Zajonc,	  2001)	  that	  there	  is	  adaptive	  value	  in	  approaching	  repeated	  stimuli,	  as	  they	  imply	  the	  absence	  of	  punishments,	  signaling	  "safety".	   In	  decision	  theory	  it	  has	  long	  been	  known	  that	  uncertainty	  and	  one	  of	  its	  declinations,	  ambiguity	  (Ellsberg,	  1961),	  decreases	  the	  perceived	  utility	  of	  prospects.	  	  	  2.2.	  Similarity	  and	  attraction	  in	  the	  social	  domain	  	  The	   folk-­‐psychological	   rule	   that	   similarity	   generates	   interpersonal	   attraction	   has	   been	  widely	  observed	  at	  both	  macro	  and	  micro	   levels	  of	   social	   ties,	  below	  we	  briefly	  address	  them	  separately.	  	  
2.2.1.	  Similarity	  in	  the	  large:	  “homophily”	  
 The	   notion	   of	   repetition	   recurs	   in	   McPherson	   et	   al.’s	   (2001)	   definition	   of	   homophily,	  which	   refers	   to	   the	   principle	   that	   contact	   between	   similar	   others	   occurs	   at	  higher	  rates	  than	   between	   dissimilar	   others.	   An	   important	   implication	   of	   this	   is	   that	   any	   type	   of	  information	   (genetic,	   cultural,	   behavioral	   or	  material)	   that	   flows	   through	   networks	  will	  tend	   to	   be	   localized	   in	   both	   geographic	   and	   network	   distance	   (“the	   number	   of	  relationships	  a	  piece	  of	  information	  has	  to	  travel	  to	  connect	  two	  individuals”	  (McPherson	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  A	  voluminous	  sociological	  literature	  has	  proved	  this	  empirical	  pattern	  along	  a	  number	  of	  relation	  types	  and	  similarity	  dimensions	  such	  as	  ethnicity,	  gender,	  age,	  religion,	  education,	  occupation;	  and	  value	  based	  similarity,	  such	  as	  that	  based	  on	  shared	  attitudes,	  behaviors,	  beliefs	  or	  similar	  tastes.	  For	  instance,	  at	  a	  national	  probability	  sample	  only	  8%	  of	   adults	   discussed	   “important	   matters”	   with	   someone	   of	   another	   race,	   1/7th	   of	   what	  
	   42	  
would	  be	  expected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  random	  extraction	  given	  relative	  group	  sizes	  (Marsden,	  1987).	  Lu	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  refer	  that	  gender	  and	  age	  related	  homophily	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  zebras	   and	   dolphins	   and	   that	   meerkats	   assort	   depending	   on	   common	   attributes	   of	  dominance	  or	  foraging	  networks.	  Infants	  as	  old	  as	  12	  months	  have	  a	  notorious	  knack	  for	  imitation	  and	   they	  also	  prefer	  others	   that	   imitate	   them	  (Meltzoff,	  2007).	  The	  commonly	  quoted	  evolutionary	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  proposed	  by	  Hamilton	  (1964)	  in	  terms	  of	  kinship	  selection.	   The	   idea	   is	   simply	   that	   agents	   may	   have	   an	   incentive	   to	   benefit	   others	  proportionally	  to	  their	  relatedness	  because,	  by	  doing	  so,	  they	  promote	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  portion	  of	  genes	  they	  share	  with	  them.	  Indeed,	  phenotypic	  matching	  (Porter,	  1987),	  that	  is,	   the	   implicit	   evaluation	   of	   relatedness	   based	   on	   phenotypic	   similarity,	   has	   been	  observed	  in	  ground	  squirrels	  (Holmes&Sherman,	  1982),	  baboons	  (Alberts,	  1999),	  rhesus	  monkeys	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  species.	  	  Interestingly,	  even	  genetic	  homophily	  has	  been	  reported	  in	  humans	  (Fowler	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  such	  that	  friends	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  share	  given	  genes,	   plausibly	  precisely	   as	   a	   consequence	  of	   homophilic	   assortment.	  DeBruine	   (2002)	  showed	   economic	   trust	  was	   increased	  when	   human	   agents	   played	  with	   a	   fictive	   player	  who’s	  face	  had	  been	  morphed	  to	  resemble	  themselves.	  Homophily	  was	  also	  predictive	  of	  cooperation	   in	   hunter-­‐gatherer	   populations	   of	   Tanzania	   (Apicella	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   where	  social	   distance	   was	   shown	   to	   be	   as	   important	   as	   genetic	   relatedness	   in	   predicting	  assortment.	   A	   rather	   fascinating	   account	   of	   genotypic	   similarity	   was	   provided	   by	  Ghirlanda&Vallortigara	   (2004).	   	   The	   authors	   are	   concerned	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   selection	  pressures	  on	  the	  individual	  cannot	  explain	  the	  fact	  that,	  at	  the	  population	  level,	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  vertebrates	  show	  lateralization	   in	  proportions	  that	  are	  different	   from	  ½	  (i.e.	  humans	  being	  more	  frequently	  right-­‐handed).	  They	  make	  the	  intriguing	  proposal	  (with	  a	  model)	   that	   this	   might	   emerge	   as	   an	   evolutionary	   stable	   strategy	   when	   asymmetric	  organisms	  must	  coordinate	  their	  behavior	  with	  other	  asymmetric	  organisms.	  In	  line	  with	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this	  argument,	  one	  of	  my	  main	  proposals	  is	  that	  similarity	  is	  not	  only	  about	  attraction,	  but	  about	   the	   impact	   it	   has	   on	   interactions.	   In	   brief,	   similarity	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   particularly	  powerful	  mechanism	  for	  social	  cohesion,	  in	  both	  phylogeny	  and	  onthogeny.	  	  	  	  
2.2.2.	  Similarity	  in	  the	  small:	  proxemics	  and	  propinquity	  	  	  The	   network	   distance	   above	   however	   has	   a	   physical	   counterpart,	   which	   is	   object	   of	   a	  branch	  of	  social	  psychology	  called	  proxemics.	  Argyle&Dean	  (1965)	  proposed	  the	  principle	  that	   intimacy	   predicts	   greater	   physical	   closeness	   and	   that	   this	   distance	   represented	   an	  equilibrium	   that	   agents	   actively	   took	   effort	   to	   maintain	   when	   perturbed	   by	   external	  factors.	  For	  example,	   in	  a	   laboratory,	   they	  observed	  that	  eye	  contact	  was	  reduced	  as	  the	  chairs	  of	  seated	  strangers	  were	  moved	  closer.	  Mehrabian	  (1969)	  found	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  liking	   and	   the	   physical	   separation	   and	   gaze	   avoidance	   between	   two	   people	   were	  negatively	   related.	   Burgess	   (1983)	   analyzed	   people	   as	   they	  walked	   through	   a	  mall	   and	  discovered	  that	  companions	  were	  nearer	  to	  each	  other	  than	  to	  strangers,	  and	  that	  as	  the	  density	   of	   the	   crowd	   increased,	   the	   companion	   groups	   compressed	   so	   as	   to	   maintain	  spacing	  from	  strangers.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   as	   in	   the	   non-­‐social	   cases	   seen	   above,	   not	   only	   does	   liking	   predict	  interpersonal	   closeness	   but	   closeness	   predicts	   liking	   (as	   in	   the	   mere	   exposure	   effect):	  Priest	  and	  Sawyer	  (1967)	  tracked	  the	  friendships	  formed	  within	  a	  new	  dormitory	  at	  the	  University	   of	   Chicago.	   They	   found	   that	   proximity	   was	   positively	   related	   to	   both	  recognition	   and	   liking	   of	   other	   students:	   roommates	   were	   liked	   more	   frequently	   than	  neighbors,	  who	  were	  liked	  more	  than	  floor	  mates,	  etc.	  Similar	  patterns	  were	  observed	  for	  factors	   such	   as	   street	   arrangements	   (Hampton&Wellman,	   2000)	   and	   legislative	   seating	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(Calderia&Patterson,	  1987).	  	  	  In	   synthesis,	   we	   argued	   that	   non-­‐social	   similarity/familiarity	   in	   the	   perceptual	   domain	  and	   reward	   could	   share	   some	   intricate	   connections	   and	   how	   this	   could	   spill	   over	   into	  social	   domain.	   Indeed,	   similarity	   and	   proximity	   appear	   to	   be	   fundamental	   factors	   of	  interpersonal	   attraction.	  However,	   though	   this	  may	   be	   sufficient	   to	   trigger	   a	   number	   of	  affect-­‐laden	   processes	   leading	   to	   social	   approach,	   it	   seems	   unlikely	   that	  reward/motivation	   alone	   could	   be	   capable	   of	   guiding	   the	   complex	   cognitive	   processes	  that	  occur	  during	  the	  social	  interactions	  that	  follow.	  Such	  interactions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  what	  matters.	   If	   homophily	   induced	   approach	   to	   malfunctioning/inefficient	   interactions	   (or	  even	  only	  neutral	  ones)	  it	  would	  seem	  implausible	  that	  it	  emerged	  as	  such	  a	  widespread	  phenomena.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  for	  homophilic	  approaches	  to	  actually	  work,	  they	  should	  be	  reinforced	  by	  the	  interactions	  that	  follow	  them.	  In	  other	  words,	  we’re	  here	  interested	  in	  the	  possible	  strategic	  components	  of	  homophily.	  	  	  Throughout	  this	  thesis	  we’ve	  stressed	  how	  one	  of	  the	  core	  assumptions	  of	  strategizing	  is	  common	   knowledge,	   in	   that	   it	   enables	   agents	   to	   form	   beliefs	   and	   expectations	   of	   what	  others	   will	   do.	   What	   we’re	   contemplating	   here	   is	   the	   potential	   role	   of	   homophily	   as	   a	  “belief-­‐correlating	   device”,	   which	   could	   precisely	   promote	   efficient	   coordination	   in	  situations	   where	   deduction	   is	   of	   no	   use.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   we	   will	   review	   evidence	  supporting	   the	   idea	   that	   similarity	   can	   indeed	  affect	   the	  way	  agents	   form	  beliefs	  on	   the	  intentions	  of	  one	  another,	  that	  is,	  on	  how	  it	  can	  affect	  “mentalizing”	  (Premack&Woodroof,	  1978).	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2.3.	  Similarity	  and	  common	  knowledge	  	  	  
Similarity	  supports	  self-­‐referential	  mentalizing	  strategies	  	  One	  of	  the	  long-­‐standing	  open	  challenges	  of	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  and	  cognitive	  science	  is	  to	  explain	   how	   we	   come	   to	   infer	   the	   mental	   states	   of	   others.	   A	   simulationist	   account	   of	  mentalizing	   (Goldman,	   2005)	   supports	   the	   view	   that	  we	   have	   direct	   access	   to	   our	   own	  mind	   and	   that	   we	   use	   such	   knowledge	   to	   reason	   about	   others.	   A	   different	   account	  however,	  called	  Theory-­‐Theory	  (Carruthers&Smith,	  1996),	  assigns	  a	  less	  important	  role	  to	  self-­‐knowledge.	   Rather,	   it	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	   our	   ability	   to	   build	   theories	   in	  general;	  the	  processes	  of	  forming	  which	  (for	  instance	  via	  the	  tacit	  generation	  of	  abstract	  and	  flexible	  rules	  or	  representations)	  shouldn’t	  be	  too	  different	  whether	  they	  are	  meant	  for	  making	   inferences	  on	  mechanistic	  processes	   (humans	  excluded)	  or	   intentional	  ones.	  Proponents	   of	   this	   view	   alike	   children	   to	   “child	   scientists”,	   who	   test	   their	   homemade	  theories	  of	  mind,	  or	  folk-­‐psychological	  rules	  (Gopnik,	  1996).	  	  	  The	   self-­‐referential	   approach	   appears	   to	   be	   particularly	   compliant	   in	   accommodating	   a	  series	  of	  experimental	  observations	  regarding	  egocentric	  biases.	  Many	  of	  which	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  well-­‐documented	  observation	  that,	  often,	  social	  inferences	  are	  “contaminated”	  by	  one’s	   first	   person	   views	   and	   perspective.	   Children	   have	   been	   long	   held	   to	   exhibit	   such	  egocentric	   beliefs	   (Piaget,	   1957).	   Seminal	   studies	   using	   the	   Sally-­‐Anne	   task	  (Wimmer&Perner,	   1983;	   Baron-­‐Cohen	   et	   al.,	   1985)	   showed	   that	   younger	   children	   (i.e.	  ages	   1-­‐3)	   have	   difficulties	   suspending	   their	   privileged	   knowledge	   when	   making	  attributions	   to	  uninformed	  others.	  Adults	   too	  however	   tend	   to	  do	   the	  same,	  usually,	  but	  not	   always	   in	   a	   self-­‐serving	   way:	   by	   assuming	   their	   intentions	   and	   beliefs	   are	   more	  transparent	  to	  others	  than	  they	  actually	  are	  (Gilovich	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  and	  by	  overestimating	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the	   degree	   to	  which	   others	   attend	   such	   intentions	   (Gilovich	   et	   al.,	   2000)	   or	   share	   their	  beliefs/thoughts	  (Keysar,	  1994),	  the	  well-­‐established	  “false	  consensus	  effect”	  (Ross	  et	  al.,	  1977;	  Marks&Miller,	  1987;	  Krueger&Clement,	  1994).	  As	  Goldman	  notes	  (2006),	  this	  form	  of	   self-­‐projection	   seems	   to	   occur	   across	   domains,	   from	   knowledge,	   to	   valuations	   to	  feelings.	  	  	  For	   instance,	   following	  Goldman	   (2006),	  Keysar	   (2003)	  had	  2	  agents,	   a	   “director”	  and	  a	  “follower”,	  face	  a	  same	  grid	  with	  several	  objects	  on	  it.	  In	  front	  of	  the	  follower,	  but	  not	  the	  director,	  one	  of	  the	  objects,	  a	  roll	  of	  scotch	  tape,	  was	  hid	  in	  an	  opaque	  bag	  and	  placed	  on	  the	  grid.	  The	  follower	  thus	  knew	  that	  the	  director	  did	  not	  know	  what	  was	  in	  the	  bag.	  	  The	  director	  was	   then	   to	  orally	   “direct”	   the	   follower	   to	   shift	   some	  of	   the	  objects	   around	   the	  grid.	   One	   of	   such	   objects	  was	   a	   videotape.	  When	   the	   director	   said	   “move	   the	   tape”	   the	  follower	   should	   have	   realized	   that	   he	   couldn’t	  mean	   the	   scotch	   tape,	   since	   the	   director	  didn’t	  know	  about	  it.	  Nonetheless,	  agents	  often	  moved	  this,	  which	  indicates	  some	  difficulty	  in	   disanchoring	   themselves	   from	   their	   own	   privileged	   information.	   Similarly,	   Newton	  (1990)	  had	  “tappers”	  tap	  the	  theme	  of	  25	  famous	  songs	  so	  to	  allow	  listeners	  to	  guess	  what	  song	  it	  was.	  Tappers	  professed	  to	  nicely	  hear	  the	  songs	  in	  their	  heads	  while	  tapping	  and	  predicted	  that	  roughly	  50%	  of	   listeners	  would	  guess	  what	  songs	  they	  were,	   though	  only	  3%	  actually	  did.	  Camerer,	  Weber	  &	  Lowenstein	  note	  that	  asymmetric	  information	  of	  this	  sort	  is	  frequent	  in	  economic	  interactions	  (i.e.	  sellers	  know	  more	  about	  their	  product	  than	  buyers,	  employees	  know	  more	  about	  their	  abilities	  than	  employers).	  For	  instance,	  in	  their	  experiment	  (Camerer,	  Weber	  &	  Lowenstein,	  1989),	  a	  group	  of	  subjects	  made	  forecasts	  on	  the	  earnings	  of	  given	  firms.	  A	  second	  group	  was	  then	  told	  the	  actual	  earnings	  of	  said	  firms	  and	  asked	  to	  trade	  assets	  that	  paid	  a	  liquidation	  dividend	  equal	  to	  the	  forecasts	  of	  the	  1st	  group.	   To	   make	   accurate	   forecasts,	   the	   second	   group	   of	   participants	   should	   have	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completely	   neglected	   their	   privileged	   knowledge	   to	   make	   optimal	   trades,	   which	   they	  didn’t,	   thus	   making	   sub-­‐optimal	   choices.	   Furthermore,	   economists	   have	   suggested	   that	  egocentric	  perspectives	  may	  play	  a	  role	   in	  adverse	  selection	  problems	  (and	  that	  “cursed	  knowledge”	  is	  one	  of	  the	  plausible	  explanations	  for	  “adverse	  selection”	  problems	  (Brocas	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Carrillo&Palfrey,	  2008).	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  notorious	  “market	  of	  the	  lemons”	  (Akerlof,	  1970),	  an	  agent	  is	  to	  make	  an	  offer	  for	  a	  firm,	  the	  true	  worth	  of	  which	  is	  known	  privately	  only	  to	  the	  seller.	  What	  the	  buyer	  knows	  is	  that	  i)	  the	  firm	  is	  worth	  some	  value	  q,	  with	  0<q<100,	  and	  ii)	  that	  it	  will	  be	  worth	  more	  in	  his	  hands	  than	  the	  current	  owner’s,	  say	  3/2q.	  The	  (Bayesian)	  NE	  of	  this	  game	  is	  for	  no	  trade	  to	  occur11.	  Unsurprisingly,	  very	  few	  buyers	  reach	  this	  conclusion	  in	  the	  lab	  (),	  plausibly	  because	  they	  unprofitably	  generalize	  their	   ignorance,	   rather	   than	   their	  knowledge.	  Critically,	   such	  egocentric	  based-­‐errors	  do	  not	   always	   occur	   (Epley	   et	   al.	   2004),	   nor	   all	   errors	   go	   in	   the	   direction	   predicted	   by	  simulation.	  For	  instance,	  Ruffman	  (1996)	  ran	  an	  experiment	  involving	  4-­‐year	  olds	  and	  an	  observer.	  In	  front	  of	  both,	  there	  was	  a	  round	  dish,	  containing	  red	  and	  green	  beads,	  and	  a	  square	   dish,	   containing	   only	   yellow	   beads.	   Hidden	   to	   the	   view	   of	   the	   observer,	   but	  accessible	  to	  the	  children,	  a	  green	  bead	  was	  taken	  from	  the	  round	  dish	  and	  placed	  in	  an	  opaque	   bag.	   The	   children	  were	   then	   asked	   to	   say	  what	   bead	   the	   observer	   thought	   had	  been	   taken.	  Most	   of	   them	  didn’t	   answer	   “green”,	   as	  would	  have	   been	  predicted	  by	   self-­‐projection,	   rather	   most	   of	   them	   answered	   “red”.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   source	   of	   the	  inference	  was	  not	   the	   self,	   but,	  plausibly,	   a	  general	   “psychological	   rule”,	   such	  as:	   “if	   you	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  reasoning	  is	  the	  following:	  suppose	  the	  buyer	  was	  considering	  to	  make	  an	  offer	  for	  the	  average	  expected	  value	  of	  the	  firm,	  that	  is	  50.	  Taking	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  seller,	  who	  knows	  the	  true	  worth	  of	  the	  firm,	  the	  buyer	  should	  realize	  that	  there	  is	  no	  world	  in	  which	  the	  seller	  would	  accept	  an	  offer	  of	  50	  if	  the	  firm	  is	  worth	  q>50.	  It	  follows	  that,	  if	  the	  firm	  is	  sold,	   it	   will	   be	   worth	   anywhere	   between	   0	   and	   50,	   the	   expected	   value	   of	   which	   is	   25.	  Under	  the	  buyer’s	  new	  administration	  this	  would	  amount	  to	  3/2*25	  =	  37.5,	  however	  the	  buyer	   spent	  50,	   thus	  prospectively	   losing	  12.5.	  Since	   the	  same	  reasoning	  occurs	   for	  any	  positive	  offer,	  the	  buyer	  should	  make	  no	  offer	  at	  all.	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don’t	  know,	  you	  get	  it	  wrong”.	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   the	   debate	   between	   simulation	   and	   theory-­‐theory	   is	   still	   very	   open	   (Goldman,	  2006),	  yet	  an	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  cognitive	  scientists	  seem	  to	  support	  “hybrid	  views”	  of	  mentalizing,	   in	   which	   self-­‐related	   and	   rule-­‐based	   inferences	   interact	   to	   support	   social	  cognition.	  One	  interesting	  hybrid	  perspective	  suggests	  that	  both	  cognitive	  strategies	  may	  play	   important	   roles	   and	   that	   contexts	  may	   cue	   how	  much	  weight	   to	   give	   to	   each	   one	  (Goldman,	   2006;	   Mitchell,	   2005;	   Meltzoff,	   2007;	   Epley	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Ames,	   2004;).	   This	  latter	   hypothesis	   is	   fundamentally	   based	   on	   similarity.	   It	   makes	   the	   argument	   that	   the	  self-­‐related	  knowledge	  may	  be	  adopted	  to	  predict	  someone’s	  behavior	  (“what	  I	  would	  do	  in	   her	   place?”),	   in	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   agents	   assume	   that	   their	   target	   is	   similar	   to	  themselves.	  Meltzoff	   (2007)	   says,	   “The	  bedrock	  on	  which	   social	   cognition	   is	   built	   is	   the	  perception	  that	  others	  are	  ‘like	  me’.”	  	  Interestingly,	   though	   not	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   simulation	   vs.	   theory-­‐theory,	   social	  psychological	   accounts	   of	   social	   judgment	   have	   converged	   on	   a	   somewhat	   similar	  distinction.	  On	  one	  side,	  similar	  to	  a	  rule-­‐based	  approach	  to	  social	  cognition,	  a	  voluminous	  literature	   has	   focused	   on	   stereotypes	   (i.e.	   “How	   smart	   is	   Joe	   the	   football	   player?”)	  (Fiske&Neuberg,	  1990;	  Hamilton&Sherman,	  1994)	  or	  prototypes	  (Karniol,	  2003).	  On	  the	  other,	  much	   research	  has	   focused	   on	   the	   self	   (Krueger,	   2000;	  Ross	   et	   al.,	   1977;	  Allport,	  1931),	  accounting	  for	  the	  pervasive	  egocentric/false	  consensus	  biases	  succinctly	  reviewed	  above.	  In	  line	  with	  hybrid	  approach,	  one	  idea	  is	  that	  these	  2	  strategies	  of	  social	  inference	  may	  not	  be	  exclusive,	  but	  complementary,	  and	  may	  be	  moderated	  by	  social	  categorization.	  Indeed,	  a	  particularly	  consistent	  finding	  is	  that	  projection	  is	  greater	  for	  ingroup	  members	  than	   outgroup	  members	   (for	   a	  meta-­‐analysis,	   see	  Krueger,	   2000).	   Krueger	   (2000)	   says,	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“The	  surest	  way	  to	  eliminate	  projection	  is	  to	  ask	  people	  to	  estimate	  social	  consensus	  for	  a	  group	  to	  which	  they	  do	  not	  belong.	   .	   .	   .	   It	   is	  as	   if	  people	   treat	  members	  of	  out-­‐groups	  as	  members	  of	  different	  species”.	  Ames	  (2004)	  took	  this	  as	  an	  indication	  that	  similarity	  may	  be	  the	  main	  modulator	  for	  adopting	  self-­‐referential	  vs.	  stereotype	  based	  strategies	  (Fig.	  5).	  For	  instance,	  “I	   found	  this	  movie	  great	  and,	  since	  I	   feel	  all	  proper	  cinephiles	  are	   like	  me,	  they’ll	  like	  it	  too”.	  	  	  	  
	  Fig.	   5.	   Ames	   (2004):	   a	   similarity-­‐contingency	  model	   accounts	   for	   the	   observation	   that	   self-­‐projection	   and	  stereotyping	  appear	  to	  be	  inversely	  modulated	  by	  one’s	  perceived	  similarity	  to	  a	  target	  group.	  	  	  	  	  	  Critically,	   a	   number	   of	   studies	   in	   social	   psychology	   have	   shown	   that,	   depending	   on	  context,	   self-­‐referential	   inferences	   can	   be	   either	   helpful	   (Hoch,	   1987)	   or	   detrimental	  (Birch&Bloom,	  2004).	  On	  the	  “helpful”	  side,	  similarity	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  shown	  to	  ease	  mentalizing:	   we	   are	   more	   empathetic	   towards	   others	   believed	   to	   have	   similar	  personalities	  to	  our	  own	  (Stotland,	  1964),	  as	  we	  are	  better	  at	  decoding	  mental	  states	  from	  faces	  of	  ingroup	  as	  opposed	  to	  outgroup	  targets	  (Adams,	  2010;	  Elfenbein&Ambady,	  2002),	  where	  outgroup	  individuals	  are	  also	  believed	  to	  have	  a	  simpler,	  less	  rich,	  mental	  life	  than	  our	  own,	  both	  at	  the	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  level	  (Leyens	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Possibly	  as	  a	  result	  of	   this,	   “group-­‐membership	   similarity”	   has	   been	   widely	   shown	   to	   generate	   “ingroup	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favoritism	   and	   discrimination	   towards	   the	   outgroup”	   (as	   Tajfel&Turner	   (1979)	  summarize	   15	   years	   of	   experiments	   on	   social	   identity	   theory).	   The	   “Minimum	   group”	  paradigm	   is	   particularly	   interesting	   because	   it	   shows	   that	   the	   specific	   characteristics	  identifying	   a	   group	   are	   relatively	   unimportant	   in	   driving	   discrimination,	   as	   agents	   will	  aggregate	   on	   virtually	   any	   trivial	   characteristic	   (such	   as	   pertaining	   to	   the	   group	   that	  overestimated,	   rather	   the	   underestimated	   the	   number	   of	   dots	   on	   a	   screen,	   or	   having	  preferred	   a	   painting	   by	   Klimt	   rather	   than	   Kandinsky);	   something	   which	   suggests	   that	  similarity	  effects	  are	  occasionally	  driven	  by	  the	  recognition	  of	  similarity	  itself,	  rather	  than	  its	  object.	  Furthermore,	  social	  closeness	  across	  a	  number	  of	  dimensions	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  benefit	  economic	  interactions	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  games	  (which	  we	  review	  in	  study	  1).	  	  	  On	  the	  “detrimental”	  of	  similarity	  and	  self-­‐referential	  mentalizing,	  egocentrism	  (Royzman	  et	   al.,	   2003)	   and	   ingroup	   favoritism	   has	   been	   shown	   go	   to	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	  misunderstanding	  and	  conflict	  (Ross&Ward,	  1995;	  Weber&Camerer,	  2003).	  Todd	  (2010)	  and	  colleagues	  devised	  an	   interesting	  paradigm	  to	  show	  how	  similarity	  can	  occasionally	  interfere	  with	  perspective	  taking.	  In	  the	  1st	  section	  we	  spoke	  about	  non-­‐social	  similarity	  and	  its	  tendency	  to	  be	  unspecific.	  This	  enabled	  Todd	  to	  induce	  a	  focus	  on	  social	  similarity	  with	  non-­‐social	  similarity.	  He	  did	  so,	  by	  having	  separate	  groups	  of	  subjects	  compare	  the	  same	  pair	  of	  images	  and	  either	  to	  “look	  for	  similarities”	  or	  “look	  for	  dissimilarities”,	  before	  taking	   part	   in	   a	   series	   of	   social	   tasks.	   As	   we	   mentioned	   earlier,	   similarity	   facilitates	  mentalizing	  when	  others	   are	   likely	   to	   share	   our	   own	  perspectives	   (i.e	   as	  might	   occur	   if	  they	   are	   part	   of	   our	   same	   cultural	   group).	   However,	   dissimilarity	   may	   help	   take	   the	  perspective	   of	   others,	  when	   these	   differ	   from	   our	   own.	   Todd	   (2010)	   demonstrates	   this	  point	  at	  both	  the	  perceptual	  and	  conceptual	  level	  through	  5	  experiments,	  which	  we	  briefly	  review.	   1)	   Perceptual	   perspective	   taking:	   after	   the	   similarity/dissimilarity	   priming,	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subjects	   viewed	   a	   picture	   of	   a	  man	   facing	   them	   and	   sitting	   at	   a	   table.	   At	   the	   left	   of	   the	  depicted	   man	   there	   was	   a	   bottle	   (thus	   to	   the	   “right”,	   according	   to	   the	   subjects	  perspective).	   Subjects	  were	   then	  simply	  asked,	   among	  several	   “distractor”	  questions,	  on	  what	  side	  of	  the	  table	  the	  bottle	  was.	  Subjects	  in	  the	  dissimilarity	  mindset	  more	  frequently	  said	   it	  was	   on	   the	   left,	   thus	   taking	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  man	   in	   the	   picture,	  while	   the	  similarity-­‐focused	   subjects	   tended	   to	   say	   the	   bottle	   was	   on	   the	   right,	   thus	   remaining	  anchored	   to	   their	   own	   perspective.	   2)	   Deciphering	   ambiguous	   communication:	   subjects	  were	  told	  about	  “Johnʼs	  dinner	  out...”.	  John	  had	  asked	  his	  wife	  to	  suggest	  him	  a	  restaurant	  to	  go	  to	  with	  his	  parents	  and	  both	  food	  and	  service	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  terrible.	  After	  dinner	  he	   sent	   an	   email	   to	   his	  wife,	   saying,	   “the	   dinner	  was	  marvelous,	   just	  marvelous”.	   After	  hearing	  this	  story	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  how	  likely	  it	  was	  for	  Michealʼs	  wife	  to	  have	  understood	  his	  sarcasm.	  Subjects	   in	  the	  dissimilar	  mindset	  thought	   it	  was	  more	  unlikely	  than	  those	  in	  the	  similar	  mindset.	  They	  were	  thus	  able	  to	  better	  detach	  themselves	  from	  their	   privileged	   knowledge,	  which	   indeed	  Michealʼs	  wife	  was	   unlikely	   to	   have.	   3)	   False	  belief	  attribution:	  subjects	  were	  shown	  comic	  strips	  depicting	  a	  girl	  who	  finishes	  playing	  the	  violin,	  puts	   it	   in	  a	  blue	  container	  (out	  of	  4	  differently	  colored	  containers)	  and	  leaves	  the	  room;	  the	  strip	  then	  depicts	  Vickyʼs	  sister,	  who	  comes	   into	  the	  room	  and	  moves	  the	  violin	   from	   the	  blue	   to	   the	   red	   container	   and	   leaves.	   Subjects	  were	   then	   asked	   to	  write	  down	  the	  probabilities	  of	  Vicky	  looking	  for	  her	  violin	  in	  each	  container.	  As	  before,	  subjects	  in	   the	   similarity	  mindset	  were	   relatively	   less	  able	   to	   take	  Vickyʼs	  naïve	  perspective	  and	  placed	   higher	   probabilities	   on	   the	   red	   container.	   4)	   Inter-­‐group	   false-­‐belief	   attribution:	  this	  experiment	  was	  identical	  to	  the	  former	  with	  the	  exception	  that	  i)	  there	  was	  no	  search	  task	   to	   induce	   focus	   on	   similarities/dissimilarities,	   and	   ii)	   the	   between	   group	  manipulation	  regarded	  simply	  the	  fact	  that,	   for	  one	  of	  the	  2	  groups,	  Vicky	  and	  her	  sister	  had	  foreign	  names,	  while	   for	   the	  other	  they	  had	  German	  names	  (the	  same	  nationality	  of	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the	   subjects).	   Subjects	   in	   the	   “foreign”	   name	   group	   behaved	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   the	  difference	   mindset	   group	   had	   in	   experiment	   3,	   that	   is,	   they	   correctly	   attributed	   lower	  probabilities	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  girl	  would	   look	   for	  her	  violin	   in	   the	  red	  container.	  This	  shows	   that	   common	   group	   characteristics,	   and	   similarity,	   can	   easily	   induce	   subjects	   to	  assume	   that	   others	   share	   their	   same	   beliefs.	   5)	   Finally,	   minimum-­‐groups	   were	   formed	  between	  subject	  pairs.	  They	  were	  then	  placed	  one	  opposite	  to	  the	  other	  and	  each	  of	  them	  took	  turns	  in	  i)	  either	  being	  blindfolded	  and	  orally	  guided	  through	  a	  virtual	  maze	  by	  the	  other	  participant,	  or	  ii)	  being	  the	  guide,	  who	  could	  only	  pronounce	  4	  directions	  (up,	  down,	  left,	   right).	   Outgroup	   pairs	   took	   less	   time	   to	   complete	   the	   maze,	   indicating	   that	   their	  perspective	   taking	   had	   been	   facilitated,	   and	   as	   a	   consequence,	   their	   coordination	   rates	  enhanced.	   In	   short,	   these	   results	   show	   nicely	   how	   both	   i)	   a	   focus	   on	   similarity	   and	   ii)	  ingroup	  membership,	   can	  be	  of	  obstacle	   in	  mentalizing,	   specifically	   in	   the	  case	   in	  which	  perspectives	  differ	  (Santiesteban	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  	  
2.4.	  Synthesis	  	  The	  findings	  reported	  above	  can	  be	  well-­‐integrated	  with	  what	  Fiske	  (2006)	  proposes	  to	  be	  the	  “universals”	  of	  social	  cognition,	  by	  which	  humans	  across	  cultures	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  differentiate	  amongst	  one	  another.	  She	  proposes	  a	  space	  delimited	  by	  2	  axes:	  warmth	  and	  competence	   (Fig.	   6).	   The	   “self”	   can	  be	   considered	   to	   be	   in	   the	   top-­‐right	   quadrant.	   Then	  perceived	   similarity	   to	   the	   self	   implies	   a	   shift	   in	   an	   affective/attraction-­‐related	   and	   a	  cognitive/belief-­‐related	   one.	  We	   not	   only	   like	   social	   closer	   others,	   but	   we	   also	   tend	   to	  assume	  that	  they	  perceive	  the	  world	  like	  ourselves	  and	  that	  they	  are	  thus	  more	  likely	  to	  behave	  like	  us.	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  Fig.	  6.	  Fiske’s	  “social	  evaluation”	  space	  along	  dimensions	  of	  “warmth”	  and	  “competence”.	  	  We	   showed	   that	   the	   impact	   this	   can	   have	   on	   interactions	   is	   strictly	   task-­‐dependent.	  Specifically,	  if	  perspective	  coincide,	  then	  projection	  can	  help,	  but	  if	  they	  differ,	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  increased	  misunderstanding	  and	  sub-­‐optimal	  behavior.	  In	  our	  studies,	  we	  aimed	  to	  link	  these	   findings	   to	   strategic	   interactions.	   Specifically,	   if	   common	   knowledge	   based	   on	  deduction	  fails	  in	  coordination	  games,	  then,	  perhaps	  closeness	  based	  common	  knowledge	  could	   vicariate.	   Indeed,	   a	   sense	   of	   likemindedness	   could	   play	   the	   role	   we	   needed	   of	  promoting	   cooperation	   and	   disfavoring	   competition,	   by	   respectively	   decreasing	  uncertainty	   when	   choices	   are	   to	   be	   matched,	   but	   increasing	   it	   when	   they	   are	   to	   be	  decoupled.	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Abstract	  Humans	  are	  often	  faced	  with	  a	  tradeoff	  between	  safe	  isolation	  and	  potentially	  beneficial,	  but	   risky,	   interdependence.	  To	  account	   for	   such	  decisions,	   standard	  economics	   typically	  focuses	   on	   their	   economics	   incentives	  while	   relatively	   neglecting	   that	   social	   species	   are	  accustomed	   to	   differentiating	   between	   one	   another	   along	   various	   dimensions,	   such	   as	  their	   degree	   of	   relatedness,	   their	   similarities	   or	   their	   group	  membership.	   Indeed,	   such	  forms	   of	   "interpersonal	   closeness"	   are	   known	   to	   foster	   cooperation.	  However,	   no	   study	  has	   investigated	   how	   closeness	   may	   play	   out	   in	   more	   competitive	   environments.	   We	  report	   2	   novel	   findings:	   playing	   with	   actual	   friends	   (vs.	   strangers)	   or	   with	   similar	   (vs.	  dissimilar)	   others	   raises	   risk-­‐rates	   and	   can	   resolve	   notorious	   coordination	   problems	  involving	   cooperation;	   the	   same	   forms	   of	   closeness	   however	   decrease	   risky	   behavior	  when	   choices	   offset	   one	   another,	   for	   instance	   when	   competing	   over	   limited	   common	  resources.	  Interestingly,	  both	  effects	   increase	  group	  payoffs,	   thus	  shedding	  light	  on	  their	  potential	  selective	  advantages.	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Introduction	  	  Sally	  (2001)	  on	  Adam	  Smith:	  
“Smith	  suggested	  a	  geometry	  of	  human	  relations:	  we	  perceive	  a	  space	  in	  which	  our	  self	  is	  the	  
origin	  and	  other	  people	  are	  arrayed	  at	  recognizable	  positions	  and	  at	  a	  calculable	  distance	  
from	   the	   origin.	   Our	   ability	   to	   change	   places	   in	   fancy	   with	   another	   declines	   as	   the	   other	  
moves	  further	  away	  from	  the	  self;	  accordingly,	  sympathy	  is	  an	  inverse	  function	  of	  distance.”	  
	   	   	  As	  social	  beings,	  it	  is	  extremely	  frequent	  that	  the	  outcomes	  of	  our	  choices	  depend	  on	  the	  choices	  of	  others.	  This	  requires	  us	  to	  peer	  upon	  the	  minds	  of	  others,	  while	  they	  peer	  into	  ours,	  to	  optimize	  behavior.	  Such	  "mutual	  mind-­‐reading"	  in	  decision-­‐making	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  "strategic	  uncertainty"	  (Van	  Huyck	  et	  al.,	  1990).	  	  	  For	   instance,	   consider	   the	   decision	   of	   joining	   a	   rebellion.	   All	   know	   that	   the	   chances	   of	  victory	  are	  proportional	  to	  the	  number	  of	  those	  joining,	  and	  that	  if	  enough	  people	  do,	  all	  of	  those	  people	  will	  be	  better	  off.	  However	  joining	  the	  rebellion	  is	  risky	  because	  one	  would	  never	   want	   to	   do	   so	   alone.	   Alternatively,	   the	   tribulation	   one	   may	   experience	   upon	  deciding	  to	  enter	  the	  freeway	  around	  rush-­‐hour	  may	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  experienced	  by	  agents	  who	  would	  like	  to	  enter	  particular	  markets	  (Camerer&Fehr,	  2006):	   in	  both	  cases,	  agents	  know	  that	  if	  too	  many	  enter,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  traffic	  jam	  on	  the	  free	  way,	  or	  a	  price	  war	  in	  the	  market,	  thus	  everyone	  loses.	  	  	  In	   rebellion-­‐style	   cases	   potential	   profits	   are	   aligned	   (if	   "we	   all	   risk,	   we	   all	   profit")	   and	  agents	  would	  thus	  prefer	  to	  match	  their	  choices	  (i.e.	  "we	  either	  all	  risk"	  or	  "no	  one	  does",	  but	   isolated	   risks	   are	   costly).	   In	   traffic-­‐style	   situations	   agents	   can	   only	   profit	   alone	   and	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would	  thus	  prefer	  to	  decouple	  their	  choices	  (such	  that	  "either	  I	  take	  the	  freeway",	  or	  "you	  do",	   but	   "we	   shouldn't	   take	   it	   together").	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   strategies	   are	   said	   to	   be	  complements,	  and	  they	  can	  foster	  cooperation,	  while	  in	  the	  latter	  they	  are	  substitutes,	  and	  are	  typical	  of	  competition	  (Bulow	  et	  al.,	  1985;	  Fehr&Camerer,	  2006).	  Both	  cases	  however,	  require	  agents	  to	  coordinate	  their	  choices	  without	  communicating.	  	  	  Understanding	  what	  mediates	  strategic	  uncertainty	  in	  coordination	  problems	  of	  this	  sort	  has	  perplexed	  economists	  and	  game	  theorists	  for	  decades	  (Schelling,	  1960).	  The	  problem	  is	   that,	   whereas,	   in	   many	   interactions,	   incentives	   alone	   can	   guide	   "rational"/deductive	  agents	  to	  optimize	  their	  behavior	  (i.e.	  in	  tic-­‐tac-­‐toe,	  a	  rational	  first-­‐mover	  will	  never	  lose),	  coordination	   dilemmas	   have	   multiple	   deductively	   valid	   solutions	   (i.e.	   multiple	   Nash	  equilibria),	   leaving	   agents	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   finding	   some	   other	   form	   of	   "tacit	  agreement".	  Indeed,	  coordination	  games	  have	  been	  said	  to	  constitute	  "the	  biggest	  problem	  of	  game	  theory"	  (Camerer,	  2003).	  	  	  However,	   standard	   economics	   typically	   assumes	   a	   parsimonious	   "social	   void"	   of	  undifferentiated	  agents	   (Charness	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  whereas	   sociobiology,	   social	  psychology,	  anthropology	   and	   sociology	   tend	   to	   explain	   behavior	   precisely	   by	   assuming	   that	   agents	  differentiate	   between	   one	   another	   along	   various	   important	   dimensions,	   such	   as	   their	  degree	   of	   relatedness	   (Hamilton,	   1964),	   their	   degree	   of	   interindividual	   similarities	  (McPherson,	  2001)	   -­‐	  which	  could	  be	  a	  proxy	   for	   relatedness	   (Fowler	  et	  al.,	  2009)-­‐	  or	   in	  terms	   of	   their	   common	   group	   membership	   (Tajfel&Turner,	   1979),	   among	   others	  (Akerlof&Kranton,	   2000).	   Such	   factors	   suggest	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   social	   space	   (Fiske	   et	   al.,	  2006;	   Jones&Raichlin,	  2006),	   in	  which	   tuning	  behavior	   to	   the	   "social	  distance"	  of	  others	  appears	   to	   be	   the	   rule,	   rather	   than	   the	   exception	   of	   interactions.	   Humans	   are	   in	   fact	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accustomed	   to	  do	   so	   since	   the	   earliest	   ages,	   preverbally	   (age	  1	   and	  younger)	   exhibiting	  affiliative/cooperative	   behavior	   towards	   parents	   but	   not	   strangers	   (Lamb,	   1977),	  evaluating	  others	  (Hamlin	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  and	  progressively	  expanding	  their	  social	  network	  beyond	   genetically	   related	   others,	   to	   include	   friends,	  with	  which	   they	   share	  more	   than	  with	   strangers	   (Olson	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   Similar	   social	   tuning	   has	   also	   been	   observed	   in	   a	  number	  of	  non-­‐human	  species	  including	  spider	  monkeys	  (Pastor-­‐Nieto	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  less	  surprising	  then	  that	  "closeness"-­‐based	  behaviors	  recur	  in	  the	  economic	  interactions	  of	  adults.	  Indeed,	  many	  different	  forms	  of	  decreased	  social	  distance	  -­‐	  in	  terms	  of	   social	   network	   distance	   (Apicella	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Harrison	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   artificial	   group	  membership	   (Charness	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Chen&Chen,	   2011),	   natural	   group	   membership	  (Berhard	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  De	  Cremer&Van	  Vugt,	  1999),	  common	  culture	  (Efferson	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  social	   identification	   (Bohnet&Frey,	   1999;	   Hoffman	   et	   al.,	   1996),	   pre/post	   play	  communication	   (Fehr&Gachter,	   1999),	   social	   distance	   (Charness	   et	   al.,	   2003),	   motor	  synchronization	   (Wilthermuth	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   facial	   resemblance	   (DeBruin,	   2002),	  demographic	  similarities	  (Cole&Teboul,	  2004)	  and	  friendship	  (Haan	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Reuben	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Yamagishi&Sato,	  1986;	  Thompson	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  -­‐	  have	  all	  been	  associated	  with	  increased	  cooperation.	  	  	  However,	  no	  study	  to	  our	  knowledge	  has	  investigated	  how	  closeness	  may	  play	  out	  in	  the	  frequent	   cases	   when	   there	   is	   no	   such	   possibility,	   rather,	   as	   incentives	   are	   in	   conflict,	  choices	  offset	  one	  another	  and	  agents	  must	  decide	  whether	  to	  engage	  competition.	  Here	  we	   investigated	   the	  hypothesis	   that	   interpersonal	   closeness	  would	  decrease	  uncertainty	  when	   choices	   are	   to	   be	   matched,	   but	   that	   it	   would	   increase	   it	   when	   they	   are	   to	   be	  decoupled.	   As	   an	   illustrative	   metaphor,	   one	   may	   think	   of	   the	   paradigmatic	   case	   of	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interpersonal	   closeness,	   namely,	   that	   of	   monozigotic	   twins:	   though	   twins	   should	   (and	  indeed	  do,	  Segal&Herchberger,	  2009)	  take	  more	  risk	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  matching	  choices	  to	  maximize	  mutual	  gains,	  the	  same	  processes	  that	  mediate	  such	  an	  effect	  could	  exacerbate	  conflict	   when	   they	   are	   to	   outsmart	   one	   another,	   thus	   raising	   their	   uncertainty	   when	  strategies	  are	  substitutes.	  Our	  study’s	  goal	  is	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  by	  systematically	  contrasting	  the	  effect	  of	  social	  distance	  in	  cooperative	  and	  competitive	  coordination	  games.	  	  	  
The	  current	  research	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  transformed	  the	  above	  examples	  (i.e.	  rebellions,	  traffic)	  in	  economic	  games,	  in	  which	  matched	  counterparts	  received	  real	  monetary	  payoffs	  depending	  on	  their	  ability	  to	   tacitly	   coordinate	   their	   choices	   in	   games	  with	   strategic	   complements	   and	   substitutes	  (see	  below).	  Using	  such	  games,	  we	  measured	  strategic	  uncertainty	  under	  3	  conditions	  of	  social	  distance.	  Study	  1	  attempted	  to	  maximize	  social	  distance	  and	  served	  as	  a	  baseline.	  In	  this	   first	   study,	   in	   keeping	   with	   standard	   behavioral	   economics	   experiments	   (Camerer,	  2003),	   agents	   knew	   nothing	   of	   one	   another.	   Furthermore,	   as	   choices	   in	   monetary	  interactions	  often	  carry	  a	  moral	  value,	  and	  subjects	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  potential	   judgment	   of	   experimenters	   (Hoffman	   et	   al.,	   1996),	   a	   double-­‐blind	   setting	  was	  adopted	  (for	  specifics,	  see	  Methodological	  Details	  S1,	  in	  the	  Supplemental	  online	  material	  -­‐	  SOM,	   available	   online).	   In	   study	   2	   we	   relaxed	   anonymity	   and	   investigated	   "objective"	  social	  distance	  by	  assessing	  how	  actual	  friends,	  as	  opposed	  to	  strangers,	  coordinated	  their	  choices	  in	  cooperative	  and	  competitive	  environments;	  in	  study	  3,	  we	  restored	  anonymity	  and	  induced	  "perceived"	  closeness	  by	  manipulating	  one	  of	  its	  most	  important	  predictors,	  namely,	   perceived	   similarity	   (McPherson,	   2001),	   matching	   subjects	   with	   other	  (unfamiliar)	  agents	  perceived	  as	  similar	  in	  terms	  of	  specified	  personality	  traits.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  we	  illustrate	  the	  games	  and	  procedures	  that	  were	  common	  to	  all	  studies.	  Then,	  in	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the	  three	  subsequent	  sections,	  we	  describe	  and	  motivate	  the	  specifics	  of	  each	  experiment	  and	  present	  their	  results	  in	  turn.	  	  	  
The	  games	  and	  procedures	  In	   all	   3	   experiments	  we	   used	   the	   same	   2	   types	   of	   (2-­‐player)	   coordination	   games:	   "Stag	  Hunts"	   (SHs)	   and	   "Entry	   Games"	   (EGs),	   which	   have	   been	   extensively	   studied,	   both	   in	  theory	   and	   experimental	   settings	   (see	   Camerer,	   2003	   for	   a	   review).	   In	   our	   versions	   -­‐	  adapted	   from	  Heinemann	  et	  al.	   (2008)	   -­‐	  we	  attempted	  to	  keep	  the	  superficial	  aspects	  of	  the	  2	  games	  as	  similar	  as	  possible,	  so	  that	  any	  behavioral	  difference	  would	  be	  due	  to	  their	  structural	   (incentive-­‐related)	   differences.	   The	   games	  were	   as	   follows:	   in	   both	   games,	   2	  agents	  had	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  same	  two	  options:	  a	  high	  paying	  "risky"	  option,	  always	  worth	  $/€15.00	  or	  0,	  and	  a	  lower	  paying	  but	  safe	  payoff	  (SP)	  of	  a	  given	  $/€	  amount	  (SP	  ≤	  15.00).	  Both	  games	  capture	  a	  frequent	  scenario,	  namely,	  that	  low	  gains	  can	  be	  obtained	  in	  isolation.	   Indeed,	   if	   the	  SP	  was	  chosen,	   it	  was	  obtained	  for	  sure,	  regardless	  the	  choice	  of	  one’s	   counterpart.	   High	   paying	   outcomes	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   required	   coordination	   and	  risk:	  in	  SHs,	  $/€15.00	  were	  obtained,	  by	  both	  players,	  only	  if	  both	  risked,	  while	  	  if	  only	  one	  risked,	  he	  obtained	  0.	   	  In	  EGs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  high	  gain	  could	  only	  be	  obtained	  in	  isolation,	  thus	   if	   both	   risked,	   both	   obtained	  0.	   Then,	   by	   varying	   the	   value	   of	   the	   SP	   and	  having	   participants	   choose	   at	   each	   (randomized)	   step	   we	   obtained	   a	   measure	   of	   their	  uncertainty	   in	   the	   2	   games.	   Importantly,	   since	   initial	   coordination	   patterns	   usually	  determine	  the	  outcome	  of	  their	  repeated	  versions	  (Heinemann	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  and	  since	  we	  were	  here	  interested	  in	  the	  way	  social	  distance	  biases	  choices	  rather	  than	  how	  it	  may	  bias	  learning	  (Fouragnan	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  no	  feedback	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  decisions	  was	  provided	  until	   the	  end	  of	   the	  experiment,	  when	  one	  choice	  was	  extracted	  at	   random	  and	  paid	   (in	  addition	  to	  a	  flat	  "show	  up	  fee"	  of	  $/€5.00).	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  Finally,	   to	   control	   for	   the	  potential	   impact	  of	   inter-­‐individual	  differences	   in	   (non-­‐social)	  risk	  attitudes,	  participants	   took	  part	   in	   lotteries.	  Here,	   they	  were	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  same	   options	   as	   in	   the	   strategic	   games,	   however,	   in	   contrast	   to	   those,	   if	   one	   chose	   the	  risky	   option	   the	   probability	   of	   winning	   was	   fixed	   at	   p=0.5	   and	   depended	   on	   a	   blind	  extraction	   from	   an	   actual	   urn	   (containing	   1	   "winning"	   ball	   and	   1	   "losing"	   ball),	   thus	  completely	  independent	  from	  the	  choice	  of	  others.	  	  	  Each	  study	  took	  place	   in	  behavioral	  economics	   labs.	  Participants	   interacted	   in	  groups	  of	  approximately	   16,	   and	   interacted	   via	   computers	   from	   shielded	   cubicles.	   All	   dependent	  variables	   were	   analyzed	   with	   generalized	   linear	   mixed	   effects	   models	   (GLMMs),	   as	  implemented	   in	   the	   lme4	   package	   (Bates	   &	   Sarkar,	   2006),	   in	   the	   R	   environment	   (R	  Development	  Core	  Team,	  2006	  )	  (for	  specifics	  see	  Methodological	  Details	  S2	  in	  SOM-­‐R).	  All	  procedures	  were	  approved	  by	  local	  ethical	  committees.	  	  
 
3.	  1.	  Experiment	  1:	  strategic	  uncertainty	  under	  anonymity	  	  The	   first	   study	  was	   conducted	   at	   the	   CEEL	   lab	   (Cognitive	   and	   Experimental	   Economics	  Laboratory)	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Trento	  (Italy).	  In	  4	  experimental	  sessions,	  75	  participants	  took	   part	   in	   the	   economic	   coordination	   tasks,	   implemented	   in	   zTree	   software	  (Fischbacher,	  2007).	  	  	  
Results	  Collapsing	  across	  SPs,	  agents	  were	  shown	  to	  risk	   in	  SHs	  (68%	  of	   the	   time)	  and	  to	  avoid	  risk	  in	  EGs	  (67%	  of	  the	  time).	  However,	  in	  SHs,	  for	  SP	  values	  above	  roughly	  2/3	  of	  what	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agents	   could	   receive	   by	   cooperating	   (threshold:	   SP=10.18)	   (Fig.	   1),	   agents	   tend	   to	   stop	  risking.	   Indeed,	   as	   expected	   in	   SHs,	   GLMMs	   revealed	   that	   increasing	   SPs	   decreased	  likelihood	   of	   risking	   (b=-­‐0.94,	   s.e.=0.08,	   p<2e-­‐16)	   increased	   miscoordination	  (coefficient=0.02,	   s.e.=0.002,	   p<0.001)	   and	   lowered	   expected	   payoffs	   (coefficient=0.25,	  s.e.=0.03,	   p<0.001),	   thus	   posing	   an	   efficiency	   dilemma	   of	   how	   to	  maintain	   coordination	  when	  SPs	  increase.	  In	  EGs	  too,	  SPs	  decreased	  likelihood	  of	  risking	  (b=0.54,	  s.e.=0.05,	  p<2e-­‐16),	   however,	   in	   contrast	   to	   SHs,	   coordination	   failures	  were	   especially	   high	   at	   low	   SPs	  (p<0.05),	   rather	   than	   high	   ones.	   Response	   time	   (RT)	   analysis	   further	   confirmed	   that	  uncertainty	  was	  highest	   at	   opposite	   SP	   ranges,	   and	   for	   opposite	   choices	   in	   the	  2	   games	  (game*choice,	  and	  game*SP	  interactions	  both	  significant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level):	  in	  EGs	  agents	  appeared	  to	  reluctantly	  engage	  competition	  (taking	  longer	  to	  do	  so)	  when	  the	  alternative	  option	   was	   particularly	   unappealing,	   that	   is,	   at	   low	   SPs	   (coefficient=-­‐0.02,	   SE=0.006,	  p<0.001),	   and	   when	   ultimately	   choosing	   to	   risk,	   rather	   than	   staying	   safe	   (mean	  difference=0.2s,	   SE=0.05,	   p<0.01).	   Indeed,	   risking	   generally	   lowered	   payoff	   (p<0.05).	  Conversely,	  in	  SHs,	  decision	  times	  (i.e.	  fear	  of	  miscoordination)	  grew	  with	  increasing	  SPs	  (coefficient=0.008,	   SE=0.003,	   p<0.05),	   and	   agents	   took	   the	   longest	   when	   finally	  interrupting	   cooperation	   by	   choosing	   the	   safe	   option	   (mean	   difference=0.16,	   SE=0.04,	  p<0.001).	  Finally,	  we	  found	  that	  across	  subjects	  mean	  risk	  rates	  in	  the	  individual	  decision-­‐making	  domain	  (lotteries)	  correlated	  with	  the	  homologous	  scores	  in	  the	  strategic	  games,	  for	  both	  SHs	  (Pearson's	  r	  =	  0.27,	  p<0.05)	  and	  EGs	  (r=0.4,	  p<0.001).	  Thus	  participants	  who	  risked	  more	  in	  the	  lotteries	  domain	  risked	  more	  in	  the	  two	  games	  (Fig.	  7).	  .	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  Fig	  7.	  Probability	  of	  risky	  choice	  (y-­‐axis)	  (estimated	  with	  a	  generalized	  logistic	  mixed	  model,	  with	  95%	  confidence	  bands	  in	   grey),	   when	   mutually	   anonymous	   counterparts	   interacted	   in	   one-­‐shot	   coordination	   games,	   given	   increasing	   sure	  payoffs	   (x-­‐axis)	   and	   the	   incentive	   to	   either	   match	   (strategic	   complements,	   dashed	   line)	   or	   decouple	   (strategic	  substitutes,	  full	  line)	  their	  choices.	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lotteries,	   while	   payoffs	   were	   being	   calculated,	   participants	   also	   took	   part	   in	   a	   brief	  questionnaire	  (see	  SOM-­‐R	  S3	  for	  details).	  	  	  
Results	  GLMMs	  revealed	  a	  2-­‐way	  interaction	  between	  game	  and	  friendship	  (b=-­‐1.73,	  s.e.=0.14,	  p<	  2e-­‐	   16).	   Indeed,	   restricted	   models	   showed	   that,	   in	   SHs,	   risky	   behavior	   was	   drastically	  reduced	  when	  agents	  played	  with	  their	  friends	  as	  opposed	  to	  strangers	  (b=-­‐3.43,	  s.e.=0.41,	  p<2e-­‐16):	   even	   when	   friends	   could	   only	   break	   even	   or	   lose	   by	   risking	   (that	   is,	   when	  SP=15),	  more	   than	  40%	  of	   them	  still	   kept	  doing	  so.	   In	   contrast	   to	   this,	   the	  already	  high	  uncertainty	  of	  mutually	  offsetting	  choices	  in	  EGs	  appeared	  aggravated	  by	  friendship.	  Here	  GLMM	  logistic	  fits	  revealed	  an	  effect	  of	  friendship	  (b=0.73,	  s.e.=0.28,	  p<0.01),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  significant	   interaction	   between	   SP	   and	   friendship	   (b=0.05,	   SE=0.02,	   p<0.05),	   suggesting	  that,	   in	  EGs,	  friendship	  lowered	  likelihood	  of	  risking	  at	  low	  SPs	  (i.e.	  when	  competition	  is	  highest)	   (see	   Fig.	   2).	   In	   line	   with	   this,	   and	   with	   experiment	   1,	   decision	   time	   analyses	  revealed	  a	  marginally	  significant	  4-­‐way	  interaction	  between	  friendship,	  game,	  choice	  and	  SP	  (b=0.11,	  s.e.=0.06,	  p=0.06):	  while	  in	  SHs,	  at	  high	  SPs	  (i.e.	  SP>7),	  friends	  hesitated	  more	  than	   strangers	   when	   interrupting	   cooperation	   (by	   choosing	   the	   safe	   option)	   (b=-­‐0.15,	  s.e.=0.05,	   p<0.05);	   in	  EGs,	   at	   the	   lowest	   SP	   (SP=0),	   they	   appeared	  most	   uncertain	  when	  risking	  collision	  (b=0.23,	  s.e.=0.12,	  p=0.06).	  Furthermore,	  the	  main	  effects	  of	  friendship	  in	  this	   study	   and	   in	   experiment	   1,	   where	   no	   social	   comparison	   was	   salient	   (because	  participants	   only	   played	   with	   strangers),	   were	   undistinguishable	   (SHs	   and	   EGs,	   both	  ps>0.3),	  thus	  ruling	  out	  potential	  experimental	  "demand	  effects".	  Also,	  the	  correlations	  we	  observed	   in	   experiment	   1	   between	   risk	   attitudes	   in	   lotteries	   and	   strategic	   games	  completely	   broke	   down	   in	   SHs	   (friends:	   Pearson's	   r=0.03,	   p=0.54;	   strangers:	   r=0.11,	  p=0.33),	   and	   were	   maintained	   in	   EGs	   (friends:	   r=0.30,	   p=0.006;	   strangers:	   r=0.56,	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p<0.001).	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matched	   to	   a	   random	   participant	   in	   the	   "friend"	   condition,	   rather	   than	   to	   their	   actual	  friends,	   thus	   suggesting	   that	   such	  beneficial	   effects	   of	   closeness	  were	  not	   driven	  by	   the	  fact	  that	  friends	  were	  able	  to	  better	  anticipate	  each	  others'	  idiosyncratic	  choices	  -­‐	  though	  they	  may	  still	  have	  believed	  so	  -­‐	  so	  much	  as	  by	  an	  unspecific	  sense	  of	  "friendliness".	  	  	  In	   such	   "random	  matching"	  procedure,	   payoff's	  were	   computed	  given	   the	  percentage	  of	  agents	  risking	  in	  the	  same	  condition.	  For	  instance,	  if	  a	  player	  risked	  in	  an	  EG	  with	  SP=7.5,	  in	   the	   friendship	   condition,	   and	   50%	   of	   the	   other	   players	   risked	   in	   this	   exact	   same	  condition	  (target's	  friend	  excluded),	  then	  the	  participant's	  payoff	  in	  this	  trial	  was	  equal,	  in	  expected	  value,	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  matched	  to	  someone	  who	  did	  not	  risk	  (thus	  1-­‐0.5=0.5),	   multiplied	   by	   the	   earning	   in	   case	   of	   success	   (15.00),	   that	   is,	   0.5*15=7.5.	  Furthermore,	   if	   this	   specific	   percentage	   occurs	   when	   SP=7.5,	   then	   no	   player	   has	   an	  incentive	  to	  change	  his/her	  choice,	  as	  even	  49%	  risking	  would	  generate	  incentive	  for	  an	  extra	  player	  to	  risk	  as	  well	  -­‐	  since	  0.51*15	  is	  larger	  that	  the	  SP	  of	  7.5.	  Indeed,	  for	  each	  SP,	  there	   exists	   such	   a	   percentage,	  which	   coincides	  with	   the	  mixed	   strategy	   solution	   of	   the	  game.	  Notably,	   it	   is	   a	  well-­‐documented	  observation	   (Camerer&Fehr,	  2006)	   that	  humans	  approximate	  such	  equilibrium	  points	  remarkably	  well	  in	  EGs,	  without	  communication	  or	  trial	   and	   error.	   "To	   a	   psychologist",	   Daniel	   Kahneman	   said,	   "it	   looks	   like	   magic"	  (Kahneman,	   1988).	   Indeed,	   equilibration	   was	   approximated	   in	   our	   study	   as	   well,	   as	   is	  clear	  from	  Fig.	  3	  (albeit	  with	  some	  under-­‐entry).	  In	  this	  figure,	  which	  here	  only	  shows	  the	  higher	   competition	   SP	   range,	   SP≤7	   (for	   full	   figure	   see	   supplementary	   online	   material,	  SOM-­‐R	   S4)	   one	   can	   appreciate	   several	   aspects:	   i)	   as	   described	   above,	   friends	   (filled	  circles)	  risk	  less	  than	  strangers	  in	  EG	  (squares);	   ii)	  by	  doing	  so,	  they	  are	  foregoing	  more	  profit	   opportunities,	   because	   they	   are	   playing	   farther	   from	   equilibria	   (empty	   circles);	  however,	   iii)	   since	   many	   equilibria	   in	   EGs,	   though	   economically	   "rational",	   yield	   low	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collective	   payoffs,	   as	   a	   group,	   friends	   are	   ultimately	   better	   off	   than	   strangers	   (they	   are	  closer	  to	  the	  social	  optimum,	  that	   is,	   the	  peak	  of	  each	  curve).	  Such	  payoff	  dynamics	  thus	  shed	  light	  on	  how	  closeness-­‐induced	  uncertainty	  could	  ultimately	  be	  reinforced,	  and	  thus	  sustained	  in	  competitive	  environments.	  	  	  






















	   67	  
3.	  3.	  Experiment	  3.	  Pychological	  social	  distance:	  similarity	  and	  liking	  	  Studying	  the	  impact	  of	  perceived	  social	  distance	  through	  friendship	  raised	  a	  few	  issues:	  	  	  1)	  Though	  friendship	  decreases	  social	  distance,	   it	  remained	  unclear	  what	  aspects	  of	   this	  could	   drive	   the	   observed	   effects.	   For	   instance,	   a	   questionnaire	   from	   the	   previous	   study	  showed	  that	  friends	  believed	  they	  were,	  relative	  to	  strangers,	  characterized	  by	  the	  same	  personality	  traits	  -­‐	  though,	  interestingly,	  they	  disagreed	  on	  which	  ones.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  similarity	  (i.e.	  homophily)	  along	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  dimensions	  is	  one	  of	  the	   best	   predictors	   of	   social	   ties	   (McPherson,	   2001),	   such	   as	   friendship	   (Morry,	   2007).	  From	   a	   psychological	   perspective,	   interpersonal	   closeness	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   induce	  agents	  to	  project	  (Goldman,	  2006)	  their	  own	  thoughts	  and	  preferences	  to	  others	  (Todd	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Robbins&Krueger,	  2005	  Mitchell	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Krienen	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  which	  could	  indeed	  decrease	  uncertainty	  when	  choices	  are	  to	  be	  matched,	  and	   increase	   it	  when	  they	  are	   to	   be	   decoupled.	   However,	   an	   alternative	   hypothesis	   is	   that,	   independently	   of	  similarity,	   agents	  who	  are	   "close"	  also	  generally	   like	   one	  another,	   and	  may	   thus	   try	  and	  benefit	  one	  another	  by	  cooperating	  more	  and	  competing	  less.	  This	  led	  us	  to	  ask	  whether	  similarity	   or	   liking	   alone	   were	   sufficient	   to	   induce	   the	   polar	   effects	   on	   coordination	  observed	  above.	  	  	  2)	   A	   second	   issue	   is	   that	   closeness	  was	   not	   the	   only	   factor	   distinguishing	   friends	   from	  strangers.	   Importantly,	   friends	   knew	   they	   would	   have	   seen	   each	   other	   after	   the	  experiment	  thus	  possibly	  raising	  reputational	  concerns	  (Fehr&Fischbacher,	  2003).	  	  	  In	   study	   3	   we	   thus	   attempted	   to	   overcome	   both	   of	   these	   intrinsic	   limitations,	   by	   re-­‐instantiating	  anonymity	  and	  simultaneously	  trying	  to	  disentangle	  between	  similarity	  and	  
	   68	  
liking.	  	  	  
	  
Material	  and	  Methods	  The	   experiment	   was	   carried	   out	   at	   LABEL	   (University	   of	   Southern	   California).	   In	   3	  sessions,	  40	  anonymous	  participants	  (29	  males,	  mean	  age	  =	  21,	 s.d=	 3)	  took	  part	  in	  the	  2	  coordination	   tasks,	   implemented	   in	   zTree	   (Fischbacher,	   2007).	   As	   soon	   as	   participants	  entered	  the	  lab	  they	  rated	  (on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  7)	  each	  of	  100	  personality	  traits.	  They	  did	  so	  twice:	  once,	  indicating	  how	  much	  they	  identified	  in	  a	  given	  trait,	  and	  the	  second,	  how	  much	   they	   liked	   the	   same	   traits.	   Then,	   for	   each	   participant,	   an	   algorithm	   clustered	   the	  traits	   in	   4	   groups,	   of	   3	   traits	   each:	   1)	   traits	   that	   one	   liked	   and	   also	   identified	   in	   (i.e.	  maximizing	  both	  liking	  and	  identity	  scores),	  2)	  traits	  that	  one	  identified	  in	  but	  did	  not	  like	  (i.e.	   maximizing	   identity	   while	   minimizing	   liking),	   3)	   traits	   that	   one	   liked	   but	   did	   not	  identify	  in,	  and,	  4)	  traits	  that	  one	  did	  not	  identify	  in	  and	  did	  not	  like	  (one	  can	  imagine	  a	  2-­‐dimensional	   space,	   with	   a	   "liking"	   and	   "identity"	   axes).	   Finally,	   participants	   played	   the	  games	  while	  being	  mutually	  informed	  whether	  their	  counterparts	  similarly	  or	  dissimilarly	  identified	  in	  a	  given	  triplet	  of	  personality	  traits,	  for	  each	  of	  the	  4	  trait	  triplets	  above.	  As	  the	  decisions	  were	  many,	  we	  adopted	  the	  strategy	  method	  (Selten	  1967;	  Brandts&Charness,	  2000),	   in	   which	   agents	   view	   all	   options,	   for	   a	   given	   game,	   trait	   cluster	   and	   similarity	  condition,	  on	  a	  single	  page,	  rather	  than	  sequentially	  (see	  fig.	  4).	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  Fig.	  10.	  Stimuli	  for	  testing	  the	  impact	  of	  similarity	  and	  liking	  on	  coordination	  games.	  Top:	  an	  example	  from	  the	   “high	   identity,	   low	   liking”	   trait	   cluster	   for	   a	   given	   participant.	   In	   a	   similarity	   condition	   matched	  counterparts	  identified	  in	  the	  same	  traits,	  in	  a	  dissimilarity	  condition	  (not	  shown)	  they	  oppositely	  identified	  in	   the	   same	   traits	   (black	   circles	   for	   "other"	   were	   shifted	   to	   the	   left).	   Bottom	   left:	   in	   this	   example	   the	  screenshot	   for	   SHs.	   In	   EGs	   (not	   shown)	   the	   "15.00"	   and	   "0"	   were	   simply	   inverted.	   Bottom	   right:	   in	   the	  strategy	  method	  agents	  view	  all	  sure	  payoff	  options,	  in	  randomized	  order	  (for	  a	  given	  game,	  trait	  cluster	  and	  similarity	  condition)	  on	  a	  single	  page.	  	  
Results	  GLMMs	   revealed	   a	   significant	   interaction	   between	   game	   and	   similarity	   (b=0.75,	   s.e.=0.22,	  
38p<0.01),	   which	   further	   interacted	   (in	   3-­‐way	   interactions)	   with	   both	   liking	   (b=0.68,	   s.e.=0.25,	  p<0.01)	  and,	  marginally,	  with	  identity	  (b=0.45,	  s.e.=0.25,	  p=0.08).	  Indeed,	  restricting	  the	  model	  to	  only	   the	   cluster	   of	   traits	   that	   subjects	   identified	   with	   and liked	   -­‐	   the	   condition	   which	   most	  resembles	   the	   case	   of	   friendship	   -­‐	  we	   replicated	   the	   findings	   of	   experiment	   2,	   albeit	   to	   a	   lesser	  degree:	   similar	   agents	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   risk	   than	   dissimilar	   ones	   in	   SHs	   (b=6.11,	   s.e.=1.33,	  p<0.0001),	  while	  the	  logistic	  fit	  to	  EGs	  revealed	  an	  opposite	  marginal	  effect	  of	  similarity	  (b=-­‐1.63,	  s.e.=0.9,	   p=0.08),	   and	   a	   SP*similarity	   interaction	   (b=0.25,	   s.e.=0.11,	   p<0.05).	   Importantly,	  restricting	  the	  model	  to	  the	  any	  of	  the	  other	  trait	  clusters	  revealed	  that	  similarity	  ceased	  to	  induce	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this	  dual	  pattern	  when	  shared	  traits	  were	  disliked,	  or	  when	  liked	  traits	  were	  not	  identified	  in.	  This	  suggests	  that	  liking,	  identity	  and	  similarity	  interact	  to	  induce	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  interest	  and	  that,	   in	   addition	   to	   objective	   network	   distance,	   psychological	   distance	   alone	   (i.e.	   perceived	  similarity	  and	  liking)	  can	  foster	  cooperation	  and	  discourage	  conflict.	  
	  
3.4.	  Discussion	  	  It	   has	   long	   been	   known	   that	   interpersonal	   closeness	   fosters	   cooperation:	   in	   treating	   moral	  sentiments	  Adam	  Smith	  (Smith,	  1759)	  recognized	  that	  "sympathy"	  declined	  with	  social	  distance,	  from	  "brothers	  and	  sisters"	   to	  "the	  children	  of	  brothers	  and	  sisters",	   to	  "the	  children	  of	  cousins"	  and	  "the	  affection	  gradually	  diminishes	  as	   the	  relation	  grows	  more	  and	  more	  remote".	  Similarly,	  Haldane	   (1939)	   provocatively	   remarked,	   "I	   would	   lay	   down	   my	   life	   for	   two	   brothers	   or	   eight	  cousins".	   Indeed,	   from	  an	  evolutionary	  perspective	   (Hamilton,	  1964),	   it	   can	  make	  sense	   to	   incur	  costs	  to	  benefit	  genetically	  closer	  others,	  because,	  by	  doing	  so,	  individuals	  may	  indirectly	  promote	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  portion	  of	  genes	  they	  share	  with	  them.	  Paralleling	  this,	  and	  perhaps	  relatedly,	  in	  non-­‐kin	  relations,	  homophily	  (the	  tendency	  to	  associate	  with	  similar	  others)	   is	  held	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	   fundamental	   mechanisms	   underlying	   social	   ties	   such	   as	   friendship	   (McPherson,	   2001).	  Incidentally,	   and	   possibly	   linking	   the	   two	   phenomena,	   friends	   have	   been	   shown	   to	   exhibit	  correlated	   genotypes,	   plausibly	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   actively	   seek	   others	  with	  similar/dissimilar	   phenotypes	   (such	   as	   similar	   cognitive	   skills,	   preferences	   or	   physical	   traits)	  (Fowler	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Here	   we	   thus	   sought	   to	   investigate	   how	   social	   closeness,	   in	   terms	   of	  friendship,	   or	   interpersonal	   similarities,	   can	   play	   out	   on	   actual	   economic	   interactions.	   We	  demonstrated	   that	   both	   can	   potentially	   resolve	   one	   of	   "the	   biggest	   problems	   of	   game	   theory",	  namely	  coordination:	  indeed,	  when	  notorious	  "Stag	  hunt"	  dilemmas	  (with	  their	  typically	  observed	  inefficiencies)	  are	  grounded	  in	  social	  contexts	  mediating	  closeness,	  the	  dilemma	  nearly	  dissolves,	  together	  with	  agents'	  uncertainty.	  However,	  we	  show	  that	  closeness	  can	  also	  increase	  uncertainty	  if	  choices	  offset	  one	  another.	  Here,	   for	   instance,	  a	  perception	  of	  similarity	  can	  deter	  agents	   from	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collectively	  over-­‐exploiting	  common	  resources,	  thus	  increasing	  collective	  profits.	  It	  follows	  that	  2	  roads	   of	   decreased	   and	   increased	   uncertainty	   can	   lead	   groups	   whose	   members	   feel	   close	   to	  maintain	  coordination	  advantages	  over	  groups	  whose	  members	  are	  "strangers".	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Chapter	  4	  Neural	  Mechanisms	  Mediating	  the	  Impact	  of	  
Social	  Distance	  on	  Human	  coordination	  	  
Introduction	  	  In	   the	   preceding	   sections	  we	   showed	   how	   homophily	   and	   social	   closeness	   can	   serve	   2	  probably	   related	   but	   conceptually	   distinct	   functions:	   i)	   Along	   a	   seemingly	  reward/motivation-­‐related	  dimension	  (i.e.	  Fiske’s	  (2007)	  “warmth”	  dimension)	  they	  can	  induce	   attraction;	   ii)	   along	   a	   more	   cognitive/informational	   dimension	   (i.e.	   Fiske’s	  “competence”	   dimension)	   they	   can	   foster	   a	   sense	   of	   likemindedness,	   mutual	  understanding,	  or	  “common	  knowledge”.	  We	  also	  provided	  evidence	  (Chierchia&Coricelli,	  under	   revision)	   that	   both	   actual	   closeness	   (friendship)	   and	   perceived	   closeness	   (i.e.	  similarity)	  support	  a	  qualitatively	  similar	  2-­‐fold	  role	  in	  mediating	  coordination:	  they	  lead	  agents	   to	   risk	  more	  when	   trying	   to	  match	   their	   choices,	   and	   to	   risk	   less	  when	   trying	   to	  decouple	  them,	  and	  that	  both	  of	  these	  effects	  generate	  an	  economic	  advantage	  to	  groups	  whose	  members	  feel	  “close”.	  Here	  we	  aimed	  to	  further	  articulate	  these	  effects	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  2	  dimensions	  illustrated	  above,	  and	  to	  attempt	  to	  dissociate	  between	  them	  at	  both	  the	  behavioral	  and	  neural	  level.	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  a	  recent	  debate	  has	  sparked	  in	  behavioral	  economics	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  traditionally	   observed	   effects	   of	   social	   distance	   on	   cooperation	   (Cox,	   2004;	   Guala	   et	   al.,	  2012;	   De	   Cremer,	   1999,	   Bohnet&Frey,	   1999).	   Two	   broad	   classes	   of	   approaches	   have	  emerged:	  one	  argues	  that	  decreased	  social	  distance	  affects	  preferences,	  such	  that	  "closer"	  counterparts	  come	  to	  positively	  regard	  one	  another's	  welfare	  (Fehr&Camerer,	  2007;	  Fehr,	  2003).	  We	  call	  this	  an	  "altruism	  hypothesis"	  (AH).	  Importantly,	  an	  AH	  posits	  that	  altruistic	  agents	  will	  attempt	  to	  benefit	  others,	  regardless	  how	  they	  expect	  them	  to	  behave.	  Indeed,	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altruism	   can	   benefit	   active	   and	   passive	   recipients	   alike	   (i.e.	   as	   charity)	   and	   is	   hence	   a	  possible	   account	   of	   social	   but	   not	   (inherently)	   strategic	   behavior.	   Conversely,	   a	   second	  approach	   has	   focused	   precisely	   on	   expected	   reciprocity	   (RH)	   (Rabin,	   1993;	  Charness&Dufwenberg,	  2006)	  and	  it	  takes	  social	  distance	  to	  be	  "degree	  of	  reciprocity	  that	  subjects	  believe	  exist	   in	  an	   interaction"	   (Hoffman	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  A	  RH	  assumes	  particular	  relevance	  in	  light	  of	  the	  frequent	  presence	  of	  "conditional	  reciprocators",	  who	  are	  willing	  to	   cooperate	   with	   others	   conditional	   on	   their	   beliefs	   that	   others	   will	   do	   the	   same	  (Camerer&Fehr,	   2006;	   Suzuki	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Chang	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Indeed,	   both	  AH	   and	  RH	  could,	   in	   principle,	   contribute	   to	   the	   observed	   polar	   effect	   of	   social	   distance	   on	  coordination:	  reasoning	  by	  extremes,	  a	  completely	  selfless/altruistic	  agent	  would	  always	  risk	   in	   SHs,	   and	   never	   do	   so	   in	   EGs,	   as	   these	   strategies	   maximally	   benefit	   one's	  counterpart.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  belief	  that	  others	  will	  reciprocate	  one's	  actions	  would	  also	   alleviate	   uncertainty	  when	   actions	   are	   to	   be	  matched	   (as	   in	   SHs),	   but	   aggravate	   it	  when	  they	  are	  to	  be	  decoupled	  (EGs).	  In	  this	  study	  we	  thus	  aimed	  to	  weigh	  the	  potentially	  separate	  contributions	  of	  non-­‐strategic	  altruism	  and	  strategic	  reciprocity.	  	  	  Intriguingly,	  evidence	  from	  social	  neuroscience	  and	  neuroeconomics	  appeared	  to	  trace	  a	  similar	   functional	   division,	   within	   the	   "default/mentalizing	   network"	   (Amodio&Frith,	  2006;	  Buckner	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  between	  the	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (mPFC)	  -­‐	   in	  particular	  its	   ventral	   portion	   (vmPFC)	   -­‐	   and	   the	   temporo-­‐parietal	   junction	   (TPJ).	   Specifically,	   the	  v/mPFC	  is	  held	  to	  be	  critical	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  recursive	  beliefs	  in	  strategic	  interactions	  (Hampton,	  2006;	  Coricelli&Nagel,	  2009;	  Yoshida	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Furthermore,	  fortifying	  this	  view	  of	  self-­‐projection	  to	  closer	  others,	  the	  vmPFC	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  recruited	  when	  agents	   think	   about	   themselves	   and	   similar	   others	   (Mitchell	   et.	   al.,	   2005;	   Jenkins	   et	   al.,	  2008),	   or	   friends	   (Fareri	   et	   al.,	   2012;	  Krienen	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   but	   not	   dissimilar	   others	   or	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strangers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  imaging	  studies	  on	  altruism	  have	  consistently	  implicated	  the	  TPJ	   (Tankersley	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Morishima	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Tricomi	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Young	   et	   al.,	  2010).	   This	   raised	   the	   possibility	   of	   dissociable	   contributions	   of	   altruism	   and	   expected	  reciprocity	  to	  the	  polar	  effect	  of	  social	  distance	  on	  coordination,	  both	  in	  behavior	  and	  the	  brain.	  	  	  
4.	  1.	  Closeness	  in	  the	  brain	  
	  
4.1.	  1.	  Common	  beliefs	  	  	  Above,	   we	   reviewed	   evidence	   that	   social	   closeness	   in	   terms	   of	   common	   social	  categorizations	   (i.e.	   such	   as	   common	   group	   membership,	   friendship,	   interpersonal	  similarity)	   can	   induce	   agents	   to	   attribute	   their	   own	  beliefs	   and	  mental	  world	   to	   others,	  apparently	  drawing	  on	  self-­‐knowledge	  to	  mentalize	  about	  them	  (i.e.	  Krueger,	  2008;	  Ames,	  2004;	  Goldman,	  2005;	  Morry,	  2007).	  	  Now,	  if	  we	  rely	  on	  related	  information	  structures	  to	  mentalize	   on	   ourselves	   and	   similar,	   but	   not	   dissimilar	   others,	   and	   related	   information	  structures	  tend	  to	  be	  co-­‐localized	  in	  the	  brain,	  this	  affords	  a	  prediction:	  we	  should	  observe	  overlapping	  neural	  regions	  to	  be	  recruited	  when	  subjects	  mentalize	  about	  themselves	  and	  similar	  others,	  and	  less	  for	  dissimilar	  others.	  This	  was	  observed	  in	  a	  study	  by	  Mitchell	  et	  al.	  (2006).	  We	  briefly	  illustrate.	  	  	  In	  a	  first	  study,	  Mitchell	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  told	  participants	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  experiment	  was	  to	   assess	   how	   well	   they	   could	   use	   a	   small	   set	   of	   information	   to	   infer	   a	   number	   of	  characteristics	  of	  2	   target	   strangers.	  One	  of	   the	   targets	  was	  described	  as	   stereotypically	  conservative	   and	   the	   other	   as	   liberal,	   such	   that,	   supposedly,	   each	   participant	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spontaneously	   felt	   more	   similar	   to	   one	   than	   the	   other.	   Subsequently,	   in	   the	   scanner,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  answer	  the	  same	  set	  of	  unrelated	  questions	  (i.e.	  “Does	  target	  X	  like	  to	  go	  back	  home	  for	  thankgiving?”)	  about	  i)	  themselves,	  ii)	  the	  conservative	  other	  and	  iii)	  the	  liberal	  other.	  After	  scanning	  subjects	  provided	  a	  behavioral	  measure	  of	  how	  much	  they	  implicitly	   associated	   with	   either	   the	   liberal	   or	   conservative	   other,	   in	   turn	   enabling	   the	  investigators	   to	   divide	   them	   into	   “similar	   to	   liberal”	   and	   “dissimilar	   to	   liberal”	   subjects.	  Mitchell	   reported	   that	   answering	   questions	   about	   one’s	   self	   (self-­‐mentalizing)	   recruited	  the	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC)	  in	  both	  groups.	  This	  region	  has	  consistently	  been	   implicated	   in	  a	  number	  of	   tasks	   tapping	  on	  self-­‐referential	  knowledge	  (for	  a	  meta-­‐analyses,	   see	   Northoff	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   Importantly,	   the	   same	   region	   was	   recruited	   when	  answering	  questions	  i)	  about	  liberal	  targets	  for	  the	  “similar	  to	  liberal”	  group	  only	  and	  ii)	  about	  conservative	  targets	  for	  the	  “dissimilar	  to	  liberal	  group	  only.	  Furthermore,	  for	  both	  groups,	  a	  distinct	  region	  in	  the	  dorsomedial	  PFC	  (dmPFC)	  was	  recruited	  for	  the	  respective	  dissimilar	  others	  (Fig.	  11).	  	  	  
	  Fig.	  12.	  Mitchell	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  show	  that	  the	  vmPFC	  is	  similarly	  recruited	  to	  answer	  questions	  about	  one’s	  self	  and	  similar	  but	  not	  dissimilar	  others.	  The	  dmPFC	  exhibits	  the	  opposite	  pattern.	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  A	  second	  study	  (Jenkins	  et	  al.	  2008)	  replicated	  these	  results	  with	  repetition	  suppression.	  In	  the	  latter	  study	  a	  behavioral	  measure	  of	  self-­‐projection	  was	  observed:	  subjects	  tended	  to	  attribute	   to	  similar	  others	   the	  same	  answers	   they	  gave	   for	   themselves.	  Mitchell	   takes	  his	  results	  to	  suggest	  that	  similarity	  has	  a	  moderating	  role	  on	  self-­‐referential	  mentalizing.	  Krienen	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   showed	   that	   similar	   effects	   on	   the	   brain	   also	   take	   place	   when	  subjects	  answer	  questions	  about	  themselves	  and	  their	  friends,	  independently	  of	  similarity	  (see	   discussion).	   Indeed,	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   overlap	   between	   other-­‐related	   and	   self-­‐related	  processing	   has	   spurred	   a	   long	   list	   of	   studies.	   In	   a	   recent	   meta-­‐analyses	   	   (Denny	   et	   al.,	  2012)	  107	  imaging	  studies	  involving	  self	  vs.	  other	  related	  contrasts	  were	  compared.	  The	  results	  confirmed	  Mitchell’s	  findings	  in	  that	  they	  revealed	  a	  gradient	  along	  the	  medial	  wall	  of	  the	  PFC,	  such	  that,	  relative	  to	  other-­‐related	  information,	  self-­‐related	  information	  seems	  to	  more	  commonly	  recruit	  a	  more	  ventral	  portion	  of	  the	  mPFC	  (Fig.	  13)	  	  
	  Fig.	  13.	  Results	  of	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	   (Denny	  et	  al.	  2012)	  on	  107	   imaging	  studies	   involving	  contrasts	   of	   self	   vs.	   other-­‐related	   information.	   Evidence	   for	   a	   gradient	   along	   the	  medial	  wall	   of	   the	   mPFC:	   ventral	   portions	   are	   more	   frequently	   recruited	   for	   self,	   rather	   than	  other-­‐related	  information,	  while	  the	  opposite	  contrasts	  often	  show	  activity	  in	  more	  dorsal	  portions.	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The	   question	   of	  why	   the	   vmPFC	  may	   contribute	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   beliefs	   for	   self	   and	  closer	   others	   remains	   open.	   Indeed,	   what	   makes	   self-­‐related	   information	   specific?	   One	  possibility	  is	  that	  self-­‐relevant	  information	  is	  more	  accessible:	  it	  is	  usually	  retrieved	  faster	  (Kuiper&Rogers,	  1979)	  and	  with	  more	  confidence	  (Bower&Gilligan,	  1979)	  than	  any	  other	  type	  of	  information.	  Related	  to	  this,	  self-­‐relevant	  information	  may	  tend	  to	  be	  richer	  than	  other	  types	  of	  information.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  vmPFC	  activity	  could	  be	  a	  neural	  signature	  for	   information	   that	   is	   being	   processed	   in	   greater	   depth.	   For	   instance,	   Coricelli&Nagel	  (2009)	  showed	  that	  it	  was	  recruited	  by	  subjects	  that	  adopted	  higher	  degrees	  of	  recursion	  in	  economic	  games.	  	  	  
4.	  1.	  2.	  Common	  preferences	  	  Interpersonal	   attraction	   and	   reward	   have	   a	   common	   behavioral	   manifestation,	   namely,	  approach.	   Indeed,	   the	   vmPFC	   is	   part	   of	   the	   dopaminergic	  mesolimbic	   pathways,	   which	  have	   been	   strongly	   implicated	   in	   mediating	   a	   value	   signal	   (cfr.	   Schultz,	   2000;	  Haber&Knutson,	  2011)	  and	  its	  diminished	  functioning	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  a	  number	  of	  pathologies	  related	  to	  decision	  making	  (for	  a	  review	  see	  Chierchia&Coricelli,	  2011).	  In	  social	  contexts,	  the	  vmPFC	  has	  been	  consistently	  implicated	  in	  mentalizing	  (Mitchell	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  moral	  reasoning	  (Moll	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  empathy	  (Jackson	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Shamay-­‐Tsoory	  et	   al.,	   2003),	   cooperation	   (Rilling,	   2000)	   and,	   in	   brief,	   notions	   related	   to	   a	   social	   value	  signal	  (Fehr&Camerer,	  2007).	   Its	  reduced	   functional	  connectivity	  with	  other	  regions	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  patients	  with	  autistic	  spectrum	  disorder	  (Kennedy&Courchesne,	  2008),	  and	   even	   its	   sheer	   volume	  has	  been	   associated	   to	   social	   competences	   and	   size	   of	   social	  networks	  (Lewis	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  However,	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  link	  between	  this	  region	  and	  interpersonal	   attraction,	   one	   study	   explicitly	   focused	  on	   the	  perception	   and	   subsequent	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approach	  behavior	  towards	  liked	  others	  (Güroğlu	  et	  al.	  2008)	  -­‐	  which	  was,	  together	  with	  similarity,	   a	   necessary	   factor	   in	   affecting	   coordination	   rates	   in	   our	   experiment.	   In	   their	  study	  members	  of	  an	  orchestra	  rated	  how	  much	  they	  liked/disliked	  i)	  each	  member	  of	  the	  group,	   ii)	   a	   series	   of	   celebrities	   and	   iii)	   a	   number	   of	   objects.	   During	   scanning,	   they	  performed	   a	   social	   interaction	   simulation	   task:	   a	   figure	   representing	   the	   subjects	   was	  placed	  in	  the	  center	  of	  a	  screen,	  which	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  imagine	  as	  a	  room.	  At	  the	  top	  of	  the	   screen	  was	   represented	   either	   a	   picture	   of	   an	   orchestra	  member,	   a	   celebrity	   or	   an	  object.	  Subjects	  simply	  had	  to	  move	  a	  lever	  “up”	  towards	  the	  picture	  to	  indicate	  approach,	  “down”	  to	   indicate	  avoidance	  and	  “left”	  to	   indicate	  neutrality.	  Clearly,	  subjects	  tended	  to	  approach	   liked	   elements	   (of	   either	   of	   the	   3	   classes),	   however,	   interestingly	   for	   our	  purposes,	   the	   vmPFC	   was	   recruited	   preferentially	   for	   liked	   peers,	   relative	   to	   liked	  celebrities	   and	   objects,	   implicating	   this	   region	   in	   interpersonal	   attraction.	   In	   Mitchell’s	  experiment	   as	  well	   (2006),	   positivity	   IAT	   scores,	   a	  measure	   of	   the	   association	   between	  liberal/conservative	   others	   and	   positively/negatively	   valenced	   words	   correlated	   with	  vmPFC	  activity	  when	  inferring	  the	  preferences	  of	  similar	  and	  liked	  others.	  Apparently,	  the	  tight	  correlation	  between	  liking	  and	  similarity	   is	  hard	  to	  tease	  a	  part,	  even	  at	  the	  neural	  level.	   One	   attempt	   was	   by	   Mobbs	   et	   al.	   (2009).	   In	   their	   task,	   subjects	   viewed	   2	   fictive	  game-­‐show	   contestants	  who,	   before	   taking	  part	   in	   the	   game,	   answered	  questions	   about	  themselves	  in	  such	  a	  way	  to	  appear	  either	  likeable	  or	  unlikeable.	  Subjects	  rated	  both	  how	  much	  they	  liked	  each	  of	  the	  participants	  and	  how	  much	  they	  felt	  similar	  to	  them,	  indeed	  the	  2	  correlated.	  In	  the	  scanner,	  subjects	  than	  watched	  the	  contestants	  win/lose	  monetary	  awards.	   The	   ventral	   striatum	   and	   the	   vmPFC	   expressed	   both	   higher	   activity	   and	  connectivity	  when	  subjects	  either	  won	  in	  the	  1st	  person,	  or	  observed	  liked	  others	  winning,	  as	  opposed	  to	  disliked	  others	  winning.	  Intriguingly,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  coupling	  between	  the	  2	  regions	  scaled	  not	  with	  liking-­‐rating	  but	  with	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  similarity	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and	   liking	   ratings.	  This	   led	   the	  authors	   to	   speak	  of	   a	  key	   role	   for	   similarity	   in	  vicarious	  reward.	   Similarly,	   Fareri	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   found	   that	   ventral	   striatum	   and	   the	   vmPFC	  were	  more	   active	  when	   subjects	  won	  monetary	  prizes	   to	  be	   shared	  with	   their	   friends,	   rather	  than	  strangers.	  	  Such	   results	   raise	   an	   important	   question.	   What	   drives	   effects	   of	   social	   closeness	   on	  coordination?	  The	  fact	  that	  closer	  others	  have	  better	  mutual	  understanding,	  that	  they	  can	  project	   to	  one	  another’s	  minds	  with	  greater	  ease	  and	  depth	   (Coricelli&Nagel,	  2009)?	  Or	  rather	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  care	  for	  one	  another	  and	  intimally	  share	  one	  another’s	  rewards	  and	   punishments?	   Plausibly,	   both	   dimensions	   of	   social	   closeness	   contribute	   to	  interactions,	  however,	  no	  study	  has	  systematically	  attempted	  to	  disentangle	  between	  the	  two.	  One	  way	   to	  do	  so	   is	   to	   force	   friendly	  and	  stranger	  counterparts	   to	   randomize	  over	  their	   choices.	   If	   subjects	   still	   exhibit	   increased	   cooperation	   for	   friends	   as	   opposed	   to	  strangers,	   it	  would	  have	  meant	   that	  non-­‐strategic	  motivational	  components	  of	  closeness	  are	  sufficient	  to	  drive	  cooperation.	  In	  any	  case,	  this	  idea	  promised	  to	  dissociate	  between	  behavioral	  and	  neural	  signatures	  of	  closeness-­‐based	  altruism	  and	  mutual	  understanding,	  the	  former	  aligning	  better	  with	  positivity/liking,	  the	  second	  with	  similarity.	  	  	  
4.	  2.	  Material	  and	  methods	  	  
The	  games	  To	   investigate	   the	  effect	  of	  social	  closeness	  on	  coordination,	  we	  re-­‐adapted	   the	  2	  games	  from	  our	   previous	   study	   (Chierchia&Coricelli,	   under	   revision)	   -­‐	  which	   in	   turn	   had	  been	  adapted	  from	  Heinemann&Nagel	  (2006):	  one	  game	  involved	  strategic	  complements	  (Stag	  hunts	  –	  SHs),	  in	  which	  agents	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  match	  their	  choices;	  the	  other	  involved	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strategic	   substitutes	   (Entry	   games	   –	   EGs),	   which	   should	   lead	   agents	   to	   attempt	   to	  decouple	   their	   choices.	  As	   in	  our	  previous	  studies,	  we	  attempted	   to	  keep	   the	  superficial	  aspects	  of	  the	  2	  games	  as	  similar	  as	  possible,	  so	  that	  any	  behavioral	  difference	  would	  be	  due	  to	  their	  structural	  (incentive-­‐related)	  differences.	  The	  games	  were	  as	  follows:	  in	  both	  games,	   2	   agents	   had	   to	   choose	   between	   the	   same	   two	   options:	   a	   high	   paying	   "risky"	  option,	   always	  worth	  €15.00	  or	  0,	   and	  a	   lower	  paying	  but	   safe	  payoff	   (SP)	  of	   a	   given	  €	  amount	  (SP	  ≤	  15.00).	  Both	  games	  capture	  a	  frequent	  scenario,	  namely,	  that	  low	  gains	  can	  be	  obtained	  in	  isolation.	  Indeed,	  if	  the	  SP	  was	  chosen,	  it	  was	  obtained	  for	  sure,	  regardless	  the	   choice	   of	   one’s	   counterpart.	   High	   paying	   outcomes	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   required	  coordination	   and	   risk:	   in	   SHs,	   $/€15.00	   were	   obtained,	   by	   both	   players,	   only	   if	   both	  risked,	  while	   if	  only	  one	  risked,	  he	  obtained	  0.	   	   In	  EGs,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  high	  gain	  could	  only	  be	  obtained	  in	  isolation,	  thus	  if	  both	  risked,	  both	  obtained	  0.	  Then,	  by	  varying	  the	  value	  of	  the	  SP	  and	  having	  participants	  choose	  at	  each	  (randomized)	  step	  we	  obtained	  a	  behavioral	  measure	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  2	  games.	  Importantly,	  since	  initial	  coordination	  patterns	   usually	   determine	   the	   outcome	   of	   their	   repeated	   versions	   (Heinemann	   et	   al.,	  2004),	  and	  since	  we	  were	  here	  interested	  in	  the	  way	  social	  distance	  biases	  choices	  rather	  than	  how	  it	  may	  bias	   learning	  (Fouragnan	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  no	   feedback	  on	   the	  outcomes	  of	  decisions	  was	  provided	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  when	  one	  choice	  was	  extracted	  at	  random	  and	  paid	  (in	  addition	  to	  a	  flat	  "show	  up	  fee"	  of	  $/€5.00).	  	  
Social	  distance	  To	   assess	   the	   impact	   of	   social	   closeness	   in	   such	   games,	   participants	   played	   each	   of	   the	  same	   games	   twice	   (with	   identical	   payoffs),	   once	   with	   a	   friend	   who	   came	   to	   the	  experimental	   session	   with	   them,	   and	   once	   with	   a	   anonymous	   stranger,	   who	   had	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previously	  taken	  part	  in	  the	  experiment12.	  	  	  
Non-­‐strategic	  conditions	  To	   disentangle	   between	   alternative	   explanations	   of	   closeness-­‐based	   cooperation	  (illustrated	   above),	  we	   included	   an	   additional	   "non-­‐strategic"	   condition	   to	   the	   standard	  strategic	  games.	  Here,	  players	  were	  informed	  that	  their	  counterparts'	  choices	  would	  have	  been	   determined	   by	   a	   coin	   flip.	   Strategic	   and	   non-­‐strategic	   trials	   were	   visually	   only	  differentiated	   by	   the	   word	   "flip"	   or	   "choice"	   (Fig.)	   and	   were	   identical	   in	   their	   payoff	  schedules.	   For	   instance,	   in	   a	   non-­‐strategic	   SH,	   1	   participant	   makes	   a	   deliberate	   choice	  between	   risking	   or	   choosing	   the	   SP.	   The	   other	   participant	   has	   50-­‐50	   of	   being	   assigned	  either	   one	   or	   the	   other.	   If	   the	   choosing	   player	   takes	   the	   risky	   option,	   there	   is	   a	   0.5%	  chance	   of	   both	   players	   earning	   the	  maximum.	  With	   the	   complementary	   probability	   the	  choosing	   player	   will	   earn	   0,	   but	   the	   non-­‐deliberating	   player	   will	   still	   earn	   the	   SP.	   	   It	  follows	   that	   in	   non-­‐strategic	   flip	   trials,	   deliberating	   players	   retained	   the	   possibility	   to	  benefit	  their	  non-­‐strategic	  counterparts,	  by	  risking	  more	  in	  SHs	  and	  less	  in	  EGs,	  however	  they	  can’t	  do	  so	  based	  on	  expected	  reciprocation.	  Since	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  closeness-­‐based	   cooperation	   is	   non-­‐strategic,	   we	   were	   interested	   in	   comparing	   the	   2	   cases.	   An	  identical	  polar	  effect	  of	  friendship	  on	  risk	  in	  strategic	  and	  non-­‐strategic	  conditions	  would	  have	   suggested	   that	   even	   the	   simplest	   preference-­‐based	  models	   (i.e.	   1st	   order	   altruism)	  could	  be	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  distance	  on	  interactions	  in	  SHs	  and	  EGs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  observing	  differential	  effects	  in	  strategic	  and	  non-­‐strategic	  conditions	  (in	   terms	   of	   an	   interaction	   between	   friendship	   and	   strategy)	   would	   have	   successfully	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  For	   the	   first	   pair	   of	   friends	  we	  were	   ready	   to	   ask	   them	   to	   come	  back	   for	   payment,	   however	   a	  “friend	  condition”	  was	  extracted	  so	  we	  were	  able	  to	  pay	  them	  immediately.	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dissociated	  and	  quantified	  the	  respective	  contributions	  of	  the	  2	  mechanisms	  to	  closeness-­‐based	  interactions.	  This	  yielded	  a	  2	  (game:	  SHs	  vs.	  EGs)	  x	  2	  (social	  distance:	  friend	  (F)	  vs.	  strangers	  (S)	  x	  2	  (strategy:	  strategic	  (s)	  vs.	  non-­‐strategic	  (ns))	  full	  factorial	  within	  subject	  design;	  in	  addition	  to	  which,	  to	  control	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  social	  distance,	  agents	  also	  played	  each	  game	  with	  a	  computer	  (C)	  that	  made	  random	  selections	  among	  options,	  thus	  adding	  2	  experimental	  cells,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  10	  experimental	  cells.	  	  	  
Stimuli	  For	   each	   of	   the	   10	   experimental	   cells,	   participants	  made	   31	   decisions	   between	   a	   risky	  option	   (always	  worth	  €15.00	  or	  nothing)	  and	  a	   safe	  option	   (SP),	  which	  varied	  31	   times	  between	  0≤SP≤15,	  in	  steps	  of	  0.5,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  310	  decisions.	  The	  order	  of	  the	  SPs	  and	  the	  order	   of	   the	   conditions	   was	   pseudo-­‐randomized	   between	   subjects.	   Furthermore,	   pilot	  studies	   had	   shown	   switching	   between	   SHs	   and	   EGs	   to	   be	   confusing.	   Thus,	   to	  minimize	  task-­‐switching	   costs,	   the	  2	   games	  were	  played	   in	   separate	   runs	   (2	   consecutive	   runs	   for	  each	  game),	  the	  order	  of	  which	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  participants.	  No	  feedback	  on	  decisions	  was	  given	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Participants	  had	  6	  seconds	  to	  make	  each	   choice.	   As	   soon	   as	   they	   did,	   a	   white	   frame	   highlighted	   their	   selected	   option	   for	  500ms.	  After	  this,	  a	  fixation	  cross	  appeared,	  the	  duration	  of	  which	  covered	  the	  remainder	  of	   the	   6	   s	   decision	   time,	   plus	   a	   jittered	   interval	   (min	   1.5s,	   max	   6s,	   log-­‐normally	  distributed)	   (Fig.	   14).	   Stimuli	   were	   prepared	   and	   administered	   in	   psychtoolboox	  (Brainard,	  1997;	  Pelli,	  1997).	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  Fig.	  14.	  Task	  structure.	  Participants	  played	  2	  types	  of	  coordination	  games:	  stag	  hunts	  (SHs)	  (shown	  above)	  and	  entry	  games	  (EGs)	  (in	  which	  the	  “if	  at	  least	  2”	  label	  became	  “if	  at	  most	  1”).	  In	  both,	  they	  chose	  between	  a	  generally	  low	  paying	  sure	  payoff	  (SP)	  and	  potentially	  higher	  paying	  but	  risky	  one	  (worth	  always	  €15.00).	  In	  SHs,	   the	  high	  payment	  was	  obtained	  only	   if	  both	  players	  chose	   to	  risk,	   thus	  matching	   their	  choices.	   If	  one	  player	  risked	  and	  the	  other	  didn’t,	  he	  earned	  0.	  In	  EGs,	  a	  player	  would	  only	  earn	  the	  high	  payoff	  if	  she	  was	  the	  only	  one	  choosing	   it,	   thus	  players	  were	   to	  decouple	   their	   choices.	   If	  both	  chose	   the	   risky	  option,	  both	  earned	  0.	  Above	  a	  SH	  is	  shown,	  in	  EGs	  the	  risky	  option	  was	  labeled	  “it	  at	  most	  1”.	  Participants	  played	  each	  of	  the	  games	  repeatedly	  without	  feedback,	  for	  different	  values	  of	  the	  SP.	  They	  did	  so	  twice:	  once	  with	  a	  friend	  playing	   outside	   the	   scanner,	   once	   with	   an	   anonymous	   participant	   (“stranger”).	   To	   dissociate	   between	  altruistic	   (non-­‐strategic)	  motives	   and	   reciprocity	   (strategic	  motives),	   in	   “flip”	   trials,	   counterparts’	   choices	  were	   determined	   at	   random.	   As	   a	   control,	   in	   “computer”	   conditions,	   participants	   made	   choices	   with	   a	  randomizing	  computer.	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outside	  the	  scanner.	  Most	  of	  the	  38	  participants	  (26)	  were	  in	  the	  human	  sciences	  (for	  the	  larger	  part	  psychology),	  none	  were	  economists.	  14	  participants	  had	  “ever	  heard”	  of	  game	  theory	  -­‐	  those	  who	  had,	  had	  studied	  it,	  on	  average,	  less	  than	  4	  hours	  in	  total	  (s.d.=3.7).	  On	  average,	  friends	  had	  known	  each	  other	  for	  6-­‐12	  months	  (17	  for	  more	  than	  1	  year,	  none	  for	  less	  than	  a	  month).	  When	  asked	  how	  frequently	  they	  had	  regularly	  seen	  one	  another	  in	  the	  past	  6	  months	  (on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  5:	  1=every	  day	  –	  5	  =	  once	  a	  month),	  the	  average	  score	  was	   2.1	   (s.d.=1.3).	   As	   soon	   as	   friend	   pairs	   entered	   the	   room,	   they	   were	   separated	   and	  given	  written	  instructions.	  They	  both	  then	  took	  part	  in	  a	  questionnaire	  that	  probed	  their	  understanding	  of	   the	   task.	  Only	  upon	  correct	  completion	  did	  we	  proceed,	   in	  which	  case,	  both	   participants	   were	   informed	   that	   both	   them	   and	   the	   other	   participants	   who	  previously	   took	   part	   in	   the	   experiment	   had	   correctly	   answered	   the	   questionnaire	   and	  were	  thus	  clear	  on	  how	  the	  games	  worked.	  Participants	  were	  informed	  that	  they	  wouldn’t	  have	  known	  the	  outcome	  of	  any	  of	  their	  interactions	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  	  
Incentive-­‐compatibility	  Participants	  were	   informed	  of	   the	   following.	  At	   the	  end	  of	   the	  experiment,	  1	   trial	  would	  have	  been	  selected	  at	  random	  and	  paid	  according	  to	  actual	  choices.	  If	  a	  stranger	  condition	  was	  selected,	  payoff	  depended	  on	  the	  corresponding	  choice	  (for	  the	  exact	  payoff	  matrix)	  of	  a	  randomly	  designated	  participant	  (friend	  excluded),	  who	  also	  had	  played	  in	  “stranger”	  matching,	  and	  who	  was	  awaiting	  payoff.	  If	  a	  non-­‐strategic	  condition	  was	  extracted,	  then	  2	  subsequent	  50-­‐50	   coin	   flips	  determined	  payoffs:	   1	   selecting	  which	  of	   the	  2	  participants	  was	   to	   be	   the	   “deliberating”	   one,	   and	   a	   second	   determining	   the	   “choice”	   of	   the	   non-­‐deliberating	  participant.	  	  	  
Questionnaire	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After	   taking	   part	   in	   the	   tasks	   of	   interest,	   participants	   responded	   to	   a	   questionnaire	  consisting	   of	   several	   parts:	   1)	   the	   two	   "McGill	   Friendship	   Questionnaires	   for	   late	  adolescents	   and	   young	   adults"	   (Mendelson&Aboud,	   1999),	   one	   tapping	   an	   "affective"	  component	  (MFQ-­‐A)	  of	  friendship	  (i.e.	  how	  much	  friends	  "like"	  each	  other),	  the	  other	  on	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  certain	  friendship	  functions	  (MFQ-­‐F)	  (i.e.	  "reliable	  alliance"	  of	   friends);	  2)	  The	  “social	  value	  orientation	  task”	  (SVO,	  Murphy	  et	  al.	  2011).	  In	  this	  task,	  participants	  are	  to	  choose	  between	  different	  predetermined	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  distribute	  hypothetical	  monetary	  sums	  to	  one’s	  self	  and	  another	  person.	  Some	  of	  the	  choices	  are	  rigged	  to	  as	  to	  allow	   for	   competitive	   behavior	   to	   emerge	   (i.e.	   such	   that	   one	   would	   be	   willing	   to	   lose	  money	   to	   decrease	   the	   payoff	   of	   a	   stranger),	   rather	   than	   altruistic	   behavior	   (i.e.	   in	  participants,	   to	  different	  extents	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  willing	   to	   incur	  costs	   to	  benefit	  others).	   In	   synthesis,	   the	   SVO	   is	   held	   to	   yield	   a	   measure	   of	   pro-­‐sociality.	   We	   had	  participants	  respond	  to	  it	  twice,	  once	  deliberating	  on	  allocations	  to	  strangers,	  the	  other	  to	  their	  friend;	  3)	  a	  novel	  "perceived	  similarity"	  questionnaire,	  in	  which	  participants	  had	  to	  score,	  relative	  to	  0	  (the	  average	  University	  of	  Regensburg),	  how	  much	  i)	  they	  identified	  in	  each	  of	  20	  positively	  valenced	  personality	   traits,	  and	   ii)	  how	  much	  they	  thought	  each	  of	  the	   same	   traits	   represented	   their	   friends;	   4)	   a	   risk-­‐attitude	   questionnaire,	   in	  which	  we	  assessed	  subjectively	  accessible	  beliefs	  about	  i)	  the	  risk	  propensities	  of	  one's	  friend	  and	  ii)	  those	  of	  the	  average	  USC	  student;	  5)	  In	  a	  reduced	  version	  of	  the	  same	  task	  games	  they	  had	  just	   concluded,	   we	   asked	   participants	   to	   state	   their	   beliefs	   about	   either	   a	   stranger’s	   or	  their	   friend’s	   choices	   for	   given	   SPs	   (when	   playing	   respectively	   with	   other	   strangers	   or	  their	  friends,	  that	  is,	  the	  subjects	  themselves).	  Finally,	  6)	  we	  asked	  participants	  whether	  it	  made	  a	  difference	  for	  them	  to	  play	  with	  their	  friend	  or	  a	  stranger,	  and	  why.	  	  
Behavioral	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We	  analyzed	  dependent	  variables	  with	  generalized	  linear	  mixed	  effects	  models	  (GLMMs),	  as	   implemented	   in	   the	   lme4	   package	   (Bates	   &	   Sarkar,	   2006),	   in	   the	   R	   environment	   (R	  Development	  Core	  Team,	  2006).	  We	  would	  start	  from	  the	  most	  complex	  models	  including	  all	   terms	  of	   interest	   and	   allowing	   all	   their	   possible	   interactions.	  Nuisance	   variables	   and	  covariates	  (gender,	  run,	  trial	  order,	  block	  order)	  were	  also	  included	  in	  the	  models,	  though	  they	  were	  not	  left	  free	  to	  interact	  with	  our	  interest	  variables,	  since	  this	  made	  the	  models	  computationally	  intractable14.	  We	  then	  proceeded	  as	  follows:	  non-­‐significant	  higher-­‐level	  interaction	   terms	   were	   progressively	   excluded,	   by	   comparing	   the	   nested	   models	   via	  likelihood	   ratio	   tests	   (Baayen,	   2008).	   We	   did	   this	   until	   no	   factor	   could	   be	   justifiably	  excluded.	   In	   the	  main	   text,	   we	   always	   report	   effect	   sizes	   and	   p-­‐values	   of	   the	   effects	   of	  interest	   from	   such	   best-­‐fitting	   models.	   Furthermore,	   since	   all	   our	   designs	   involved	  repeated	  measures,	   all	   models	   included	   1	   random-­‐intercept	   term	   (Baayen,	   2008),	   thus	  accounting	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  responses	  provided	  by	  a	  same	  subject	  were	  not	  independent.	  In	  the	  experiments	  involving	  friends,	  an	  additional	  random	  effect	  term	  was	  incorporated	  to	  nest	  friends	  within	  friend	  pairs,	  so	  to	  account	  for	  eventual	  dependencies	  among	  friends.	  As	   additional	   controls,	   once	   a	   satisfactory	   model	   was	   found,	   random	   slopes	   were	   also	  progressively	   added	   to	   ensure	   that	   none	   of	   the	   observed	   effects	   of	   interest	  was	   due	   to	  inter-­‐individual	  variability	  in	  the	  susceptibility	  to	  our	  factors	  of	  interest.	  Finally,	  extreme	  residuals	  (larger	  than	  2.5	  standard	  deviations)	  of	  the	  final	  models	  were	  excluded,	  and	  the	  model	  re-­‐ran	  so	  as	  to	  control	  that	  none	  of	  the	  reported	  effects	  was	  due	  to	  extreme	  values.	  	  	  With	   this	   statistical	   procedure,	   we	   ran	   the	   following	  models,	   all	   of	   which	   included	   our	  basic	   terms	   of	   interest	   and	   their	   interactions:	   game,	   the	   SP	   covariate,	   friendship	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In	  other	  words,	  our	  reported	  conclusions	  control	  for	  direct	  effects	  of	  nuisance	  variables	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  however	  they	  do	  not	  exclude	  that	  these	  may	  have	  indirectly	  affected	  them,	  i.e.	  through	  interaction	  with	  some	  other	  term.	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strategy.	   In	   a	  1st	   behavioral	  model	   on	   choice	   (BMC1)	  we	  dropped	   the	   computer	   control	  condition,	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  balanced	  2	  (player:	  friend/stranger)	  x	  2	  (game:	  entry/stag)	  x	  2	   (strategy:	   strategic/non	   strategic).	   This	   model	   was	   also	   implemented	   to	   investigate	  effects	   on	   response	   times	   (BRT1).	   In	   a	   second	   model	   on	   choice	   (BMC2),	   to	   allow	  comparison	  with	  the	  computer	  condition,	  strategic	  cells	  were	  dropped,	   thus	  yielding	  a	  3	  (player:	  friend/stranger/computer)	  x	  2	  (game).	  In	  a	  follow-­‐up	  RT	  model	  (BRT2),	  the	  term	  “choice”	  (whether	  participants	  had	  chosen	  the	  safe	  or	  risky	  option)	  was	  also	  added.	  Since	  however	   “choice”	   is	   theoretically	   a	   non-­‐manipulable,	   though	   we	   treat	   it	   here	   as	   an	  independent	  variable,	  we	  nested	  this	  term	  within	  the	  subject	  random	  effect	  term,	  so	  that	  different	  risk	  rates	  between	  subjects	  could	  be	  accounted	  for	  as	  random	  slopes,	  and	  their	  contributions	   to	   the	   main	   effects	   consequently	   discounted	  (http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/r/pages/mesimulation.htm).	  	  	  	  	  	  
MRI	  acquisition	  Imaging	  was	  performed	  on	  a	  3T	  head-­‐only	  scanner	  (Siemens	  Allegra,	  Siemens,	  Erlangen,	  Germany)	   equipped	   with	   a	   single-­‐channel	   head	   coil.	   4	   functional	   runs	   of	   400	   volumes	  consisting	   of	   34	   axial	   slices	   were	   acquired	   with	   a	   standard	   T2*-­‐weighted	   echo-­‐planar	  imaging	  sequence	  (repetition	  time	  TR	  =	  2	  s,	  echo	  time	  TE	  =	  30	  ms,	  flip	  angle	  FA	  =	  90	  °,	  64	  x	  64	  matrix,	   in-­‐plane	   resolution	   3	   x	   3	  mm^2,	   slice	   thickness	   including	   gap	   3.45	  mm).	   To	  allow	   for	   saturation	   of	   the	  magnetic	   field	   the	   first	   10	   (can't	   remember,	   there	   are	   a	   few	  dummy	   scans	   at	   the	   scanner	   anyway	   and	   we	   excluded	   the	   first	   four	   saved	   volumes?)	  volumes	  of	   each	   run	  were	  discarded	   from	  preprocessing	  and	  analysis.	  Between	   the	  2nd	  and	   the	   3rd	   functional	   run	   an	   anatomical	   T1-­‐weighted	   volume	  with	   160	   saggittal	   slices	  was	  measured	  using	  an	  MP-­‐RAGE	  sequence	  (TR	  =	  2250	  ms,	  TE	  =	  2.6	  ms,	  FA	  =	  9	  °,	  240	  x	  256	  matrix,	  voxel	  size	  1	  x	  1	  x	  1	  mm3).	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Preprocessing	  Preprocessing	  and	  fMRI	  data	  analysis	  were	  conducted	  with	  SPM8	  (Wellcome	  Department	  of	  Imaging	  Neuroscience,	  London,	  UK)	  running	  under	  Matlab	  7.5	  (Mathworks,	  Natick,	  MA,	  USA).	   In	   the	   first	  step	   individual	  structural	  volumes	  and	  corresponding	   functional	  series	  were	   reoriented	   parallel	   to	   the	   AC-­‐PC	   line	   (a	   line	   running	   through	   the	   anterior	   and	  posterior	   commissures)	   and	   the	   intrahemispheric	   fissure	   with	   the	   origin	   set	   to	   the	  anterior	   commissure,	   according	   to	   definitions	   of	   the	   Talairach	   space	   (Talairach	   &	  Tournoux,	  1988).	  Functional	  volumes	  were	  then	  slice-­‐time	  corrected	  with	  the	  temporally	  middle	   slice	   serving	   as	   a	   reference	   and	   realigned	   to	   the	  mean	   volume	   of	   the	   four	   runs.	  After	  coregistration	  onto	   the	   functional	  mean	   the	  structural	  volume	  was	  segmented	  and	  normalized	   into	  MNI	   standard	   space	   using	   unified	   segmentation	   (Ashburner,	   &	   Friston,	  2005).	   Corresponding	   normalization	   parameters	   were	   reapplied	   onto	   the	   functional	  series,	   which	   were	   resampled	   to	   a	   voxel	   resolution	   of	   2	   x	   2	   x	   2	   mm^3	   and	   spatially	  smoothed	   by	   an	   isotropic	   Gaussian	   kernel	   of	   8	   mm	   FWHM.	   Data	   quality	   and	   subjects'	  motion	  was	  checked	  with	  ArtRepair	  V4	  toolbox	  (Mazaika,	  Whitfield,	  &	  Cooper,	  2005).	  Fast	  head	  motion,	   defined	   as	   scan-­‐to-­‐scan	  motion	   above	   0.5	  mm	   in	  more	   than	   xyz	  %	   of	   the	  volumes,	  lead	  to	  exclusion	  of	  two	  subjects.	  	  
MRI	  analysis	  General	   linear	  models	   (GLM)	  were	   used	   to	   fit	   hemodynamic	   signal	   to	   our	   experimental	  design.	   GLM1	   included	   11	   in	   each	   run,	   5	   for	   our	   conditions	   of	   interest	   (Fs	   =	   strategic	  friend,	  Ss	  =	  strategic	  stranger,	  Fn	  =	  non-­‐strategic	   friend,	  Sn	  =	  non-­‐strategic	  stranger	  and	  Cmp	   =	   computer)	   and	   6	   motion	   realignment	   parameters	   (the	   4	   additional	   regressors	  corresponded	  to	  the	  average	  run-­‐specific	  average	  signal).	  Corresponding	  boxcar	  functions	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defined	  by	  trial	  onsets	  and	  trial-­‐specific	  duration	  were	  convolved	  with	  the	   implemented	  first-­‐order	   canonical	   hemodynamic	   response	   function.	   When	   necessary,	   an	   additional	  regressor	   was	   added	   to	   model	   trials	   in	   which	   subjects	   did	   not	   respond	   within	   the	  response	  window	  of	  6	  s.	  Slow	  signal	  drifts	  and	  temporal	  correlations	  between	  the	  residual	  errors	  were	   removed	  with	   a	   high-­‐pass	   filter	   of	   1/128	  Hz	   and	   an	   auto-­‐regressive	  AR(1)	  model.	  From	  GLM1,	  2	  analyses	  were	  carried	  out,	  GLM1_A1	  and	  GLM1_A2.	  	  GLM1_A1.	   Paralleling	   our	  behavioral	   analysis,	   a	   first	   analysis	   focused	  human	   conditions	  only	  (thus	  dropping	  computer	  conditions)	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  2	  (player:	  friend/stranger)	  x	  2	  (strategy:	  strategic/non-­‐strategic)	  x	  2	  (game:	  EG/Sh)	  within	  subject	  design.	  For	  each	  of	  these	   "factors"	   differential	   contrast	   images	   of	   the	   two	   levels	  were	   generated	   on	   single-­‐subject	   level	   using	   t	   contrasts.	   Contrast	   images	   corresponding	   to	   the	   three	   two-­‐way	  interactions	   and	   the	   three-­‐way	   interaction	  were	   built	   in	   a	   similar	  way.	   Group	   analyses	  were	  then	  conducted	  with	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  based	  on	  the	  contrast	  images.	  	  	  The	  initial	  voxel	  threshold	  was	  set	  to	  puncorr	  <	  .001	  with	  an	  extent	  threshold	  of	  k	  >	  100	  voxels	   [depends	   on	   your	   preferences,	   choose	   something	   between	   say	   100	   and	   150]	   for	  analysis	   1	   and	   a	   cluster	   threshold	   of	   pcorr	   <	   .05	   (FWE)	   for	   analysis	   2.	   The	   statistical	  threshold	   for	   post-­‐hoc	   tests	   was	   set	   to	   .001,	   reflecting	   the	   initial	   voxel	   threshold.	  Anatomical	   labels	  were	   derived	   from	   the	  Anatomical	   Automatic	   Labeling	   (AAL)	   toolbox	  (Tzourio-­‐Mazoyer	   et	   al.,	   2002),	   reported	   coordinates	   are	   in	  MNI	   space.	  Activation	  maps	  were	  mapped	  onto	  the	  population-­‐average	  landmark-­‐	  and	  surface-­‐based	  (PALS)	  standard	  brain	   (Van	   Essen,	   2005)	   with	   Caret	   5.6	   (Van	   Essen	   et	   al.,	   2001;	  http://brainvis.wustl.edu/wiki/index.php/Caret	  ).	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  GLM1_A2.	   To	   incorporate	   the	   computer	   conditions,	   a	   second	   analysis	   focused	   on	   non-­‐strategic	   conditions	   only.	   Contrast	   images	   for	   the	   6	   non-­‐strategic	   conditions	   (3	   player:	  friend/stranger/computer	   x	   2	   games)	   were	   calculated	   on	   single-­‐subject	   level	   in	   SPM,	  averaging	  across	   the	  two	  runs	  of	  a	  game,	  and	  subjected	  to	  a	  random-­‐effects	  2x3	  ANOVA	  with	   factors	   game	   and	   player.	   The	   group	   statistics	   were	   estimated	   with	   GLM	   Flex	  (http://nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/harvardagingbrain/People/AaronSchultz/GLM_Flex.html),	  a	   collection	   of	   scripts	   that	   allows	   for	   statistically	   valid	   within-­‐subject	   ANOVAs	   using	  partitioned	  error	  terms	  (see	  McLaren	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Significant	  clusters	  in	  F	  contrasts	  were	  further	  analyzed	  with	  post-­‐hoc	  tests.	  For	  this	  purpose	  beta	  estimates	  averaged	  across	  the	  cluster	  were	  extracted	  individually	  for	  the	  different	  levels	  using	  MarsBaR	  0.42	  (Brett	  et	  al.,	  2002)	  and	  then	  tested	  with	  paired	  t-­‐tests	  in	  SPSS	  ().	  	  	  2	  further	  GLMs	  were	  conducted	  to	  analyze	  the	  impact	  of	  2	  further	  regressors	  of	  interest,	  both	   of	   which	   used	   the	   same	   regressors	   as	   GLM1	   but	   added	   cell-­‐specific	   parametric	  regressors	   representing	   i)	   SPs	   (GLM2)	   and	   ii)	   payoffs	   (GLM3).	   Monetary	   payoffs	   were	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  when	  a	  participant	  chose	  the	  SP,	  the	  given	  SP	  was	  attributed	  to	  him,	  while	   when	   he	   risked,	   earnings	   were	   computed	   in	   expected	   value	   (EV),	   given	   random	  matching	  to	  any	  of	  the	  other	  participants	  for	  that	  specific	  trial,	  according	  to	  the	  following	  formula:	  	   EVSH(Riskj)=15*p(Risk-­‐j)	  	  EVEG(Riskj)=15*[1-­‐p(Risk-­‐j)]	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This	  says	  that	  the	  EV	  of	  an	  agent	  when	  risking,	  is	  a	  positive	  (in	  SHs)	  or	  negative	  (in	  EGs)	  linear	  function	  of	  the	  relative	  frequency	  (p)	  with	  which	  the	  other	  agents	  (-­‐j)	  also	  chose	  to	  risk	   for	   that	   specific	   SP,	   in	   that	   specific	   condition.	   The	   2	   regressors	   were	   modeled	   in	  separate	  GLMs,	  because	  presented	  correlations.	  	  	  
4.	  3.	  Behavioral	  results	  	  BMC1	   (see	   behavioral	   analysis	   section)	   on	   the	   total	   38	   participants	   revealed	   a	   3-­‐way	  interaction	   between	   game,	   social	   distance	   and	   strategy	   (p<0.01)	   as	   well	   as	   a	   4-­‐way	  interaction	   that	   additionally	   included	   SPs	   (p<0.01).	   Replicating	   our	   previous	   findings	  (Chierchia&Coricelli,	  under	  revision),	  friends	  were	  estimated	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  risk	  than	  strangers	  in	  SHs	  (mean	  difference=11.8,	  s.e.=3,	  p<0.0001),	  while,	  they	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  risk	   at	   low	   SPs	   in	   EGs	   (mean	   slope	   difference=0.05,	   SE=0.02,	   p<0.05)	   (Fig	   15).	   Our	  addition	  of	  non-­‐strategic	  trials	  proved	  to	  be	  effective,	  as	  playing	  with	  randomizing	  others	  decreased	  risk	  rates	  in	  SHs	  (p<0.001)	  and	  increased	  them	  in	  EGs	  (p<0.001).	  Interestingly,	  even	  when	  counterparts'	  choices	  were	  random,	  friends	  still	  risked	  more	  in	  SHs	  (p<0.01)	  and	  less	  in	  EGs	  (p<0.05).	  However,	  this	  difference	  was	  amplified	  in	  SHs	  (p<0.05).	  In	  EGs	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   though	   the	   interaction	   between	   social	   distance	   and	   strategy	   did	   not	  reach	   significance	   in	   term	   of	   risk	   rates,	   it	   did	   in	   terms	   of	   response	   times	   (p<0.01)	   (see	  BRT2	   in	  behavioral	  analysis	  section	  above).	   Indeed,	   in	  EGs,	  participants	  were	  quicker	   to	  choose	  the	  safe	  option	  with	  friends	  in	  comparison	  to	  strangers	  (p<0.05),	  though	  this	  only	  occurred	   when	   interactions	   were	   strategic.	   This	   suggests	   that	   different	   processes	   may	  have	  driven	  the	  similar	  choice	  patterns	  in	  strategic	  and	  non-­‐strategic	  EGs.	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  Fig.	  15	  A	  GLMM	  (BMC1,	  see	  behavioral	  analysis	  section)	  estimated	  probability	  of	  risking	  (y-­‐axis)	  in	  SHs	  (left	  panel)	  and	  EGs	   (right	  panel),	  given	  SPs	   (x-­‐axis),	  when	  playing	  with	   friends	   (green)	  and	  strangers	   (red)	   in	  strategic	   (full	   line)	   and	   non-­‐strategic	   (dashed	   line)	   condition.	   Error	   bands	   represent	   95%	   confidence	  intervals.	   Points	   are	   observed	   percentages	   of	   risky	   choices,	   for	   each	   SP.	   In	   non-­‐strategic	   conditions,	  counterparts'	   choices	  were	  determined	  by	  a	   coin	   flip.	  The	  graph	   shows	   that	  when	  payoffs	   are	   aligned	   (in	  SHs),	  then	  agents	  risk	  more	  when	  they	  interact	  with	  a	  motivated	  counterpart,	  than	  when	  they	  play	  against	  chance	  (full	  vs.	  dashed	  lines,	  left	  panel).	  Conversely,	  when	  incentives	  are	  in	  conflict	  (as	  in	  EGs),	  then	  players	  risk	  less	  with	  a	  motivated	  counterpart,	  than	  against	  chance	  (full	  vs.	  dashed	  lines,	  right	  panel).	  Within	  both	  strategic	   and	   non-­‐strategic	   conditions,	   the	   same	   pattern	   differentiates	   play	   with	   friends	   and	   strangers:	  friends	   risk	   more	   in	   SHs,	   and	   less	   in	   EGs.	   The	   square	   brackets	   in	   the	   left	   panel	   indicate	   the	   significant	  interaction	  between	  strategy	  and	  social	  distance	  in	  SHs	  (p<0.05).	  All	  curves	  are	  differentiable	  at	  p<0.05.	  	  	  Finally,	   to	   incorporate	   our	   non-­‐social	   computer	   condition,	   and	   to	   control	   for	   residual	  effects	   of	   social	   closeness,	   we	   ran	   the	   above	   model	   while	   focusing	   on	   non-­‐strategic	  conditions	  only	  (since	  computer	  counterparts	  always	  randomized)	  (BMC2,	  see	  behavioral	  analysis	  section	  above).	  The	  model	  confirmed	  and	  extended	  the	  previous	  results:	   in	  SHs,	  players	   risked	  more	  when	   the	   outcomes	   of	   their	   decisions	   affected	   their	   friends,	   rather	  than	  both	  strangers	  and	  computers	   (ps<0.001).	   In	  EGs,	   the	  opposite	  was	  observed,	   such	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that	   friends	   risked	   less	  with	   friends	   than	   strangers	   or	   computers	   (ps<0.001).	   However,	  interestingly,	   in	   both	   games,	   players	   risked	   at	   non-­‐dissociable	   rates	  when	   their	   choices	  impacted	  the	  payoff	  of	  a	  stranger,	  or	  that	  of	  a	  computer	  (all	  ps>0.2)	  (Fig.	  16).	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  Fig.	  17.	  Behavior	   in	   the	   scanner:	   interaction	  of	   strategy	  and	  game	   (BMC1).	   Interacting	  with	  a	   strategic,	   as	  opposed	   to	  a	  non-­‐strategic	   (random)	  counterpart,	   raises	   risk	  rates	  when	  payoffs	  are	  aligned	  (Stag	  hunts),	  but	  decreases	  them	  in	  competitive	  environments	  (Entry	  games).	  	  	  	  As	   did	   the	   interaction	   between	   social	   distance	   and	   game	   (b=-­‐1.11,	   se=0.25,	   z=-­‐4.300,	  p<1.71e-­‐05):	  friends	  risked	  more	  than	  strangers	  in	  SHs	  (b=0.87,	  se=0.3,	  z=2.843,	  p<0.01),	  however	  the	  opposite	  effect	  was	  no	  longer	  significant	  in	  EGs	  (p<0.3)15.	  This	  latter	  finding	  wasn’t	   too	   surprising,	   since	   our	   previous	   research	   (Chierchia&Coricelli,	   under	   revision)	  showed	  that,	  relative	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  social	  closeness	  in	  SHs,	  the	  corresponding	  effects	  of	  social	   closeness	   in	   EGs	   tend	   to	   be	   smaller,	   and	   usually	   require	   at	   least	   20	   subjects	   to	  emerge.	   In	   line	  with	   this	   interpretation	  of	  a	  power	  problem,	  when	  restricting	   the	  above	  model	   to	   “counterpart”	   participants	   (those	   who	   didn’t	   undergo	   fMRI),	   we	   observed	   a	  quantitatively	   similar	   results	   as	   for	  when	   the	  model	  was	   restricted	   to	  MRI	   participants	  alone.	   Furthermore,	   the	   full	   including	   all	   participants	   showed	   that	   that	   there	   was	   no	  significant	  difference	  of	  choice	  behavior	  between	  MRI	  participants	  and	  their	  counterparts	  outside	  the	  scanner	  (p>0.8).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Friend-­‐pliant	  choices	  in	  non-­‐strategic	  conditions	  were	  also	  eliminated	  in	  SHs,	  though	  they	  remained	  marginally	  significant	  in	  EGs	  (p=0.05).	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  Finally,	  RT	  analyses	  showed	  that	  behavior	  of	  MRI	  subjects	  alone	  had	  been	  affected	  by	  our	  manipulations	  in	  the	  predicted	  direction.	  A	  GLMM	  revealed	  a	  significant	  3-­‐way	  interaction	  between	  game,	  strategy	  and	  player	  (b=0.12,	  se=0.03,	  t=	  3.11,	  p<0.01).	  Specifically,	  in	  both	  games,	   players	   were	   faster	   to	   reach	   a	   decision	   when	   interacting	   with	   their	   friends	   as	  opposed	  to	  strangers,	  provided	  the	  condition	  was	  strategic.	  Importantly	  however,	  players	  were	   not	   always	   facilitated	   when	   interacting	   with	   friends,	   rather,	   they	   were	   only	  facilitated	   to	   make	   opposite	   choices	   in	   opposite	   games.	   This	   was	   suggested	   by	   an	  additional	  GLMM	  that	  controlled	  for	  choice	  (risk	  or	  safe).	  This	  model	  revealed	  a	  significant	  4-­‐way	   interaction	   between	   game,	   friendship,	   strategy	   and	   choice	   (risk	   or	   safe)	   (t=3.79,	  p<0.001).	  What	  this	  interaction	  says,	  in	  synthesis,	  is	  i)	  that	  friendship	  facilitated	  risking	  in	  SHs	  (b=-­‐0.18,	  se=0.02,	  t=-­‐8.77,	  p<0.0001),	  while	  facilitating	  safe	  choices	   in	  EGs	  (b=-­‐0.09,	  se=0.02,	   t=-­‐4.111,	   p<0.01),	   and	   ii)	   that	   this	   pattern	   was	   disrupted	   in	   non-­‐strategic	  conditions	  (both	  ps	  >0.4)	  (Fig.	  18).	  	  	  
	  Fig.	   18.	  Behavior	   in	   scanner	   (BRT2,	   see	  behavioral	   analysis	   section):	   interaction	  of	   strategy,	   game,	   choice	  and	  player.	  Collapsing	  across	  choices,	  a	  previous	  model	  (BRT1)	  showed	  that	  players	  were	  faster	  to	  reach	  a	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decision	  when	  interacting	  with	  friends	  rather	  than	  strangers.	  The	  addition	  of	  choice	  however	  (BRT2)	  shows	  that	   this	  such	  a	   facilitation	   is	  completely	  due	  to	  opposite	  choices	   in	   the	  2	  games:	   in	  EGs,	  participants	   take	  less	  when	  they	  choose	  the	  safe	  option	  with	  friends,	  in	  SHs,	  they	  take	  less	  to	  risk.	  This	  pattern	  only	  occurs	  in	  strategic	  conditions.	  	  	  	  	  
4.	  4.	  Imaging	  results	  	  Analysis	  revealed	  neural	  areas	  that	  track	  social	  distance,	  independently	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  strategy	  (main	  effect	  of	  social	  distance),	  areas	  that	  were	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  strategic	  vs.	  non-­‐strategic	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction	  (main	  effect	  of	  strategy),	  and	  importantly,	  areas	  that	  were	  sensitive	  to	  the	  interaction	  of	  these	  factors.	  We	  report	  such	  results	  in	  turn.	  	  	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  social	  distance	  was	  similar	   for	  both	  GLM1_A1	  and	  GLM2_A2.	  We	  thus	  report	  effects	  for	  GLM1_A2,	  since	  this	  enabled	  comparison	  with	  the	  computer	  conditions.	  This	  model	   focused	   only	   on	   non-­‐strategic	   conditions,	   and	   revealed	   a	   number	   of	   neural	  regions	  (Fig.,	  Table	  1).	   	  Of	  particular	   interest,	  bilateral	  TPJ	   (t=743,	  p<0.001)	  and	  dmPFC	  (t=6.83,	  p<0.001),	  nicely	   tracked	  social	  distance,	   independently	  of	  whether	  counterparts	  randomized	  or	  deliberated	  over	  their	  choices.	  Post-­‐hoc-­‐tests	  further	  revealed	  that	  a	  right-­‐sided	  bias	   in	   such	   sensitivity,	   such	   that	   right	  but	  not	   left	  TPJ	   significantly	  differentiated	  between	  computer	  counterparts,	  strangers	  and	  friends	  (all	  ps<0.001),	  as	  did	  the	  superior	  medial	  frontal	  cortex	  (Fig.	  19).	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  Fig.	  19.	  Effect	  of	  social	  distance	  in	  non-­‐strategic	  conditions	  (GLM1_A2).	  F-­‐test,	  initial	  voxel	  threshold	   puncorr	   =	   .001,	   cluster	   threshold	   pcorr	   =	   .05	   (FWE).	   Parameter	   estimates	   for	  selected	  clusters	  are	  based	  on	  peak	  voxels.	  Error	  bars	  correspond	  to	  90%	  C.I	  	  
Anatomical	   Side	   Label	   x	   y	   z	   k	   pcorr	   T	  
Angular	   gyrus,	   inferior	   parietal,	  
supramarginal	   gyrus,	   middle	  
temporal	  
R	   TPJ	  R	   52	   -­‐62	   44	   1917	   <.001	   7.43	  
Middle	  temporal	   L	   STS	  L	   -­‐56	   -­‐34	   -­‐10	   365	   .002	   7.09	  
Middle	  frontal,	  superior	  frontal	   R	   	   36	   18	   46	   1	  374	   <.001	   6.83	  
Precuneus	   L/R	   	   -­‐4	   -­‐50	   30	   2	  097	   <.001	   6.80	  
Middle	  temporal	   R	   STS	  R	   62	   -­‐18	   -­‐16	   340	   .002	   6.62	  
Inferior	   parietal,	   middle	  
temporal,	  angular	  gyrus	  
L	   TPJ	  L	   -­‐58	   -­‐58	   28	   1	  153	   <.001	   6.07	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  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  rather	  distinct	  set	  of	  neural	  regions	  was	  revealed	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  our	  strategic	  vs.	  non-­‐strategic	  manipulation	  (Table	  2).	  GLM1_A1	  showed	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	   the	  previously	   reported	  regions	   that	   tracked	  social	  distance,	  nearly	   the	  whole	  medial	  wall	   of	   the	   PFC	   (t=7.56,	   p<0.001)	   was	   recruited	   when	   counterparts	   deliberated	   as	  opposed	  to	  randomized	  between	  choices	  (Fig.	  20)	  
	  Fig.	  20.	  Main	  effect	  of	  strategizing	  (GLM1_A2).	  F-­‐test,	  initial	  voxel	  threshold	  puncorr	  =	  .001,	  cluster	  threshold	  pcorr	  =	  .05	  (FWE).	  	  	  
Anatomical	   Side	   Label	   x	   y	   z	   k	   pcorr	   T	  
Temporal	   pole,	  
middle	   temporal,	  
inferior	  temporal	  
L	   	   -­‐52	   6	   -­‐32	   	  	  	  	  187	   .040	   7.74	  
Superior	   frontal	  
medial,	  ACC	  
L/R	   	   -­‐6	   46	   36	   4661	   <.001	   7.56	  
Angular	  gyrus,	  middle	  
temporal	  
L	   TPJ	  L	   -­‐50	   -­‐58	   26	   610	   <.001	   7.41	  
EFFECT OF STRATEGIZING 
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Middle	  frontal	   R	   	   36	   22	   42	   211	   .025	   6.64	  
Inferior	   temporal,	  
middle	   temporal,	  
temporal	  pole	  
R	   	   50	   2	   -­‐38	   279	   .007	   6.51	  
Inferior	   frontal	   pars	  
orbitalis,	  insula	  
R	   	   30	   14	   -­‐20	   381	   .001	   6.51	  
Middle	   temporal,	  
inferior	  temporal	  
R	   	   56	   -­‐22	   -­‐18	   464	   <.001	   6.18	  
Angular	   gyrus,	  
superior	   temporal,	  
middle	  temporal	  
R	   TPJ	  R	   52	   -­‐58	   26	   429	   .001	   5.97	  
Middle	  temporal	   L	   	   -­‐60	   -­‐18	   -­‐14	   456	   <.001	   5.81	  
Insula,	  temporal	  pole,	  
inferior	   frontal	   pars	  
orbitalis	  
L	   	   -­‐32	   16	   -­‐24	   283	   .007	   5.52	  
Precuneus,	  PCC	   L/R	   	   6	   -­‐54	   28	   252	   .012	   5.25	  Table	  2.	  Neural	  regions	  recruited	  for	  strategizing	  	  Finally,	  GLM1_A1	  revealed	  that	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  regions	  of	  this	  network	  was	  sensitive	  to	  the	   interaction	   between	   social	   distance	   and	   strategy.	   In	   particular,	   the	   vmPFC	   	   (t=6.33,	  p=0.01)	  differentiated	  between	  friends	  and	  strangers	  only	  if	  the	  interaction	  was	  strategic	  (Fig.	  21).	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  Fig.	  21.	  Effects	  of	  Player,	  Strategy	  and	  corresponding	  interaction.	  The	  TPJ	  responds	  preferentially	  to	  social	  distance,	  dorsal	  regions	  of	  the	  mPFC	  to	  strategy,	  while	  vmPFC,	  middle	  cingulate	  cortex	  and	  PCC	  respond	  to	  their	   interaction.	  Results	  are	  based	  on	  t-­‐tests,	   initial	  voxel	   threshold	  puncorr	  =	   .001,	  cluster	   threshold	  pcorr	  =	  .05	   (FWE).	  Parameter	   estimates	   for	   selected	   clusters,	   are	  based	  on	  peak	  voxels.	  Error	  bars	   correspond	   to	  90%	  C.I.	  F	  =	  Friend,	  S	  =	  Stranger,	  s	  =	  strategic,	  ns	  =	  non-­‐strategic.	  	  	  
Anatomical	   Side	   x	   y	   z	   k	   pcorr	   T	  
Parietal	  lobe	   L/R	   18	   -­‐66	   42	   4272	   <.001	   7.40	  
Middle	   occipital,	  
cerebellum,	   middle	  
temporal	  
R	   28	   -­‐62	   -­‐44	   1694	   <.001	   7.02	  
Lingual	   gyrus	   R,	  
calcarine	   sulcus	   R/L,	  
cerebellum	  R/L	  
R/L	   20	   -­‐74	   -­‐44	   1690	   <.001	   6.59	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Rectus	   L/R,	   medial	  
frontal	  pars	  orbitalis	  L	  
L/R	   -­‐8	   54	   -­‐20	   202	   .011	   6.33	  
Superior	  temporal	   L	   -­‐58	   -­‐40	   12	   209	   .009	   6.15	  
Middle	   occipital,	  
superior	  occipital	  
L	   -­‐26	   -­‐82	   12	   310	   .001	   6.02	  
Cerebellum,	   fusiform	  
gyrus	  
L	   -­‐38	   -­‐68	   -­‐22	   445	   <.001	   5.65	  
Paracentral	   lobule,	  
SMA	  
L	   -­‐14	   -­‐22	   60	   146	   .043	   5.38	  
Middle	   frontal,	  
superior	   frontal,	  
precentral	  gyrus	  
R	   36	   2	   44	   174	   .021	   5.34	  
ACC	   L/R,	   medial	  
frontal	   pars	   orbitalis	  
R	  
R/L	   4	   40	   -­‐2	   337	   .001	   5.28	  
Cerebellum,	   lingual	  
gyrus	  
L	   -­‐14	   -­‐84	   -­‐18	   326	   .001	   4.84	  
Table	  3.	  Brain	  regions	  sensitive	  to	  the	  interaction	  of	  social	  distance	  and	  strategizing.	  	  	  	  	  
4.	  5.	  Discussion	  	  Social	  closeness	  has	  long	  been	  known	  to	  foster	  cooperation	  (Smith,	  1759).	  Humans	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  cooperate	  more	  frequently	  with	  other	  humans,	  than	  computers	  (Kiesler	  et	  al.,	  1996),	  with	  friends	  more	  than	  strangers	  (Yamagishi&Sato,	  1986),	  with	  similar	  rather	  than	  dissimilar	  others	  (Chierchia&Coricelli,	  under	  revision)	  and	  with	  ingroup	  rather	  than	  outgroup	   members	   (Charness	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Chen&Chen,	   200).	   In	   all	   of	   such	   cases,	  similarities	   between	   self	   and	   other	   are	   stressed.	   Such	   perceived	   closeness	   can	   favor	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cooperation	  in	  two	  different	  ways:	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  “liking”	  others,	  so	  that	  they	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  altruistically	  incur	  more	  risk/costs,	  to	  benefit	  one	  another,	  or	  it	  can	  increase	  expected	  reciprocity,	   which	   decreases	   the	   perceived	   risk	   that	   others	   may	   defect.	   In	   both	   cases,	  agents	   may	   will	   be	   cooperating,	   but	   they	   will	   be	   doing	   so	   for	   fundamentally	   different	  reasons.	   Here,	   we	   aimed	   to	   weigh	   the	   respective	   contributions	   of	   such	   mechanisms.	  Replicating	  our	  previous	  results	  (Chierchia&Coricelli,	  under	  revision)	  we	  show	  that,	   in	  a	  game	   that	   requires	   agents	   to	  match	   choices,	   subjects	   risk	  more	   if	   they	   are	  playing	  with	  their	  friends,	  rather	  than	  strangers;	  while	  if	  the	  game	  requires	  to	  decouple	  choices,	  friends	  risk	  less.	  Here	  we	  extended	  those	  results	  by	  showing	  that	  even	  when	  subjects	  know	  that	  both	   friendly	   and	   stranger	   counterparts	   are	   randomizing	   their	   choices,	   they	   keep	  exhibiting	   this	   behavior,	   albeit	   to	   a	   lesser	   degree.	   This	   suggests	   however,	   that	   both	  expected	   reciprocity	   and	   altruism	   could	  work	   synergistically	   in	   promoting	   cooperation.	  Interestingly,	   we	   find	   the	   brain	   to	   rather	   clearly	   distinguish	   between	   these	   two	  components	  of	  closeness.	  A	  first	  important	  finding	  is	  that	  of	  an	  apparent	  gradient	  within	  the	   so-­‐called	  mentalizing	   network	   (Saxe&Kanwisher,	   2003;	   Van	   Overwalle,	   2011),	   with	  nearly	  the	  whole	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  being	  recruited	  for	  social	  interactions	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  extent	  when	  they	  are	  strategic	  (i.e.	  when	  choices	  are	  interdependent)	  than	  when	  they	  are	  not	  (that	  is	  when	  other	  people	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  our	  decisions,	  though	  we’re	  not	  affected	   by	   theirs),	   and	   the	   TPJ	   being	   more	   finely	   tuned	   to	   social	   distance.	   The	   mPFC,	  especially	   its	   dorsal	   component	   has	   been	   linked	   to	   performance	   monitoring	   and	  uncertainty	   in	  many	   forms	   of	   abstract	   goal	   directed	   behaviors	   (i.e.	   Ridderinkoff,	   2004).	  Through	   its	   connection	   with	   the	   hippocampus	   and	   dlPFC	   (Kim&Whalen,	   2009)	   it	   is	  frequently	  considered	  to	  favor	  more	  cognitively	  mediated	  forms	  of	  perspective	  taking,	  in	  opposition	   to	   the	   vmPFC,	  which	   through	   its	   connections	  with	   the	   amygdala,	   accumbens	  and	  insula,	   is	  held	  to	  mediate	  more	  affect	  laden	  forms	  of	  mentalizing	  (Vollm	  et	  al.,	  2006;	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Shamaay-­‐Tsoory,	   2009).	   One	   recent	   account	   (Venkatramman&Huettel,	   2012)	   has	  implicated	   the	   dmPFC	   specifically	   in	   strategic	   control.	   Indeed,	   false-­‐belief	   tasks,	   which	  require	   subjects	   to	   adopt	   a	   perspective	   that	   differs	   from	   their	   own	   -­‐	   and	   are	   thus,	   by	  definition,	  more	  mediated	  -­‐	  regularly	  recruit	  this	  area	  (Buckner,	  2008),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  TPJ	  (Saxe&Kanwisher,	  2003).	  One	  interesting	  addition	  of	  our	  study	  to	  this	  literature	  is	  that	  it	  shows	  that	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  d/mPFC	  by	  strategizing	  isn’t	  necessarily	  a	  mere	  matter	  of	   difficulty	   or	   uncertainty,	   which	   often	   may	   co-­‐occur	   with	   strategizing.	   Indeed,	  strategizing	   in	   EGs	   raised	   difficulty	   (as	   suggested	   by	   the	   increased	   RTs)	   and	   decreased	  uncertainty	  (as	  subjects	  risked	  less)	  relative	  to	  its	  non-­‐strategic	  analog,	  while	  the	  opposite	  occurred	   in	   SHs.	   In	   spite	   of	   these	   differences,	   contrasting	   strategic	   and	   non-­‐strategic	  interactions	  in	  both	  of	  these	  games	  resulted	  in	  dmPFC	  activation.	  	  	  The	  TPJ,	   together	  with	   the	  mPFC	  has	  been	  overwhelmingly	   involved	   in	  mentalizing	  (see	  Van	  Overwalle,	  2012,	  for	  a	  review).	  At	  lower	  levels,	  it	  is	  has	  been	  consistently	  implicated	  in	  attention	  reorientation	  (i.e.	  Posner	  tasks)	  and	  stimulus	  driven	  control:	  when	  attention	  is	  focused	  on	  some	  external	  object	  (i.e.	  reading)	  and	  a	  novel	  event	  occurs	  (i.e.	  an	  unusual	  noise)	   that	   reorients	   our	   attention,	   the	   TPJ	   passes	   from	   deactivated	   to	   transiently	  activated.	   Interestingly	   however,	   it	   doesn’t	   do	   so	   for	   just	   any	   event,	   for	   instance,	   it	   has	  been	  shown	  to	  not	  get	  “distracted”	  (activated)	  by	  highly	  salient	  but	  task	  irrelevant	  stimuli	  (Indovina&Macaluso,	   2007).	   This	   involvement	   of	   the	   TPJ	   in	   tracking	   “relevant”	  environmental	  differences	  that	  require	  attention	  reorientation	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  be	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  involvement	  in	  reading	  the	  mind	  of	  others	  and	  perspective	  taking	  (Corbetta	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  especially	  when	  they	  differ	  from	  one’s	  own.	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  there	  is	  a	  vast	  literature	   linking	   the	   TPJ	   to	   self-­‐other	   differentiation	   and	   control	   (i.e.	   Decety&Lamm,	  2007).	  A	  fascinating	  series	  of	  studies	  by	  Santiesteban	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  showed	  how	  excitatory	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stimulation	  via	  tDCS	  on	  TPJ	  improved	  social	  abilities	  in	  a	  number	  of	  context	  involving	  co-­‐representations	   of	   self	   and	   other.	   In	   one	   task,	   participants	   had	   to	   respond	   to	   a	   finger	  movement	  seen	  on	  a	  screen,	  with	  an	  incongruent	  finger	  movement	  (i.e.	  if	  the	  index	  moved,	  subjects	  had	  to	  move	  their	  middle	  pinky	  and	  viceversa).	  To	  better	  resist	  the	  tendency	  to	  imitate,	   they	   had	   to	   thus	   inhibit	   the	   other-­‐related	   representation	   in	   favor	   of	   their	   own	  perspective.	   Stimulation	   on	   TPJ	   (relative	   to	   sham)	   increased	   accuracy	   and	   speed.	  Conversely,	   in	   another	   task,	   subjects	   viewed	   a	   matrix-­‐like	   cupboard	   with	   a	   series	   of	  objects	  in	  a	  subset	  of	  its	  cubicles.	  Some	  of	  such	  objects	  (i.e.	  a	  small	  candle)	  could	  be	  seen	  from	  both	  the	  subject	  and	  a	  “director”	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  cupboard;	  others	  	  (i.e.	  a	  big	  salient	  candle)	  could	  only	  be	  seen	  for	  the	  subject.	  The	  director	  then	  gave	   instructions	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  which	  objects	  to	  take.	  Contrary	  to	  before,	  in	  this	  task,	  subjects	  had	  to	  inhibit	  their	   own	  perspective	   and	  amplify	   that	   of	   the	  director.	  Again,	  TPJ	   excitation	   resulted	   in	  better	   performance.	   Finally,	   in	   a	   last	   important	   task,	   subjects	   were	   asked	   (i.e.	   as	   in	  Mitchell	   et	   al.	   2005	   or	   Krienen’s	   tasks)	   to	   answer	  mental	   (on	   preferences)	   or	   physical	  questions	  about	  either	   themselves	  or	  others,	   so	  self	  and	  other	  representations	  were	  not	  co-­‐represented.	  	  In	  a	  later	  memory	  retrieval	  task	  subjects	  exhibited	  typical	  self-­‐referential	  biases	  (i.e.	  they	  were	  faster	  and	  better	  at	  remembering	  self-­‐judgments)	  that	  were	  not	  been	  altered	  by	  TPJ	  stimulation.	  From	  this,	   it	  would	  almost	  appear	   that	  vmPFC	  and	  TPJ	  serve	  complimentary	   functions	   of,	   respectively,	   integrating	   vs.	   segregating	   self-­‐other	  representations,	  which	   could,	   in	   turn	   lead	   respectively	   to	   self-­‐projection	   (i.e.	   egocentric	  biases)	  or	  perspective	  taking.	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  and	  the	  previous	  claims	  on	  dmPFC,	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	   by	   Denny	   (107	   studies)	   (2012)	   showed	   that	   while	   the	   vmPFC	   was	   more	  frequently	  reported	  in	  self	  vs.	  other	  contrasts,	  both	  dmPFC	  and	  TPJ	  have	  been	  found	  more	  frequently	   observed	   in	   other	   vs.	   self	   contrasts.	   Finally,	   Tankersley	   et	   al	   (2007)	   had	   the	  intriguing	   idea	   that	   the	  TPJs	   involvement	   in	   agency	  detection,	   the	   ability	   to	   understand	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behaviors	  as	  motivated	  (Castelli	  et	  al.,	  2000),	  could	  constitute	  a	  low-­‐level	  determinant	  of	  altruism.	  In	  their	  task	  subjects	  either	  viewed	  others	  play	  a	  reaction	  time	  game,	  or	  played	  the	   game	   themselves.	   Indeed,	   TPJ	  was	  more	   active	   for	  when	   they	  watched	   others	   play,	  rather	   then	   when	   they	   played	   in	   first	   person.	   The	   magnitude	   of	   this	   effect	   predicted	  subsequent	  scores	  in	  altruism	  questionnaires.	  This	  very	  low-­‐level	  role	  for	  TPJ	  in	  altruism	  was	   further	   neurobiologically	   grounded	   by	   a	   recent	   study	   by	   Morishima	   et	   al.	   (2012),	  which	  showed	  that	  inter-­‐individual	  differences	  in	  altruistic	  tendencies	  were	  predicted	  by	  grey	   matter	   volume	   in	   the	   TPJ.	   For	   our	   task,	   we	   had	   hypothesized	   that	   regions	   that	  tracked	  social	  distance	  in	  a	  way	  that	  wasn’t	  modulated	  by	  strategy	  would	  have	  been	  apt	  neural	  mediators	  of	  altruistic	  motives.	  The	  region	  we	  found	  is	  precisely	  the	  TPJ.	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	   with	   regards	   to	   Mitchell’s	   idea	   linking	   the	   vmPFC	   to	   similarity.	   Krienen	   et	   al.	  (2010)	  put	   it	   to	   the	   test	  with	  4	   fMRI	  experiments,	   in	  all	  4,	   subjects	   answered	  questions	  about	   themselves	  and	  given	  target	  others.	  The	   first	  served	  to	  define	  a	   localizer	   in	  which	  ROIs	   were	   defined	   that	   preferentially	   responded	   for	   questions	   about	   one’s	   self	   vs.	  president	   Bush.	   The	   second	   experiment	   found	   that	   previously	   observed	   vmPFC	   region	  was	  preferentially	  active	  for	  friends	  rather	  than	  strangers,	  regardless	  whether	  they	  were	  similar	  or	  dissimilar.	  The	  third	  dropped	  the	   friendship	   factor	   in	  order	  to	  assure	  that	   the	  previous	  failure	  of	  similarity	  to	  recruit	  vmPFC	  wasn’t	  due	  to	  a	  “rescaling”	  of	  the	  similarity	  perception	   due	   to	   the	   highly	   salient	   similar	   friend.	   The	   fourth	   took	   the	   2	   extremes:	  dissimilar	  friends	  and	  similar	  strangers,	  and	  showed	  that	  vmPFC	  was	  much	  more	  sensitive	  to	   the	   former	   than	   the	   latter.	   The	   interpretation	   the	   authors	   give	   is	   that	   rather	   than	  similarity,	  behavioral	  relevance	  is	  the	  important	  factor.	  In	  Mitchell’s	  defense	  -­‐	  though	  the	  authors	  themselves	  admit	  this	  –	  their	  similarity	  manipulation	  used	  here	  was	  not	  effective.	  The	  authors	  had	  run	  into	  the	  same	  problem	  I	  found	  for	  my	  similarity	  experiment,	  that	  is,	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to	  try	  to	  separate	  similarity	  from	  liking.	  In	  the	  attempt	  to	  provide	  similar	  targets	  that	  had	  only	  mildly	   likeable	   traits,	   they	  probably	  ended	  up	  making	   the	   similarity	   characteristics	  irrelevant	  or	  uninteresting.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  clear	  that,	  as	  a	  feature,	  of	  similarity	  per	  se	  cannot	  mean	  much,	  because,	  virtually,	  there	  will	  always	  be	  some	  element	  by	  which	  2	  subjects	  are	  similar.	  Plausibly,	  context	  will	  determine	  which	  ones	  are	  likely	  to	  matter.	  For	  instance,	  if	  a	  drunk	   man	   comes	   towards	   me	   on	   the	   street	   with	   hostile	   intentions,	   I	   might	   not	   even	  notice	  that	  he’s	  wearing	  the	  same	  shirt	  as	  I	  am,	  though	  in	  a	  different	  circumstance,	  i.e.	  at	  a	  dinner,	   the	   same	   shirt	   could	   be	   a	   conversation	   starter.	  What	   is	   interesting	   about	   social	  categorizations	  (i.e.	  minimal	  group	  paradigms)	  and	  similarity	  is	  not	  that	  they	  can	  be	  made	  irrelevant,	  rather	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  it	  they	  often	  spontaneously	  adopted	  by	  participants	  in	   search	   for	   social	   (and	   non-­‐social)	   navigation	   devices.	  When	  we	   are	   first	   struck	   by	   a	  given	  similarity	  with	  someone,	  i.e.	  we	  both	  liked	  a	  given	  movie,	  and	  we	  feel	  that	  sense	  of	  approach,	   I	   don’t	   believe	   it	   is	   because	   we	   are	   interested	   in	   object	   of	   similarity	   per	   se,	  rather	  I	  believe	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  common	  object	  of	  interest	  promises	  other	   similarities	   and	   other	   common	   interests.	   Indeed,	   were	   we	   to	   follow	   up	   with	  questions	  (i.e.	  what	  scenes	  of	  the	  movie	  were	  liked?	  Or	  maybe	  probe	  the	  other’s	  reaction	  to	   our	   favorite	   quote	   from	   the	  movie),	   we	  would	   feel	   pleasure	   to	   see	   our	   expectations	  confirmed.	  That	  these	  expectations	  are	  formed	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  that	  they	  drive	  our	  questions	  and	  predictions	  seems	  to	  be	  characteristic	  of	  similarity	  and	  analogical	  reasoning	  (Vosniadou&Ortony,	  1989).	  	  	  	  Krienen	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   thus	   attempted	   to	   replace	   similarity	   with	   “behavioral	   relevance”,	  though	  it	  isn’t	  clear	  whether	  this	  was	  successful.	  A	  particularly	  interesting	  study	  by	  Nicolle	  et	   al.	   (2012)	   proposes	   to	   replace	   the	   “self”	   with	   behavioral	   relevance.	   They	   had	  participants	  take	  part	  in	  a	  typical	  time	  discounting	  task,	  in	  which	  they	  chose	  over	  varying	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magnitudes	  of	   reward	  “now”,	  over	  some	   larger	  reward	   in	   the	   future.	  Subjects	  were	  pre-­‐tested	  and	  had	  known	  discount	  functions,	  which	  described	  their	  idiosyncratic	  preferences	  in	  regards	  to	  time	  discounting.	  They	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  learn	  the	  preferences	  of	  another	  person,	  who	   had	   different	   (but	   not	   anti-­‐correlated)	   function.	   Then,	   in	   the	   scanner,	   they	  were	   to	  make	  choices	   for	  either	   themselves	  or	   said	  others.	  As	  predicted	  by	  a	   self/other	  distinction	  along	   the	  vm/dmPFC,	  while	   responding	   for	   themselves,	  vmPFC	   tracked	   their	  own	   subjectively	   discounted	   values,	   while	   simultaneously	   tracking,	   in	   the	   dmPFC,	   the	  preferred	  values	  for	  their	  counterparts.	  However,	  even	  more	  interestingly,	  when	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  answer	  for	  their	  counterparts,	  this	  pattern	  completely	  flipped	  over:	  now	  the	  vmPFC	   was	   tracking	   their	   counterparts’	   preferences	   and	   not	   their	   own.	   The	   authors’	  conclusion	   is	   that	   of	   an	   “agent	   independent	   axis”	   in	   the	  mPFC.	   I	   believe	   they	  make	   an	  excellent	  point.	  However,	  were	  subjects	  not	  “themselves”	  when	  responding	  for	  the	  other	  person?	   Were	   they	   not	   responding	   to	   their	   own	   contingent	   objective	   of	   complying	   to	  experimental	  demands?	  Are	  we	  not	  ourselves	  when	  we	  role-­‐play?	  If	  we	  are,	  then	  Nicolle’s	  study	  paradoxically	  seems	  to	  chain	  the	  self	  to	  the	  vmPFC,	  rather	  than	  freeing	  it.	  	  	  From	   an	   overview	   our	   own	   results,	   and	   the	   existing	   literature,	   the	   perspective	   that	  emerges	   is	   certainly	  not	   that	   the	   vmPFC	   is	   selective	   for	   similarity	   (Mitchell	   et	   al.	   2005,	  2008).	   Rather,	   its	   activity	   can	   be	   usually	   taken	   to	   indicate	   that	   diverse	   functions,	   such	  depth	  of	  reasoning	  (Coricelli&Nagel,	  2009)	  and	  reward-­‐related	  signals	  (Schultz,	  2000)	  are	  synergistically	   working	   to	   drive	   decisions.	   It	   is	   this	   particular	   mixture	   of	   features,	   if	  anything,	  that	  makes	  vmPFC	  somewhat	  specific	  in	  the	  brain.	  What	  many	  studies	  may	  thus	  pick	  up	  on	  then	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  “self”-­‐related	  stimuli	  are	  usually	  processed	  in	  greater	  depth	  (Symon&Johnson,	  1997),	   or	   are	   liked	   (Ferguson	  et	   al.,	   1983).	  Consequently,	   the	   same	   is	  probably	   true	   for	   stimuli	   that	   make	   us	   see	   ourselves	   in	   others,	   that	   is	   homophily.	   The	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6.	  Conclusion	  	  We	   opened	   with	   Rousseau’s	   Stag	   Hunt,	   a	   metaphor,	   for	   characterizing	   the	   potential	  benefits,	   but	   also	   the	   risks	   of	   sociality:	   agents	   can	   achieve	   more	   by	   working	   together,	  however,	   to	  do	  so	   they	  need	  to	  depend	  on	  one	  another,	  which	  makes	  cooperation	  risky.	  Moreover,	   by	   living	   together,	   agents	  will	   incur	  more	   frequent	   competition	   over	   limited	  common	  resources,	  thus	  creating	  an	  additional	  potential	  cost	  of	  social	  life.	  With	  hindsight,	  humans	  “chose”	  to	  live	  socially.	  Our	  question	  was,	  in	  a	  typical	  “cost-­‐benefit”	  analysis,	  what	  (neuro-­‐cognitive)	  mechanisms	  could	  have	  tilted	  the	  balance	  towards	  sociality?	  	  To	   illustrate	   this	   point	   we	   proceeded	   with	   3	   sections,	   which	   attempted	   to	   capture	   the	  problem	   at	   3	   apparently	   different	   levels	   and	   approaches:	   the	   game-­‐theoretic	   level,	   the	  psychological	  level,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  neuroscience.	  In	  brief	  these	  sections	  were	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  
Behavioral	  game	  theory	  and	  common	  knowledge	  Behavioral	   game	   theory	   meshes	   the	   typical	   deductive	   approach	   of	   game	   theory,	   with	  empirical	   observation.	   	   To	   illustrate	   this,	   in	   1.1.,	   we	   very	   briefly	   described	   basic	  applications	   of	   game-­‐theoretic	   concepts	   to	   strategic	   interactions	   and	   confronted	   its	  predictions	   to	   games	   played	   by	   actual	   players,	   for	   real	  money,	   in	   labs.	   In	   some	   of	   such	  games,	  game	  theoretic-­‐predictions	  seem	  to	  do	  remarkably	  well,	  in	  others	  -­‐	  exemplified	  in	  1.2.	  -­‐	  they	  drastically	  fail.	  To	  account	  for	  the	  latter	  findings,	  we	  briefly	  went	  through	  recent	  classes	   of	   proposals	   on	   which	   of	   game	   theory’s	   assumptions	   should	   be	   relaxed.	   For	  instance,	  standard	  game	  theory	  assumes	  strict	  self-­‐interest	  and	  unbounded	  computational	  abilities,	   either	   or	   both	   of	   which	   could	   be	   unrealistic.	   However,	   we	   will	   stress	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   “common	  knowledge	   of	   rationality”	   assumption.	   In	   1.2.	  we	  passed	   to	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different	   particular	   class	   of	   games,	   coordination	   games.	   We	   will	   show	   why	   the	   game	  theoretic-­‐concepts	   illustrated	   above	   fundamentally	   fail	   to	   capture	   the	   essence	   of	  coordination.	  In	  such	  situations,	  inferences	  cannot	  be	  made	  by	  deliberation	  or	  deduction	  and	   an	   important	   “matching”	  problem	  emerges;	   here,	   common	  knowledge	  must	   rely	   on	  common	   intuitions	   (focality),	   common	   conventions	   or	   communication.	   In	   some	   cases,	  agents	   seem	   to	   develop	   conventions	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   “historical	   accidents”,	   which	   can	  remain	   “culture/group-­‐specific”	   and	   generate	   inter-­‐group	   conflict;	   in	   other	   cases,	   the	  conventions	  seem	  to	  emerge	  from	  actual	  similarities	  among	  agents,	  as	  all	  groups	  seem	  to	  take	   the	   same	   ones.	   In	   both	   cases	   however,	   when	   incentives	   are	   aligned,	   common	  knowledge	  will	  bring	  agents	  to	  behave	  similarly.	  	  
	  
Homophily	  One	   of	   the	   strongest	   patterns	   that	   sociologists	   and	   biologists	   have	   found	   to	   predict	  network	   closeness	   in	   social	   species	   is	   homophily,	   the	   preference	   for	   similar	   others.	  We	  will	   discuss	   why	   similarity	   and	   reward/motivation	   apparently	   share	   an	   intimate	  connection.	  However,	   the	   literature	   suggests	   that	   similarity	   is	  not	  merely	  about	   reward,	  but	   that	   it	   also	   serves	   the	  purpose	   of	   aligning	  beliefs,	   that	   is,	   it	   re-­‐instantiates	   common	  knowledge.	   The	   suspicion	   that	   emerges	   is	   that	   if	   similarity	   is	   so	   successful	   as	   a	   social	  attractor	   it	   isn’t	   merely	   about	   motivation/attraction,	   but	   also	   (and	   perhaps	   critically)	  about	  its	  potential	  benefits	  on	  the	  actual	  strategic	  interactions	  that	  follow.	  Separating	  this	  motivational	   component	   of	   closeness	   and	   similarity	   from	   a	   potential	   “knowledge”	  component	  will	   be	  one	  of	   the	  principle	  objectives	  of	  my	  experimental	  work.	  A	  different	  question	   however	   is	   what	   impact	   such	   “psychological	   closeness”	   could	   have	   on	  interactions.	  Previous	  experimental	  evidence	  shows	  that	   it	  can	  be	  helpful	   if	  perspectives	  are	  aligned,	  but	  detrimental	  when	  they	  are	  not,	  though	  no	  study	  had	  focused	  on	  how	  this	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could	   oppositely	   impact	   games	   in	   which	   choices	   should	   be	   matched	   as	   opposed	   to	  decoupled.	  	  
	  
Novel	  experimental	  findings	  Throughout	  this	  thesis	  we	  reported	  the	  following	  findings	  i)	  relative	  to	  complete	  chance	  (p=0.5),	   such	   as	   placing	   bets	   on	   a	   coin	   flip	   –	   for	   real	  monetary	   outcomes	   -­‐,	   agents	   risk	  much	  more	  frequently	  (and	  take	  less	  time	  do	  so)	  when	  they	  are	  required	  to	  match	  their	  choices	   with	   another	   anonymous	   but	   motivated/intentional	   agents;	   conversely,	   if	  mutually	  anonymous	  agents	  are	  to	  decouple	  their	  choices,	  then	  they	  risk	  less	  than	  when	  they	   play	   against	   chance	   (taking	   longer	   to	   do	   so)	   (study	   1,	   experiment	   1);	   ii)	   a	   similar	  behavioral	  pattern	  is	  observed	  when	  friends,	  as	  opposed	  to	  strangers,	  interact	  in	  the	  same	  scenarios:	   friends	   more	   quickly	   and	   more	   frequently	   accept	   the	   risks	   of	   cooperation	  relative	   to	   strangers;	   however,	  when	   choices	   are	   to	   be	   decoupled,	   friends	   quickly	   avert	  from	  risk	  (study	  1,	  experiment	  2);	   iii)	  a	  similar	  behavioral	  pattern	  occurs	  when	  subjects	  
don’t	  know	  each	  other	  but	  perceive	  certain	  similarities	  between	  them.	  The	  pattern	  holds	  only	  when	   features	   are	   not	   only	   shared	   but	   also	   liked.	   However,	   it	   also	   doesn’t	   hold	   if	  features	   are	   liked	   but	   not	   shared	   (study	   1,	   experiment	   3);	   iv)	   Two	   mechanisms	   could	  explain	  these	  results:	  expected	  reciprocity	  and	  altruism.	  In	  an	  fMRI	  experiment	  we	  show	  that,	   even	   when	   agents	   know	   that	   their	   counterparts	   (friends	   or	   strangers)	   are	  randomizing	   over	   choice,	   a	   similar	   “polar”	   effect	   on	   risk	   is	   observed.	   This	   is	   consistent	  with	   altruism.	   However,	   the	   interaction	   between	   “social	   distance”	   (i.e.	   friendship)	   and	  strategy	  (whether	  counterparts	  randomized	  or	  not)	  was	  significant	  both	  in	  behavior	  and	  the	  brain:	  the	  vmPFC	  –	  an	  area	  previously	  implicated	  in	  interpersonal	  similarity,	  depth	  of	  reasoning	   and	   reward	   -­‐	   was	   recruited	   to	   a	   greater	   extent	   for	   friends,	   rather	   than	  strangers,	   especially	   in	   strategic	   conditions;	   the	   dmPFC	   was	   preferentially	   active	   for	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Section	  2	  
 
Study	  1	  Reputational	  priors	  magnify	  striatal	  responses	  to	  violations	  of	  trust	  
 
 
Elsa Fouragnan,1 Gabriele Chierchia,1 Susanne Greiner,2 Remi Neveu,3 Paolo Avesani, 2 and 
Giorgio Coricelli 1, 3, 4 
 
1Interdepartmental Centre for Mind/Brain Sciences (CIMeC), University of Trento, 38060 
Trento, Italy; 2NeuroInformatics Laboratory (NILab) of Bruno Kessler Foundation, 
Neuroimaging Laboratory (LNIF) of CIMeC, University of Trento, 38060 Trento, Italy; 
3National Scientific Research Center (CNRS), UMR5292, University of Lyon, 69003 Lyon, 
France ; 4Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 
90089-0253, U.S.A. 
	   114	  
Abstract	  	  Humans	   learn	   to	   trust	   each	  other	  by	  evaluating	   the	  outcomes	  of	   repeated	   interpersonal	  interactions.	  However,	  available	  prior	  information	  on	  the	  reputation	  of	  traders	  may	  alter	  the	   way	   outcomes	   affect	   learning.	   Our	   functional	   magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	   (fMRI)	  study	   is	   the	   first	   to	   allow	   the	   direct	   comparison	   of	   interaction-­‐based	   and	   prior-­‐based	  learning.	  Twenty	  participants	  played	  repeated	  trust	  games	  with	  anonymous	  counterparts.	  We	  manipulated	   two	   experimental	   conditions:	  whether	   or	   not	   reputational	   priors	  were	  provided,	  and	  whether	  counterparts	  were	  generally	  trustworthy	  or	  untrustworthy.	  When	  no	   prior	   information	   is	   available	   our	   results	   are	   consistent	   with	   previous	   studies	   in	  showing	   that	   striatal	   activation	   patterns	   correlate	   with	   behaviorally	   estimated	  reinforcement	   learning	   measures.	   However,	   our	   study	   additionally	   shows	   that	   this	  correlation	   is	   disrupted	  when	   reputational	   priors	   on	   counterparts	   are	   provided.	   Indeed	  participants	   continue	   to	   rely	   on	   priors	   even	   when	   experience	   sheds	   doubt	   on	   their	  accuracy.	   Notably,	   violations	   of	   trust	   from	   a	   cooperative	   counterpart	   elicited	   stronger	  caudate	   deactivations	   when	   priors	   were	   available	   than	   when	   they	   were	   not.	   However,	  tolerance	   to	   such	   violations	   appeared	   to	   be	   mediated	   by	   prior-­‐enhanced	   connectivity	  between	   the	   caudate	   nucleus	   and	   ventro-­‐lateral	   Prefrontal	   Cortex	   (vLPFC)	   which	   anti-­‐correlated	   with	   retaliation	   rates.	   Moreover,	   on	   top	   of	   affecting	   learning	   mechanisms,	  priors	  also	  clearly	  oriented	  initial	  decisions	  to	  trust,	  reflected	  in	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  activity.	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Introduction	  
Trusting	  others	   involves	   risk	  and	  uncertainty:	  people	   invest	   a	   form	  of	   good	   (i.e.	  money,	  work,	   time	   etc.)	   in	   interactions	   that	   can	   yield	   a	   profit	   or	   a	   loss,	   depending	   on	  whether	  others	  hold	   to	   their	   end	  of	   the	  bargain	   (Coleman,	  1994).	  Critically,	  when	  others	  are	  not	  contractually	  committed	  to	  doing	  so,	  they	  may	  be	  untrustworthy	  for	  their	  own	  benefit	  and	  harm	   the	   person	   that	   initially	   placed	   trust	   in	   them	   (Berg	   et	   al.,	   1995).	   In	   financial	  transactions,	   investors	  should	   then	  either	  anticipate	   this,	  and	  not	   invest	  money	  to	  begin	  with,	   or	   develop	   efficient	   strategies	   to	   estimate	   the	   trustworthiness	   of	   others	   (Camerer	  and	  Weigelt,	  1988).	  
Experiments	  with	  repeated	  Trust	  Games	  (RTGs)	  allow	  to	  empirically	  observe	  trust-­‐based	  dynamics	  (Chang	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Neuroimaging	  studies	  employing	  RTGs	  have	  shown	  that,	  when	  no	  prior	   information	  on	   transaction	  partners	   is	   available,	   the	  brain’s	   reward	  circuitry	  is	  involved	  in	  learning	  about	  their	  type	  (i.e.	  their	  level	  of	  trustworthiness),	  based	  on	   the	   outcomes	   of	   previous	   trust-­‐based	   interactions	   (King-­‐Casas	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   Indeed,	  reward-­‐related	   brain	   regions	   have	   been	   found	   to	   respond	   positively	   to	   trustworthiness	  and	  negatively	   to	  violations	  of	   trust	   (Krueger	  et	   al.,	   2007;	  Phan	  et	   al.,	   2010;	  Long	  et	   al.,	  2012).	  We	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  “interaction-­‐based”	  learning.	  
However,	   a	   second	   important	   alternative	   for	   investors	   to	   efficiently	   engage	   in	  financial	  decisions	  is	  to	  rely	  on	  priors	  provided	  by	  a	  third-­‐party.	  Such	  priors	  may	  affect	  the	  way	  agents	  evaluate	  the	  outcomes	  of	  transactions	  and	  thus	  how	  they	  learn	  about	  the	  type	  of	   their	   counterparts.	   We	   refer	   to	   this	   as	   “prior-­‐based”	   learning.	   For	   example,	   in	   web-­‐based	   transactions,	   which	   are	   increasingly	   used,	   investors	   interact	   with	   complete	  strangers	  and	  rely	  on	  available	   reputation	  priors	   (e.g.,	   reports	  on	  previous	   transactions,	  customer	   reviews	   etc.)	   to	   predict	   expected	   returns	   and	   potential	   risks	   associated	   with	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investments	   (Kim,	   2009).	   However,	   while	   the	   neural	   correlates	   of	   interaction-­‐based	  learning	  to	  trust	  have	  been	  largely	  explored,	  only	  few	  studies	  have	  investigated	  the	  neural	  bases	   of	   trust	   when	   reputation	   priors	   are	   provided	   (Delgado	   et	   al.	   2005;	   Stanley	   et	   al.	  2012).	  No	  studies	  on	  date	  have	  directly	  compared	  the	  two	  forms	  of	  trust-­‐based	  decision	  making	  within	  the	  same	  experiment.	  
To	   confront	   this	   issue,	   we	   conducted	   a	   functional	   magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	  (fMRI)	  experiment	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  characterize	  the	  neural	  activation	  patterns	  related	  to	  trust-­‐based	  decisions	  during	  RTGs.	  Two	  situations	  were	  analyzed	  and	  compared,	  one	   in	  which	  we	  provided	  information	  about	  the	  social	  attitude	  of	  counterparts	  (i.e.	  reputational	  priors),	  and	  one	  in	  which	  no	  such	  information	  was	  provided.	  Furthermore,	  in	  contrast	  to	  a	  previous	   neuroimaging	   study	   on	   the	   same	   issue	   (Delgado	   et	   al.,	   2005),	   we	   also	  manipulated	  the	  actual	  level	  of	  trustworthiness	  demonstrated	  by	  counterparts	  during	  an	  RTG,	   such	   as	   to	  make	   it	   consistent	  with	   the	   provided	   priors.	   Finally,	  we	   used	   standard	  fMRI	   analysis,	   model-­‐free	   and	   model-­‐based	   reinforcement	   learning	   (RL)	   models	   to	  approach	   the	   problem	   of	   social	   learning	   and	   reputation	   effects.	   Our	   main	   goal	   was	   to	  assess	  whether	  and	  how	  reputation	  priors	  affect	  RL	  mechanisms	  at	  both	   the	  behavioral	  and	  neural	  level.	  
Materials	  and	  methods	  Participants	  
Twenty	  male	  participants	  (mean	  age,	  29.5	  ±	  3.53	  years)	  took	  part	  in	  the	  fMRI	  experiment;	  two	  were	  removed	  from	  the	  analysis	  for	  excessive	  head	  movement	  (See	  fMRI	  analysis).	  All	  of	  them	  were	  healthy,	  gave	  written	  informed	  consent,	  had	  normal	  or	  corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	  vision	  without	   any	   history	   of	   psychiatric,	   neurological,	   or	  major	  medical	   problems,	   and	  free	  of	  psychoactive	  medications	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  study.	  Participants	  were	  told	  that	  the	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experiment	  aimed	  at	  studying	  decision	  making	  in	  a	  social	  context,	  that	  they	  would	  receive	  a	  compensation	  of	  15	  Euros/hour	  and	  that	   the	  money	  gained	   in	   ten	  randomly	  extracted	  trials	   would	   be	   added	   to	   their	   compensation.	   The	   study	   was	   approved	   by	   the	   local	  institutional	  ethical	  committee	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Trento.	  
Task	  
The	  experimental	  task	  was	  based	  on	  the	  Trust	  Game	  (TG)	  (Berg	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  In	  one	  round	  of	   our	   task,	   each	   participant	   played	   as	   “investor”	   with	   an	   anonymous	   counterpart	   as	  “trustee”.	  Both	  players	  were	  endowed	  with	  1	  euro	  before	  starting	  a	  round	  composed	  of	  2	  stages	  (see	  Fig.	  1A):	   in	  stage	  1	   the	  participant	  decided	  whether	  or	  not	   to	  share	  his	  euro	  with	  the	  trustee.	  If	  he	  decided	  to	  share,	  the	  euro	  was	  multiplied	  by	  3	  by	  the	  experimenter	  before	   being	   allotted	   to	   the	   trustee.	   In	   stage	   2	   the	   response	   of	   the	   trustee	   could	   be	   to	  either	  equally	  share	  his	  money	  with	   the	   investor	  (1/2	  of	  4	  euros	  =	  2	  euros)	  or	  keep	  his	  money	   and	   return	   nothing.	   It	   follows	   that	   if	   the	   investor	   invested	   and	   the	   trustee	  reciprocated,	  both	  players	  were	  better	  off	   than	   if	   the	   interaction	  has	  not	  occurred	  at	  all.	  However,	  investing	  was	  risky,	  as	  if	  a	  trustee	  returned	  nothing,	  the	  investor	  incurred	  a	  loss.	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Figure	  1.	  Experimental	  design.	  A.	  One	  round	  of	  the	  two-­‐player	  repeated	  trust	  game	  
(RTG).	  P1	  is	  the	  payoff	  of	  the	  participant,	  who	  always	  plays	  as	  investor;	  P2	  is	  the	  payoff	  of	  his	  counterpart,	  who	  plays	  as	  trustee.	  Before	  each	  round	  both	  players	  are	  endowed	  with	  1	  euro.	  The	  participant	  moves	  first	  and	  chooses	  either	  to	  “keep”	  or	  “share”.	  If	  he	  keeps,	  both	  players	  maintain	   their	   initial	   endowments.	   If	   he	   shares	   the	   participant’s	   endowment	   is	  multiplied	  by	  3	  and	  passed	  to	  the	  counterpart.	  The	  trustee	  then	  decides	  whether	  to	  share	  in	   turn	   (by	   returning	   2	   euros),	   or	   to	   keep	   (by	   returning	   nothing).	   RTGs	   consisted	   of	  several	   consecutive	   rounds	   with	   a	   same	   counterpart.	   Participants	   played	   with	   many	  different	   counterparts	   and	   were	   told	   that	   their	   counterparts	   had	   already	   made	   their	  choices.	   	  B.	   Experimental	   conditions.	   Two	   conditions	   were	   adopted:	   1)	   the	   “type”	   of	  
previous neuroimaging study on the same issue (Delgado et al.,
2005), we also manipulated the actual level of trustworthiness
demonstrated by counterparts during an RTG, such as tomake it
consistent with the provided priors. Finally, we used standard
fMRI analysis as well as model-free and model-based reinforce-
ment learning (RL) algorithms to approach the problem of social
learning and reputation effects. Our main goal was to assess
whether and how reputation priors affect RLmechanisms at both
the behavioral and neural level.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Twenty male participants (mean age, 29.5! 3.53 years) took part in the
fMRI experiment; twowere removed from the analysis for excessive head
movement (see below, fMRI analysis). All of them were healthy; gave
written informed consent; had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
without any history of psychiatric, neurological, or major medical
problems; and were free of psychoactive medications at the time of the
study. Participants were told that the experiment aimed at studying de-
cisionmaking in a social context, that theywould receive a compensation
of €15/h and that themoney gained in 10 randomly extracted trials would
be added to their compensation. The study was
approved by the local institutional ethical com-
mittee of the University of Trento.
Task
The experimental task was based on the trust
game (TG) (Berg et al., 1995). In one round of
our task, each participant played as “investor”
with an anonymous counterpart as “trustee.”
Both players were endowed with €1 before
starting a round composed of two stages (Fig.
1A): in stage 1 the participant decided whether
or not to share his euro with the trustee. If he
decided to share, the euro was multiplied by 3
by the experimenter before being allotted to
the trustee. In stage 2 the response of the
trustee could be to either equally share his
money with the investor (1/2 of €4 " €2) or
keep his money and return nothing. It follows
that if the investor invested and the trustee re-
ciprocated, both players were better off than if
the interaction had not occurred at all. How-
ever, investingwas risky, as if a trustee returned
nothing, the investor incurred a loss.
We used a repeated version of this TG
(RTG), which consisted in a series of consecu-
tive TG rounds with a same counterpart. How-
ever, this alters the nature of the single-shot
TG, as RTGs allow for additional strategic ma-
neuvers. For instance, investors tend to invest
more (and trustees to reciprocate) in initial
rounds of RTGs, than in final rounds or single-
shot games (Isaac et al., 1985). For similar rea-
sons, both parties may strategically punish (by
not investing) if they believe this might incen-
tivize uncooperative counterparts to review
their strategies in future rounds.
Our study intended to minimize the strate-
gic component of trust-related behavior; hence
our version of the game differentiated from the
typical RTG in a few but important respects.
(1) Subjects were informed that trustees had
al eady made their choices, which thus would
not have been affected by those of the partici-
pant. In other words, participants knew that
counterparts were not interactive. This feature
should have eradicated any strategic compo-
nent usually present in RTGs. In reality, the
trustees were computer simulations and they reciprocated an investment
with fixed probabilities unknown to participants. (2) Another feature
was also adopted to make learning independent on participants’ actions.
In traditional RTGs, when an investor does not trust, the round ends and
nothing is learned about the behavior of counterparts. In our study, on
the other hand, participants learned about the trustees’ choices even
when they invested nothing. This adjustment enabled us to keep the
amount of feedback fixed (regardless the choice of participants), thus
allowing us to compare learning mechanisms between conditions. (3)
Finally, to further reduce strategic reasoning, participants did not know
howmany games composed each RTG with a given trustee but only that
RTGs were consecutive and if they were not paired with the same trustee
twice in a row, then they would have never encountered the counterpart
again. Specifically, we fixed a constant probability of 1/3 to continue the
game with a same counterpart; this resulted in a minimum of one and a
maximum of eight games with a same trustee.
Then, each trustee was introduced with a picture of his face before a
RTG began (Fig. 1B). The association between pictures and RTGs was
randomized, as was the order of RTGs. To reduce facial information
extraction and gender attraction, we assembled a database of colored
pictures of 20- to 60-year-old Caucasian men (mean age: 34.05! 11.19)
Figure 1. Experimental design. A, One round of the two-player RTG. P1 is the payoff of the participant, who always plays as
investor; P2 is the payoff of his counterpart, who plays as trustee. Before each round both players are endowed with€1. The
participant moves first and chooses either to “keep” or “share.” If he keeps, both players maintain their initial endowments. If he
shares the participant’s endowment ismultiplied by 3 and passed to the counterpart. The trustee then decideswhether to share in
turn (by returning€2), or to keep (by returningnothing). RTGs consistedof several consecutive rou dswith the same counterpart.
Participants played with many different counterparts and were told that their counterparts had already made their choices. B,
Experimental conditions. Two conditions were adopted: (1) the “type” of counterpart and (2) the presence versus absence of
“reputational priors.” Types: counterparts could be either “cooperative” or “individualistic” in their (simulated) behavior in RTGs;
the former shared and the latter kept in 80%ofRTG rounds. Reputational priors: participantswere told that cues indicatedwhether
the current counterpart hadobtainedahighor lowscore in a social orientation task (triangles indicated lowscores, circles indicated
high scores). Such priors reliably differentiated between the two counterpart types. C, Time line of the first RTG round. Presenta-
tion: face of the counterpart (with a prior or no-prior) was displayed for 3.5 s, and only presented for the first round of an RTG.
Fixation: Fixation cross was presented during a jittered ISI. Choice: participants made their choice by pressing “Keep” or “Share.”
Delay: ISI corresponding to the (simulated) decision of the counterpart. Outcome: outcome of the game and the payoffs of each
player.
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counterpart,	  and	  2)	  the	  presence	  vs.	  absence	  of	  “reputational	  priors”.	  Types:	  counterparts	  could	   be	   either	   “cooperative”	   or	   “individualistic”	   in	   their	   (simulated)	   behavior	   in	   RTGs;	  the	   former	   shared	   and	   the	   latter	   kept	   in	   80%	   of	   RTG	   rounds.	   Reputational	   priors:	  participants	  were	  told	  that	  cues	  indicated	  whether	  the	  current	  counterpart	  had	  obtained	  a	  high	   or	   low	   score	   in	   a	   social	   orientation	   task	   (triangles	   indicated	   low	   scores,	   circles	  indicated	   high	   scores).	   Such	   priors	   reliably	   differentiated	   between	   the	   2	   counterpart	  types.	  C.	  Timeline	  of	  the	  first	  RTG	  round.	  Presentation:	  Face	  of	  the	  counterpart	  (with	  a	  prior	   or	   no-­‐prior)	  was	   displayed	   for	   3.5	   s,	   and	   only	   presented	   for	   the	   first	   round	   of	   an	  RTG.	  Fixation:	  Fixation	  cross	  was	  presented	  during	  a	  jittered	  inter-­‐stimulus	  interval	  (ISI).	  
Choice:	   Participants	   made	   their	   choice	   by	   pressing	   “Keep”	   or	   “Share”.	   Delay:	   ISI	  corresponding	  to	  the	  (simulated)	  decision	  of	   the	  counterpart.	   Outcome:	  Outcome	  of	   the	  game	  and	  the	  payoffs	  of	  each	  player.	  
We	   used	   a	   repeated	   version	   of	   this	   TG	   (RTG),	   which	   consisted	   in	   a	   series	   of	  consecutive	   TG	   rounds	  with	   a	   same	   counterpart.	   However,	   this	   alters	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  single-­‐shot	  TG,	   as	  RTGs	   allow	   for	   additional	   strategic	  maneuver.	   For	   instance,	   investors	  tend	   to	   invest	  more	   (and	   trustees	   to	   reciprocate)	   in	   initial	   rounds	  of	  RTGs,	   than	   in	   final	  rounds	   or	   single	   shot	   games	   (Isaac	   et	   al.,	   1985).	   For	   similar	   reasons,	   both	   parties	  may	  strategically	  punish	  (by	  not	  investing)	  if	  they	  believe	  this	  might	  incentivize	  uncooperative	  counterparts	  to	  review	  their	  strategies	  in	  future	  rounds.	  
Our	  study	  intended	  to	  minimize	  the	  strategic	  component	  of	  trust-­‐related	  behavior;	  hence	   our	   version	   of	   the	   game	   differentiated	   from	   the	   typical	   repeated	   TG	   in	   few	   but	  important	  respects.	  
(i)	   Subjects	   were	   informed	   that	   trustees	   had	   already	   made	   their	   choices,	   which	   thus	  wouldn’t	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  those	  of	  the	  participant.	  In	  other	  words,	  participants	  knew	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that	  counterparts	  were	  not	  interactive.	  This	  feature	  should	  have	  eradicated	  any	  strategic	  component	   usually	   present	   in	   RTGs.	   In	   reality,	   the	   trustees	  were	   computer	   simulations	  and	  they	  reciprocated	  an	  investment	  with	  fixed	  probabilities	  unknown	  to	  participants.	  
(ii)	   Another	   feature	   was	   also	   adopted	   to	   make	   learning	   independent	   on	   participants’	  actions.	  In	  traditional	  RTGs,	  when	  an	  investor	  does	  not	  trust,	  the	  round	  ends	  and	  nothing	  is	  learned	  about	  the	  behavior	  of	  counterparts.	  In	  our	  study,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  participants	  learned	   about	   the	   trustees’	   choices	   even	   when	   they	   invested	   nothing.	   This	   adjustment	  enabled	  to	  keep	  the	  amount	  of	  feedback	  fixed	  (regardless	  the	  choice	  of	  participants),	  thus	  allowing	  us	  to	  compare	  learning	  mechanisms	  between	  conditions.	  
(iii)	   Finally,	   to	   further	   reduce	   strategic	   reasoning,	   participants	   did	  not	   know	  how	  many	  games	  composed	  each	  RTG	  with	  a	  given	  trustee	  but	  only	  that	  RTGs	  were	  consecutive	  and	  if	  they	  were	  not	  paired	  with	  the	  same	  trustee	  twice	  in	  a	  row,	  then	  they	  would	  have	  never	  encountered	  the	  counterpart	  again.	  Specifically,	  we	  fixed	  a	  constant	  probability	  of	  1/3	  to	  continue	   the	   game	   with	   a	   same	   counterpart;	   this	   resulted	   in	   a	   minimum	   of	   one	   and	   a	  maximum	  of	  eight	  games	  with	  a	  same	  trustee.	  
Then,	   each	   trustee	  was	   introduced	  with	   a	  picture	  of	  his	   face	  before	   a	  RTG	  began	  (see	  Fig.	   1B).	   The	   association	   between	   pictures	   and	   RTGs	  was	   randomized,	   as	  was	   the	  order	   of	   RTGs.	   To	   reduce	   facial	   information	   extraction	   and	   gender	   attraction,	   we	  assembled	  a	  database	  of	  colored	  pictures	  from	  20	  to	  60	  years	  old	  Caucasian	  men	  (mean	  age:	  34.05	  ±	  11.19)	  controlled	   for	  attractiveness,	  emotion	  and	  racial	   traits.	  128	  pictures	  were	   selected	   and	   used	   with	   authorization	   from	   the	   FERET	   database	   of	   facial	   images	  collected	   under	   the	   FERET	   program	   (Phillips	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   The	   words	   “trust”	   or	  “trustworthy”	  were	  never	  mentioned	  during	  the	  training	  session	  and	  the	  experiment.	  
	   121	  
Experimental	  conditions	  
A	   first	   key	   manipulation	   was	   that	   trustees	   were	   divided	   into	   2	   predefined	   types:	   they	  could	  be	  either	  “cooperative”	  or	  “individualistic”.	  Cooperative	  trustees	  would	  reciprocate	  80%	   of	   the	   times,	   while	   individualistic	   counterparts	   would	   defect	   80%	   of	   the	   times	  (though	  participants	  were	  not	   informed	  of	  such	  contingencies).	  The	  distinction	  between	  types	   furthermore	  allowed	  confronting	  the	  cases	   in	  which	  trustees	  behaved	  consistently	  (“Cons”)	  or	  inconsistently	  (“Incons”)	  with	  their	  types.	  	  
The	  second	  key	  feature	  of	  our	  study	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  reputation	  prior	  was	  provided	  (see	  Fig.	  1B).	  In	  the	  prior-­‐condition,	  half	  of	  the	  cooperative	  and	  half	  of	  the	  individualistic	  trustees	  were	   flagged,	   respectively	   by	   a	   circle	   and	   a	   triangle.	   These	   cues	   signalled	   their	  “reputation”.	  Specifically,	  participants	  took	  part	  in	  the	  Social	  Valuation	  Orientation	  (SVO)	  (Messick	   and	  McClintock,	   1966;	   Van	   Lange	   et	   al.,	   1999)	   and	  were	   told	   that	   the	   distinct	  cues	  were	  based	  on	  the	  trustees’	  scores	  for	  the	  same	  task.	  This	  task	  distinguishes	  between	  different	  types	  of	  social	  value	  orientations	  (e.g.,	  cooperative	  or	  individualistic).	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  each	  category	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  one	  cares	  about	  own	  payoffs	  and	  that	   of	   the	   others	   in	   social	   dilemma	   situations.	   Finally,	   for	   the	   remaining	   half	   of	   the	  counterparts,	  no	  prior	  information	  was	  provided	  (no-­‐prior	  condition).	  
In	   order	   to	   insure	   no	   difference	   in	   learning	   scheme	   in	   each	   of	   the	   four	   conditions	  	  (Prior/Cooperative,	   Prior/Individualistic,	   No-­‐Prior/Cooperative,	   No-­‐Prior/Individualistic),	   RTG	   length	   and	   share/keep	   schedules	   within	   each	   RTG	   were	  counterbalanced.	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Procedure	  
Training	  
Participants	  received	  written	  instructions,	  took	  part	  in	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  the	  SVO	  task	  and	   completed	   a	   20	   minutes	   RTG	   practice	   session	   (20	   trials).	   The	   experiment	   was	  implemented	  using	  Presentation®	  software	  (version	  0.70).	  
Inside	  the	  MRI	  
In	   the	   scanner,	   subjects	   completed	  356	   trials	   (89	   for	  each	   condition:	  Prior/Cooperative,	  Prior/Individualistic,	  No-­‐Prior/Cooperative,	  No-­‐Prior/Individualistic),	  divided	  in	  4	  runs	  of	  20	  minutes.	  Figure	  1C	  shows	  the	  timeline	  of	  the	  first	  trial	  of	  a	  RTG.	  Each	  RTG	  started	  with	  a	  3.5	  s	  display	  of	  the	  face	  of	  the	  trustee	  (which,	  only	  in	  “prior”	  conditions,	  was	  flagged	  with	  a	  reputational	  cue).	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  fixation	  cross	  and	  then	  by	  a	  “decision-­‐screen”,	  which	   required	  participants	   to	   choose	  between	  1	  of	  2	  option,	   labeled	   “share”	  or	   “keep”.	  After	   making	   their	   choice,	   participants	   waited	   a	   jittered	   interval	   before	   an	   “outcome	  screen”	  appeared,	  displaying	   the	   trustee’s	   choice	  and	   the	   corresponding	  payoffs	   to	  both	  players.	  For	  those	  trials	  in	  which	  participants	  chose	  to	  keep,	  the	  outcome	  screen	  was	  still	  shown.	  
Analysis	  
Behavioral	  data	  analysis	  
Behavioral	   data	   were	   analyzed	   using	   Stata©	   Statistical	   Software	  version	   9.2	   and	   the	   R	  environment	  (Development	  Core	  Team	  2008).	  A	  two-­‐way	  repeated	  measure	  ANOVA	  was	  performed	   to	   identify	   differences	   between	   conditions	   for	   each	   variable	   of	   interest	   (e.g.,	  decision	  to	  trust,	  payoffs	  made	  in	  each	  condition).	  Next,	  we	  computed	  regression	  analyses	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using	  mixed-­‐effects	   linear	  models	   (MEL),	   in	  which	  participants	  were	   treated	   as	   random	  effects	   and	   hence	   were	   allowed	   to	   have	   individually	   varying	   intercepts.	   Parameter	  estimates	  (b),	  standard	  error	  (se),	  t-­‐values	  and	  p-­‐values	  were	  reported.	  
RL	  models	  
Model	  1:	  Model-­‐free	  TD	  learning	  
We	   first	   used	   a	   “model-­‐free”	   temporal-­‐difference	  (TD)	   (model	   1)	   learning	  algorithm	  (Rummery	  and	  Niranjan,	  1994;	  Sutton	  and	  Barto,	  1998),	  which	  assumes	   that	  agents	  are	  initially	  unaffected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  priors,	  but	  that,	  as	  trials	  with	  a	  counterpart	  unravel,	  they	  may	  update	  reward	  values	  differently	  when	  priors	  are	  available	  as	  opposed	  to	  when	  they	  were	  not	  available.	  Participants	  would	  sample	  the	  reward	  probability	  of	  two	  choices	  (“Keep”	   or	   “Share”)	   in	   the	   Cooperative	   and	   Individualistic	   conditions.	   We	   then	  hypothesized	   that	   participants	   would	   obtain	   reliable	   expectation	   of	   these	   conditions	  updating	   the	   estimated	   value	   of	   each	   choice	   with	   a	   discounted	   “step-­‐size”.	   Thus	   the	  stochastic	  prediction	  error	  δ,	  based	  on	   the	  Rescorla-­‐Wagner	   learning	  rule	   (Rescorla	  and	  Wagner,	  1972)	  was	  computed	  as	  follows:	  
δt	  =	  rt	  –	  Q(C,t)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  where	  r	  is	  the	  payoff	  obtained	  at	  time	  t,	  when	  choosing	  an	  option	  C	  at	  time	  t	  or	  t+1,	  Q	  is	  the	  value	   of	   each	   choice	   “Share”	   or	   “Keep”	   in	   each	   trial.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   the	   following	  learning	  rule	  differentially	  updated	  the	  stochastic	  prediction	  error	  in	  the	  Prior	  (P)	  and	  No	  Prior	  (NP)	  conditions:	  
Q(C,t+1)	  =	  Q(C,t)	  	  +	  αP	  .δP(C,t)	  	  +	  αNP	  .δNP(C,t)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  
The	   degrees	   in	   which	   δP	   and	   δNP	   influence	   the	   new	   action	   value	   are	   weighted	   by	   two	  learning	  rates	  αP	  and	  αNP	  where	  0	  <	  αP,	  αNP	  <	  1.	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Model	  2:	  Model	  with	  separate	  expectations	  for	  	  positive	  or	  negative	  priors	  
Additionally,	   we	   hypothesized	   that,	   in	   the	   Prior	   condition,	   participants	   may	   have	  “optimistic”	   or	   “pessimistic”	   expectations,	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   game	   due	   to	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  positive	  (P+)	  or	  negative	  Prior	  (P-­‐),	  respectively	  (Biele	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Wittmann,	  2008)	   (model	  2).	  Thus,	   the	  values	  of	   initial	   choices	  when	  playing	  with	  a	  Cooperative	  or	  Individualistic	  counterpart	  in	  the	  prior	  condition	  were	  computed	  as:	  
QP+(C,0)	  =	  gP+.μθP+.N	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  
QP-­‐(C,0)	  =	  gP-­‐.μθP-­‐.N	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4)	  
where	  gP+	  gP-­‐	  	  are	  equal	  to	  1	  when	  playing	  with	  a	  counterpart	  with	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  
prior,	   respectively;	   and	   0	   otherwise.	   θP+	   and	   θP-­‐	   are	   free	   parameters	   capturing	   the	  optimistic	  or	  pessimistic	   impact	  of	   the	  priors	  expectation,	  μ	   is	   the	  expected	  payoff	   from	  choosing	   randomly	  among	  all	  options,	  which	   serves	  as	  a	  normalization	  constant	   (in	  our	  case	  μ	  =	  1),	  and	  N	  is	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  experienced	  in	  the	  learning	  condition,	  which	  is	  a	  scaling	   factor,	   allowing	   for	   the	   comparison	  between	  an	  expected	  value	  decision	  and	   the	  outcome	  of	  the	  decision.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  the	  no	  prior	  condition,	  only	  one	  parameter	  weighted	  the	  initial	  expected	  value	  of	  choices,	  QNP(C,0).	  The	  Softmax	   function	  was	   then	  used	   for	   the	   two	  models	   to	  determine	   the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  a	  given	  choice	  option	  given	  the	  learned	  values:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (5)	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where	  β	   is	  called	  a	   temperature	  parameter.	  For	  high	  values	  of	  β,	  all	  actions	  have	  almost	  the	  same	  probability	  (i.e.	  choices	  are	  random),	  while	  for	  low	  βs	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  the	  action	  with	  the	  highest	  expected	  reward	  (Q1	  >	  Q2)	  is	  close	  to	  1.	  In	   order	   to	   generate	   model-­‐based	   regressors	   for	   the	   imaging	   analysis,	   both	  learning	   models	   were	   simulated	   using	   each	   subject’s	   actual	   sequence	   of	   rewards	   and	  choices	  to	  produce	  per-­‐trial,	  per-­‐subject	  estimates	  of	  the	  initial	  values	  Qt	  and	  error	  signals	  
δt	  (Morris	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Wittmann	  et	  al,	  2008).	  All	  parameters	  of	  interest	  were	  implemented	  in	   Matlab	   R2009	   and	   were	   estimated	   using	   the	   negative	   log	   likelihood	   of	   trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  choice	   prediction.	   Model	   comparisons	   were	   performed	   with	   the	   Bayesian	   Information	  Criterion,	  the	  pseudo	  r2	  value	  using	  the	  Log	  likelihood	  of	  a	  random	  distribution	  and	  tested	  with	  the	  likelihood	  ratio	  test.	  
fMRI	  method	  
fMRI	  data	  acquisition	  
A	   4T	   Bruker	   MedSpec	   Biospin	   MR	   scanner	   (CiMEC,	   Trento	   -­‐	   Italy)	   and	   an	   8-­‐channel	  birdcage	  head	  coil	  were	  used	  to	  acquire	  both	  high-­‐resolution	  T1-­‐weighted	  anatomical	  MRI	  using	   a	   3D	   MPRAGE	   with	   a	   resolution	   of	   1	   mm3	   voxel	   and	   T2*-­‐weighted	   Echo	   planar	  imaging	  (EPI).	  The	  parameters	  of	  the	  acquisition	  were	  the	  following:	  34	  slices,	  acquired	  in	  ascending	  interleaved	  order,	  the	  in-­‐plane	  resolution	  was	  3	  mm3	  voxels,	  the	  repetition	  time	  2	  sec	  and	  the	  echo	  time	  was	  33ms.	  For	  the	  main	  experiment,	  each	  participant	  completed	  4	  runs	   of	   608	   volumes	   each.	   An	   additional	   scan	  was	   performed	   in	   between	   two	   different	  runs	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  point-­‐spread	  function	  (PSF)	  that	  was	  then	  used	  to	  correct	  the	  known	  distortion	  in	  a	  high-­‐field	  MR	  system.	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Preprocessing	  
The	   first	   five	  volumes	  were	  discarded	   from	  the	  analyses	   to	  allow	   for	  stabilization	  of	   the	  MR	   signal.	   The	   data	   were	   analyzed	   with	   Statistical	   Parametric	   Mapping	   8	   software	  (SPM8®,	   Welcome	   Department	   of	   Cognitive	   Neurology,	   London,	   UK)	   implemented	   in	  Matlab	  R2009	  (Mathworks,	  Sherborn,	  MA).	  We	  used	  SPM8®	  for	  the	  preprocessing	  steps.	  Head	   motions	   were	   corrected	   using	   the	   realignment	   program	   of	   SPM8®.	   Following	  realignment,	   the	  volumes	  were	  normalized	   to	   the	  Montreal	  Neurological	   Institute	   (MNI)	  space	  using	  a	  transformation	  matrix	  obtained	  from	  the	  normalization	  process	  of	  the	  first	  EPI	  image	  of	  each	  individual	  subject	  to	  the	  EPI	  template.	  The	  normalized	  fMRI	  data	  were	  spatially	  smoothed	  with	  a	  Gaussian	  kernel	  of	  8	  mm	  (full-­‐width	  at	  half-­‐maximum)	  in	  the	  (x,	  y,	  z)	  axes.	  Imaging	  data	  for	  participants	  with	  head	  motions	  exceeding	  one	  voxel	  (3mm)	  in	  transition	  and	  3°	  in	  rotation	  were	  discarded	  (Eddy	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  We	  also	  used	  the	  xjView	  package	  and	  MRICron	  to	  create	  the	  pictures	  presented	  in	  the	  results	  (version	  1.39,	  Build	  4).	  
fMRI	  analysis	  
GLM	  1a	  and	  b.	  Our	  first	  analysis	  considered	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  reputation	   priors	   when	   a	   new	   counterpart	   is	   presented	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   We	   used	   a	  general	  linear	  model	  (GLM),	  estimated	  in	  three	  steps:	  1)	  first,	  individual	  BOLD	  signal	  was	  modeled	   by	   a	   series	   of	   events	   convolved	   with	   a	   canonical	   hemodynamic	   response	  function.	   The	   regressors	   representing	   the	   events	   of	   interest	   were	  modeled	   as	   a	   boxcar	  function	  with	   onsets	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   each	   RTG	   (“Pre”)	   and	   durations	   of	   3.5sec.	   For	  
GLM1a,	  regressors	  represented	  trials	  in	  which	  i)	  priors	  were	  provided	  (“Prior_Pre”)	  and	  ii)	  no	  priors	  were	  provided	  (“NoPrior_Pre”).	  For	  GLM1b,	  regressors	  represented	  trials	  in	  which	  i)	  priors	  were	  provided	  for	  a	  cooperative	  counterpart	  (“Prior+_Pre”),	  ii)	  priors	  were	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provided	   for	   individualistic	   counterparts	   (“Prior-­‐_Pre”)	  and	   iii)	  no	  priors	  were	  provided	  (“NoPrior_Pre”).	   For	   t-­‐contrasts,	   we	   then	   computed	   first-­‐level	   one-­‐sample	   t-­‐tests	  comparing	  trials	  with	  and	  without	  priors	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  GLM1a.	  2)	  We	  then	  analyzed	  second-­‐level	   group	   contrasts.	   Our	   fMRI	   results	   were	   initially	   thresholded	   at	   p	   <	   0.001	  uncorrected	   and	   were	   subsequently	   cluster-­‐thresholded	   at	   p	   <	   0.05	   FWE.	   All	   reported	  coordinates	   (x,	   y,	   z)	   are	   in	   MNI	   space.	   Anatomical	   localizations	   were	   performed	   by	  overlaying	  the	  resulting	  maps	  on	  a	  normalized	  structural	  image	  averaged	  across	  subjects,	  and	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  anatomical	  atlas.	  Finally,	  3),	  we	  used	  the	  Marsbar	  toolbox	  from	  SPM8®	   to	  perform	   functionally	  defined	   (based	  on	   the	   averaged	  parameter	   estimates	   in	  the	  cluster	  found	  with	  GLM	  1b)	  region	  of	  interest	  analysis	  (ROI)	  and	  compute	  percentage	  signal	  changes.	  
GLM	  2	  Model-­‐based	  fMRI	  analysis.	  A	  second	  GLM	  model	  still	  focused	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  prior	  and	  no	  prior	  conditions	  but	  additionally	  separated	  between	  two	  phases	  of	  the	   RTG:	   the	   decision	   phase	   and	   the	   outcome	   phase.	   This	   allowed	   to	   assess	   how	   the	  impact	   on	   BOLD	   signal	   of	   priors	   was	   parametrically	   modulated	   by	   two	   behaviorally	  estimated	   learning	   measures	   (from	   model	   2):	   1)	   at	   time	   of	   choice,	   the	   parameter	   Qt,	  weighted	  the	  value	  of	  options,	  on	  a	  trial	  to	  trial	  basis,	  depending	  on	  RTG	  history;	  2)	  while	  
δt	  scaled	   outcomes	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   estimated	   prediction	   error.	  We	   performed	   this	  analysis	  at	   the	   individual	   level	  and	  ran	  group	  statistics,	   taking	   individual	  participants	  as	  random	  effects.	  We	  then	  focused	  on	  a	  subset	  of	  our	  resulting	  brain	  regions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  effect	  strength	  (P	  <	  0.05	  FWE	  corrected).	  Specifically,	  averaged	  parameter	  estimates	  were	  extracted	  from	  bilateral	  caudate	  (MNI	  coordinates:	  (-­‐14,	  20,	  2)	  and	  (12,	  18,	  6)),	  separating	  between	  prior	  vs.	  no	  prior	  contexts.	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GLM	  3.	  Violation	  of	   trust.	   In	  a	  third	  GLM	  we	  differentiated	  between	  consistent	  (“Cons”)	  and	  inconsistent	  (“Incons”)	  outcomes.	  We	  classified	  consistent	  outcomes	  as	  those	  rounds	  in	   which	   either	   i)	   participants	   had	   kept	   with	   individualistic	   counterparts	   that	   defected	  (“Cons-­‐”)	   	   (distribution	   of	   trials:	  M	   =	   57	   ±	   3)	   or	   ii)	   they	   had	   shared	  with	   a	   cooperative	  counterpart	  that	  reciprocated	  (“Cons+”)	  (M	  =	  56	  ±	  4	  trials);	  inconsistent	  outcomes,	  on	  the	  other	   hand,	   occurred	   when	   either	   iii)	   participants	   had	   kept	   with	   an	   individualistic	  counterpart	   that	   reciprocated	   (“Incons-­‐”)	   (M	   =	   14	   ±	   4	   trials)	   or	   iv)	   they	   shared	  with	   a	  cooperative	   counterpart	   that	   defected	   (“Incons+”)	   (M	   =	   15	   ±	   4	   trials),	   and	   who	   thus	  “violated”	  their	  trust.	  	  
Functional	   connectivity	   analysis	   (PPI).	  To	  explore	   the	   interplay	  between	   the	   caudate	  and	   other	   brain	   regions	   following	   violations	   of	   trust	   (Incons+),	   we	   assessed	   functional	  connectivity	   using	   psychophysiological	   analysis	   (PPI:	   Friston	   1994;	   Cohen	   et	   al.	   2005)	  that	  compares	  the	  pattern	  of	  activity	  of	  a	  seed	  region	  to	  every	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  brain.	  We	   took	   the	  bilateral	   caudate	   resulting	   from	   the	   reported	  GLM3	   (“Cons”	  >	   “Incons”)	   as	  seed	  regions,	  as	  these	  areas	  showed	  highest	  sensitivity	  to	  violations	  of	  trust	  (t	  =	  6.78,	  p	  <	  0.05,	  FWE).	  Then,	  we	  created	  three	  regressors:	  1)	  the	  caudate	  time	  course	  (physiological	  regressor);	  2)	  an	  event	  related	  regressor	  that	  distinguished	  between	  violations	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  prior	  and	  no	  prior	  conditions	  (with	  a	  boxcar	   function	  ranging	   from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  outcome	  phase	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ISI)	  and	  3)	  the	  interaction	  term.	  Additionally,	  we	  also	   conducted	   a	   correlation	   analysis	   between	   the	   retaliation	   rate	   for	   each	   subject	  (measured	  by	  the	  percentage	  of	  choices	  to	  keep	  after	  violation	  of	  trust	  when	  playing	  with	  a	  cooperative	  partner)	  and	  the	  parameter	  estimates	  in	  left	  ventro-­‐lateral	  Prefrontal	  Cortex	  (vLPFC)	   (MNI	   -­‐40,	   42,	   4)	   across	   subjects.	   Finally,	   to	   examine	   how	   striatal	   responses	   to	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violations	   of	   trust	   were	   related	   to	   learning,	   we	   plotted	   individual	   parameter	   estimates	  against	  the	  individual	  learning	  rates	  (estimated	  with	  model	  2	  described	  above).	  
	  
Results	  
Behavioral	  results	  	  
Our	  main	  goal	  was	  to	  determine	  whether	  reputation	  priors	  influence	  initial	  expectations	  and	   decisions	   in	   the	   games,	   and	   subsequent	   learning	  mechanisms.	   A	   repeated	  measure	  two-­‐way	  ANOVA	  was	  performed	  using	  type	  of	  counterpart	  (cooperative	  or	  individualistic)	  and	   prior	   condition	   (prior	   or	   no-­‐prior)	   as	  within	   participant	   factors.	   The	   percentage	   of	  decisions	  to	  share	  was	  significantly	  higher	  with	  cooperative	  counterparts	  (M	  =	  71.77,	  SE	  ±	  4.03)	   than	   with	   individualistic	   counterparts	   (M	   =	   27.34,	   SE	   ±	   3.71;	   F1,	  17	   =	   174.01,	   p	   <	  0.001).	   The	   results	   also	   showed	   a	   significant	   interaction	   effect	   of	   prior	   with	   type	   of	  counterpart	   (F2,	   35	   =	   30.87,	   p	   <	   0.001).	   Post	   hoc	   tests	   (t-­‐tests	   Bonferroni	   corrected)	  indicated	   that	   participants	   decided	   to	   share	   with	   cooperative	   partners	   more	   when	  provided	  with	   a	   prior	   (M	   =	   81.09,	   SE	   ±	   4.78)	   than	  when	   priors	  weren’t	   provided	   (M	   =	  62.45,	  SE	  ±	  5.81;	  t	  =	  5.89,	  p	  <	  0.001),	  whereas	  they	  decided	  to	  share	  with	   individualistic	  counterparts	   less	  in	  the	  prior	  (M	  =	  18.37,	  SE	  ±	  4.66)	  than	  in	  the	  no	  prior	  condition	  (M	  =	  36.3,	  SE	  ±	  5.05;	  t	  =	  4.23,	  p	  <	  0.002,	  see	  Fig.	  2A).	  When	  payoffs	  are	  analyzed	  with	  type	  of	  counterparts	  and	  prior	  condition	  as	  within-­‐subject	  variables,	  we	  found	  that	  payoffs	  were	  significantly	  higher	  when	  playing	  with	  cooperative	  counterparts	  (M	  =	  1.43,	  SE	  ±	  0.13)	  than	  individualistic	   counterparts	   (M	   =	   0.94,	   SE	   ±	   0.11;	   F1,	   17	   =	   138.32,	   p	   <	   0.001)	   and	  significantly	  higher	  in	  the	  prior	  condition	  (M	  =	  1.20,	  SE	  ±	  0.10)	  than	  the	  no	  prior	  condition	  (M	  =	  1.08,	  SE	  ±	  0.06;	  F1,	  17	  =	  28.98,	  p	  <	  0.001,	  see	  Fig.	  2C).	  	  




Figure	   2.	   Behavioral	   results.	   A.	   Average	   percentage	   of	   decision	   to	   trust	   across	  
conditions.	  Mean	  ±	   standard	   error	  of	   participants’	   decision	   to	   trust	   (share)	   are	  broken	  down	   for	   trustee’s	   type	   (Cooperative/Individualistic)	   and	   prior	   condition	   (Prior/No	  Prior);	  ***	  p<0.001.	  Priors	  enabled	  participants	  to	  match	  (on	  average)	  their	  choices	  with	  the	   counterpart’s	   level	   of	   trustworthiness.	  B.	   Learning	   dynamics	   across	   RTG	   rounds.	  Average	   percentage	   of	   the	   decision	   to	   trust	   for	   each	   round	   when	   playing	   with	   a	  “cooperative”	  vs.	   “individualistic”	  counterpart,	  and	  when	  priors	  were	  present	  vs.	  absent.	  When	  participants	  know	  nothing	  of	   their	   counterparts	   they	   tend	   to	   randomize	  between	  trusting	   and	   not	   trusting	   during	   initial	   rounds	   and	   adjust	   their	   choices	   to	   their	  counterparts’	   type	   in	   succeeding	   rounds.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   when	   priors	   are	   present,	  
shared less over time (b ! "0.12 (SE #
0.02), t!"6.81, p$ 0.001). These results
suggest that participants took into ac-
count reputation priors and played ac-
cording to the counterpart’s level of
trustworthiness. Instead, when priors
were not available, participants learned
counterparts’ types on the basis of their
actions. Interestingly, we found an inter-
action effect between trustees’ type and
the prior condition (b! 2.27 (SE# 0.13),
t ! 17.39, p $ 0.001). These results indi-
cate that the difference between prior and
no-prior conditions was greater when
playing with a cooperative than with an
individualistic counterpart. Furthermore,
even though participants in the no-prior
condition adjusted their decisions to their
counterparts’ type over rounds, they still
shared with cooperative counterparts less
than when they had priors (Fig. 2B). Post
hoc t test revealed that, in the no-prior
condition, in rounds when cooperative
counterparts kept, participants subse-
quently kept more (Mean percentage of
decisions to keep ! 0.48, SE # 0.019),
whereas they persisted in sharing in the
prior condition (M! 0.2, SE# 0.015; t(17)
! "4.99, p $ 0.001; Fig. 2D). Similarly,
when individualistic counterparts shared
in a round, participants subsequently
shared more when not provided with a
prior (Mean percentage of decisions to
share ! 0.34, SE # 0.015) than when
given a prior (M ! 0.21, SE # 0.009;
t(17)!"4.783, p$ 0.001; Fig. 2E).
Results from learning models
A likelihood ratio test revealed that the Prior model (model 2)
with separated expectations for cooperative and individualistic
counterparts performed better than the classical TD learning
model (model 1) (p$ 0.001) (Additional statistics are reported
in Table 1). The best-fitting parameters are shown in Table 2. For
these parameters, we found that the average learning rate esti-
mated from trials in the No-Prior condition, !NP, was signifi-
cantly higher than the average learning rate estimated from trials
in the Prior condition !P(t(17)! 2.29; p$ 0.05). We also found
that the initial value in the Cooperative Prior condition, QP%(0)
was significantly higher than the initial value in the No-Prior
conditionQNP(0) (t(17)!"2.82; p$ 0.001), and the initial value
in the Individualistic Prior condition, QP"(0) (t17!"3.07; p$
0.001). There was no significant difference between the initial
value in the Individualistic Prior condition,QP-(0), and the initial
value in the No-Prior condition QNP(0) (t ! 0.46). Finally, we
found that the average learning rates estimated for each partici-
pant when they kept was higher (M! 0.46, SE# 0.04) thanwhen
they shared (M! 0.38, SE# 0.048; t(17)!"2.27, p$ 0.05; Table
2).
fMRI results
Effect of prior at time of counterpart presentation
The contrast (Prior_Pre&NoPrior_Pre) (see Materials and Meth-
ods, GLM1a and 1b) revealed differential activity in themedial PFC
(mPFC; 0, 62, 31), to the presence versus absence of any priorswhen
new counterparts were presented (t ! 8.26; p $ 0.05, FWE cor-
rected) (Fig. 3A; Table 3). Further functional ROI analysis, based on
GLM 1b, qualified this activation pattern as responding with in-
creased activity to the presence of priors, regardless of their nature
(positive or negative), and decreased activity to their absence (Fig.
3B). The opposite contrast (NoPrior_Pre& Prior_Pre) revealed ac-
tivity in bilateral anterior insula ("36,"4, 15), t! 3.91; p$ 0.001
uncorrected and (38, 3, 10), t! 3.45; p$ 0.002 uncorrected).
Effect of prior at RTG choice
Applying parametric analysis (see Materials and Methods,
GLM 2 model-based fMRI analysis) to the functional MRI
data, we focused on trial-to-trial weights on decision values as
represented by per-trialQt estimate amplitude. We found that
decision value estimates were correlated with neural activity in
a network consisting of the mPFC ("2, 64, 10) and the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (dLPFC) ("38, 38, 32), surviving p$
0.05, FWE corrected (Fig. 4A; Table 3). These two regions
reflected the contributions of prior’s valence (positive or neg-
ative) to the pattern of activity related to the decision to trust
(Fig. 4B). Moreover, the difference at a neural level between
prior and no-prior condition was greater when playing with a
cooperative counterpart compared with an individualistic
counterpart. This is consistent with the observed behavioral
asymmetry of the effect of priors between cooperative and
individualistic conditions (Fig. 2B).
Figure 2. Behavioral results. A, Average percentage of decision to trust across conditions. Mean# SE of participants’ decision
to trust (share) are brokendown for trustee’s type (Cooperative/Individualistic) andprior condition (Prior/NoPrior); ***p$0.001.
Priors enabled participants to match (on average) their choices with the counterpart’s level of trustworthiness. B, Learning
dynamics across RTG rounds. Average percentage of the decision to trust for each roundwhen playingwith a “cooperative” versus
“individualistic” counterpart, and when priors were present versus absent. When participants know nothing of their counterparts
they tend to randomize between trusting and not trusting during initial rounds and adjust their choices to their counterparts’ type
in succeeding rounds. On the other hand, when priors are present, participants tend to rely on them already from early rounds.
Shadedareas above andbelow the curves are SEs.C, Averagepayoffs in thePrior andNo-Prior conditions. Averagepayoffs# SE (in
€) in Prior/No Prior conditions. When priors are available, participants significantly earn more when they adjust their choices to
counterparts’ types; **p $ 0.01. D, Choices following unexpected behavior of cooperative and individualistic counterparts.
Average (#SE) of percentage of “keep” choices in prior versus no-prior condition at time t, following rounds inwhich participants
shared anda cooperative counterpart violated their trust by deciding to keep (at t"1). Decisions to Keepat time t (i.e., retaliation)
were less frequent when priors were available. E, Percentage of “share” choices (at t) following rounds in which participants had
kept and an individualistic counterpart has shared (at t" 1).
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participants	   tend	   to	   rely	   on	   them	   already	   from	   early	   rounds.	   Shaded	   areas	   above	   and	  below	   the	   curves	   are	   standard	   errors.	  C.	  Average	   payoffs	   in	   the	   Prior	   and	   No-­‐Prior	  
conditions.	   Average	   payoffs	   ±	   standard	   error	   (in	   euros)	   in	   Prior/No	   Prior	   conditions.	  When	   priors	   are	   available,	   participants	   significantly	   earn	   more	   when	   they	   adjust	   their	  choices	  to	  counterparts’	  types;	  **	  p<0.01.	  D.	  Choices	  following	  unexpected	  behavior	  of	  
cooperative	  and	  individualistic	  counterparts.	  Average	  (±	  standard	  error)	  of	  percentage	  of	   “keep”	   choices	   in	   prior	   vs.	   no	   prior	   condition	   at	   time	   t,	   following	   rounds	   in	   which	  participants	  shared	  and	  a	  cooperative	  counterpart	  violated	  their	  trust	  by	  deciding	  to	  keep	  (at	  t-­‐1).	  Decisions	  to	  Keep	  at	  time	  t	  (i.e.,	  retaliation)	  was	  less	  frequent	  when	  priors	  were	  available.	  E.	   Percentage	  of	   “share”	   choices	   (at	   t)	   following	   rounds	   in	  which	  participants	  had	  kept	  and	  an	  individualistic	  counterpart	  has	  shared	  (at	  t-­‐1).	  
In	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  prior	  condition,	  the	  trustees’	  type,	  the	  order	  of	  the	   repeated	  game	  and	   the	   interactions	  of	   such	   factors	  on	   the	  decision	   to	   share	   (binary	  dependent	  variable),	  we	  performed	  regression	  analyses	  using	  mixed-­‐effects	  linear	  (MEL)	  models.	  The	  results	  revealed	  that	  participants	  shared	  with	  cooperative	  counterparts	  more	  often	  as	  compared	  to	  individualistic	  counterparts	  (b	  =	  1.29	  (SE	  ±	  0.08),	  t	  =	  15.8,	  p	  <	  0.001);	  shared	  less	  when	  they	  did	  not	  receive	  priors	  (b	  =	  -­‐	  1.09	  (SE	  ±	  0.09),	  t	  =	  -­‐	  12.1,	  p	  <	  0.001);	  and	   shared	   less	   over	   time	   (b	   =	   -­‐	   0.12	   (SE	   ±	   0.02),	   t	   =	   -­‐	   6.81,	   p	   <	   0.001).	   These	   results	  suggest	  that	  participants	  took	  into	  account	  reputation	  priors	  and	  played	  according	  to	  the	  counterpart’s	   level	   of	   trustworthiness.	   Instead,	   when	   priors	   were	   not	   available,	  participants	   learned	   counterparts’	   types	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   actions.	   Interestingly,	   we	  found	  an	  interaction	  effect	  between	  the	  trustees’	  type	  and	  the	  prior	  condition	  (b	  =	  2.27	  (SE	  ±	  0.13),	  t	  =	  17.39,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  These	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  prior	  and	  no	   prior	   conditions	   was	   greater	   when	   playing	   with	   a	   cooperative	   than	   with	   an	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individualistic	   counterpart.	   Furthermore,	   even	   though	   participants	   in	   the	   no	   prior	  condition	   adjusted	   their	   decisions	   to	   their	   counterparts’	   type	   over	   rounds,	   they	   still	  shared	  with	  cooperative	  counterparts	  less	  than	  when	  they	  had	  priors	  (see	  Fig.	  2B).	  	  Post	  hoc	   t-­‐test	   revealed	   that,	   in	   the	   no	   prior	   condition,	   in	   rounds	   when	   cooperative	  counterparts	  kept,	  participants	  subsequently	  kept	  more	  (Mean	  percentage	  of	  decisions	  to	  
keep	  =	  0.48,	  SE	  ±	  0.019),	  whereas	  they	  persisted	  in	  sharing	  in	  the	  prior	  condition	  (M	  =	  0.2,	  
SE	   ±	   0.015;	   t17	   =	   -­‐	   4.99,	   p	   <	   0.001),	   (see	   Fig.	   2D).	   Similarly,	   when	   individualistic	  counterparts	   shared	   in	   a	   round,	   participants	   subsequently	   shared	   more	   when	   not	  provided	  with	  a	  prior	  (Mean	  percentage	  of	  decisions	  to	  share	  =	  0.34,	  SE	  ±	  0.015)	  than	  when	  given	  a	  prior	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (M	  =	  0.21,	  SE	  ±	  0.009;	  t17	  =	  -­‐	  4.783,	  p	  <	  0.001,	  see	  Fig.	  2E).	  	  
Results	  from	  learning	  models	  
A	   likelihood	   ratio	   test	   revealed	   that	   the	   Prior	   model	   (model	   2)	   with	   separated	  expectations	   for	   cooperative	   and	   individualistic	   counterparts	   (Prior	   mode)	   performed	  better	  than	  the	  classical	  TD	  learning	  model	  (model	  1)	  (p	  <	  0.001)	  (Additional	  statistics	  are	  reported	   in	   Table	   1).	   The	   best-­‐ﬁtting	   parameters	   are	   shown	   in	   Table	   2.	   For	   these	  parameters,	  we	  found	  that	  the	  average	  learning	  rate	  estimated	  from	  trials	  in	  the	  No	  Prior	  condition,	   αNP,	  was	   signiﬁcantly	   higher	   than	   the	   average	   learning	   rate	   estimated	   from	  trials	  in	  the	  Prior	  condition	  αP	  (t17	  =	  2.29;	  p	  <	  0.05).	  We	  also	  found	  that	  the	  initial	  value	  in	  the	  Cooperative	  Prior	  condition,	  QP+(0)	  was	  significantly	  higher	   than	   the	   initial	  value	   in	  the	   No	   Prior	   condition	   QNP(0)	   (t17	   =	   -­‐	   2.82;	   p	   <	   0.001),	   and	   the	   initial	   value	   in	   the	  Individualistic	  Prior	  condition,	  	  	   	  QP-­‐(0)	  (t17	  =	  -­‐	  3.07;	  p	  <	  0.001).	  There	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	   initial	  value	   in	   the	   Individualistic	  Prior	  condition,	  QP-­‐(0)	  and	  the	  initial	  value	  in	  the	  No	  Prior	  condition	  QNP(0)	  (t	  =	  0.46).	  Finally,	  we	  found	  that	  the	  average	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learning	  rates	  estimated	  for	  each	  participant	  when	  they	  kept	  was	  higher	  (M	  =	  0.46,	  SE	  ±	  0.04)	  than	  when	  they	  shared	  (M	  =	  0.38,	  SE	  ±	  0.048;	  t17	  =	  -­‐	  2.27,	  p	  <	  0.05,	  see	  Table2).	  
	  
Effect of prior at RTG outcome
Across all RTGs, during the outcome phase of the game (see
Materials and Methods, GLM 2 model-based fMRI analysis),
individually estimated trial-wise prediction errors (positive
and negative combined) correlated significantly with BOLD
responses in the bilateral caudate in the No-Prior trials only
(p! 0.05, FWE) (Fig. 5A; Table 3). On the other hand, striatal
activity appeared to track estimated prediction errors in a
more blunted fashion when priors were provided (Fig. 5A).
Moreover, from a direct comparison between the no-prior
and prior conditions, we found higher activity in the left
caudate for the no-prior condition compared with the prior
condition with group peak MNI coordinates at "12, 20, 8
(Fig. 5B).
Pattern of activity related to violation of trust: functional
connectivity analysis
Finally, we specified the changes in activity in the caudate related
to the effects of violation of trust (e.g., the decisions to keep a
cooperative counterpart in response to a decision to trust of a
participant) in the prior and no-prior condition (analysis from
GLM 3; Table 3). This analysis showed a stronger deactivation of
the caudate in the prior condition compared with the no-prior
condition (t # 6.78; Fig. 6A,C). However, in contrast with the
no-prior condition, striatal deactivations to violation of trust
were not reflected in the behavior of our participants. Indeed, the
pattern of striatal activity related to violation of trust did correlate
with individual learning rates only in the no-prior condition
(from the model 2: r # "0.687, p ! 0.001; Fig. 6D). No such
correlation was found in the Prior condition (Fig. 6D).
We used functional connectivity analysis to search (see Mate-
rials and Methods, Functional connectivity analysis) for brain
areas that could have mediated such striatal responses when rep-
utation priors were provided.We found that left and right vLPFC
showed strong functional connectivity with the caudate seed re-
gion after violation of trust in the prior compared with no-prior
conditions; vLPFC, left ("40, 42, 4), t# 3.73; right (38, 46, 4), t#
6.37, p! 0.05 corrected (Fig. 6A; Table 3). Finally, we found that the
strength of connectivity between caudate–vLPFCwas anticorrelated
with participants’ decisions to keep following violation of trust
(Spearman correlation r#"0.67, p! 0.001). Moreover, we found
that the activity in the vLPFC was inversely correlated with indi-
vidual retaliation rates (computed as the
percentage of Keep over Share choices) af-
ter violations of trust (r # "0.6, p !
0.009; Fig. 6B).
Discussion
Reputation-based social decision making
has been investigated both by theoretical
and empirical studies (Camerer and
Weigelt, 1988; Fudenberg et al., 1990;
Boero et al., 2009); however, research on
its neurocognitive bases is still in its in-
fancy. Though it is rather unlikely that, in
daily decisions, people possess absolutely
no-prior/contextual information on who
they interact with, the growing literature
using RTGs in fMRI focused mainly on
situations in which strictly no-priors are
available (McCabe et al., 2001; King-Casas
et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2007). Only two
recent fMRI studies investigated how so-
cial priors (i.e., the moral character of
their counterparts) affect the way people engage in RTGs (Del-
gado et al., 2005; Fareri et al., 2012). These studies, however, did
not completely isolate the effect of priors on trust (prior-based
trust) by confronting them with identical conditions with no
priors (interaction-based trust). Our experimental setting is the
first to allow this direct comparison. The main goal of our study
was to determine whether, and how, reliable reputational priors
affect initial decisions and subsequent learning mechanisms at
both the behavioral and neural level.
From a behavioral point of view, we show that priors affect
decisions to trust in at least two ways: (1) in initial stages of the
interaction, participants clearly chose to trust or distrust ac-
cording to the positive or negative reputation of their coun-
terparts; furthermore (2) players tend to keep relying on
Figure 3. mPFC encodes reputational priors when a new counterpart is first presented. A, Random effect analysis. When
contrasting (Prior)$ (No Prior) conditions at time of counterpart presentation, activity in themPFC survived FWE correction, p!
0.05. B, Functional ROI analysis in mPFC. Functional ROI analyses further revealed percentage signal changes in the mPFC cortex
MNI (0, 62, 31). The figure shows an increased activity when priors were present, regardless of their type, and decreased activity
when there were no priors.










Pseudo r 2 0.14 0.273
Bayesian information criterion value (BIC), Log likelihood, and the pseudo r 2 suggest that the Prior% and Prior"
expectations TD learning model fits the observed behavior better the other TD learning models.
Table 2. Averaged best-fitting parameter estimates (across subjects) SE
Parameter estimate for best behavioral model, depicted as mean& SE
Mean SE
Learning rate Prior condition!P 0.3373 & 0.0456
Estimates for Cooperative counterparts 0.327 & 0.0424
Estimates for Individualistic counterparts 0.3475 & 0.0398
Learning rate No Prior condition!NP 0.5075 & 0.0689
Estimates for Cooperative counterparts 0.4686 & 0.0701
Estimates for Individualistic counterparts 0.539 & 0.0599
Estimates learning rates for Invest trials (participants shared) 0.3845 & 0.0459
Estimates learning rates for Non-Invest trials (participants kept) 0.4603 & 0.0476
Softmax inv. Temp Betha" 4.7769 & 0.3149
Initial value Cooperative Prior condition, QP%(0) 1.3814 & 0.1031
Initial value Individualistic Prior condition, QP"(0) 0.9838 & 0.1055
Initial value No Prior condition QNP(0) 1.0641 & 0.126
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fMRI	  results	  
Effect	  of	  prior	  at	  time	  of	  counterpart	  presentation	  
The	   contrast	   (“Prior_Pre”	   >	   “NoPrior_Pre”)	   (see	   Methods,	  GLM1a)	   revealed	   differential	  activity	   in	   the	   mPFC	   (0,	   62,	   31),	   to	   the	   presence	   vs.	   absence	   of	   any	   priors	   when	   new	  counterparts	  were	   presented	   (t	   =	   8.26;	  p	   <	   0.05	   FWE	   cor.)	   (See	  Fig.	   3A	   and	  Table	   3).	  Further	   functional	   ROI	   analysis,	   based	   on	   GLM1b,	   qualified	   this	   activation	   pattern	   as	  responding	  with	   increased	   activity	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   priors,	   regardless	   of	   their	   nature	  (positive	  or	  negative),	  and	  decreased	  activity	  to	  their	  absence	  (see	  Fig.	  3B).	  The	  opposite	  contrast	  (“NoPrior_Pre”	  >	  “Prior_Pre”)	  revealed	  activity	  in	  bilateral	  anterior	  insula	  (-­‐36,	  -­‐4,	  15),	  t	  =	  3.91;	  p	  <	  0.001	  unc.,	  and	  (38,	  3,	  10),	  t	  =	  3.45;	  p	  <	  0.002	  unc.).	  
	  
	  
Figure	   3.	   mPFC	   encodes	   reputational	   priors	   when	   a	   new	   counterpart	   is	   first	  
presented.	  A.	  Random	  Effect	  Analysis.	  When	  contrasting	  (Prior)	  >	  (NoPrior)	  conditions	  at	  time	  of	  counterpart	  presentation,	  activity	  in	  the	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  survived	  FWE	  correction,	   p	   <	   0.05.	   B.	   Functional	   ROI	   Analysis	   in	   mPFC.	   Functional	   ROI	   analyses	  Effect of prior at RTG outcome
Across all RTGs, during the outcome phase of the game (see
Materials and Methods, GLM 2 model-based fMRI analysis),
individually estimated trial-wise prediction errors (positive
and negative combined) correlated significantly with BOLD
responses in the bilateral caudate in the No-Prior trials only
(p! 0.05, FWE) (Fig. 5A; Table 3). On the other hand, striatal
activity appeared to track estimated prediction errors in a
more blunted fashion when priors were provided (Fig. 5A).
Moreover, from a direct comparison between the no-prior
and prior conditions, we found higher activity in the left
caudate for the no-prior condition compared with the prior
condition with group peak MNI coordinates at "12, 20, 8
(Fig. 5B).
Pattern of activity related to violation of trust: functional
connectivity analysis
Finally, we specified the changes in activity in the caudate related
to the effects of violation of trust (e.g., the decisions to keep a
cooperative counterpart in response to a decision to trust of a
participant) in the prior and no-prior condition (analysis from
GLM 3; Table 3). This analysis showed a stronger deactivation of
the caudate in the prior condition compared with the no-prior
condition (t # 6.78; Fig. 6A,C). However, in contrast with the
no-prior condition, striatal deactivations to violation of trust
were not reflected in the behavior of our participants. Indeed, the
pattern of striatal activity related to violation of trust did correlate
with individual learning rates only in the no-prior condition
(from the model 2: r # "0.687, p ! 0.001; Fig. 6D). No such
correlation was found in the Prior condition (Fig. 6D).
We used functional connectivity analysis to search (see Mate-
rials and Methods, Functional connectivity analysis) for brain
areas that could have mediated such striatal responses when rep-
utation priors were provided.We found that left and right vLPFC
showed strong functional connectivity with the caudate seed re-
gion after violation of trust in the prior compared with no-prior
conditions; vLPFC, left ("40, 42, 4), t# 3.73; right (38, 46, 4), t#
6.37, p! 0.05 corr cted (Fig. 6A; Table 3). Finally, we found that the
strength of connectivity between caudate–vLPFCwas anticorrelated
with participants’ decisions to keep following violation of trust
(Spearman correlation r#"0.67, p! 0.001). Moreover, we found
that the activity in the vLPFC was inversely correlated with indi-
vidual retaliation rates (computed as the
percentage of Keep over Share choices) af-
ter violations of trust (r # "0.6, p !
0.009; Fig. 6B).
Discussion
Reputation-based social decision making
has been investigated both by theoretical
and empirical studies (Camerer and
Weigelt, 1988; Fudenberg et al., 1990;
Boero et al., 2009); however, research on
its neurocognitive bases is still in its in-
fancy. Though it is rather unlikely that, in
daily decisions, people possess absolutely
no-prior/contextual information on who
they interact with, the growing literature
using RTGs in fMRI focused mainly on
situations in which strictly no-priors are
available (McCabe et al., 2001; King-Casas
et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2007). Only two
recent fMRI studies investigated how so-
cial priors (i.e., the moral character of
their counterpart ) affect the way people engage in RTGs (Del-
gado et al., 2005; Fareri et al., 2012). These studies, however, did
not completely isolate the effect of priors on trust (prior-based
trust) by confronting them with identical conditions with no
priors (interaction-based trust). Our experimental setting is the
first to allow this direct comparison. The main goal of our study
was to determine whether, and how, reliable reputational priors
affect initial decisions and subsequent learning mechanisms at
both the behavioral and neural level.
From a behavioral point of view, we show that priors affect
decisions to trust in at least two ways: (1) in initial stages of the
interaction, participants clearly chose to trust or distrust ac-
cording to the positive or negative reputation of their coun-
terparts; furthermore (2) players tend to keep relying on
Figure 3. mPFC encodes reputational priors when a new counterpart is first presented. A, Random effect analysis. When
contrasting (Prior)$ (No Prior) conditions at time of counterpart presentation, activity in themPFC survived FWE correction, p!
0.05. B, Functional ROI analysis in mPFC. Functional ROI analyses further revealed percentage signal changes in the mPFC cortex
MNI (0, 62, 31). The figure shows an increased activity when priors were present, regardless of their type, and decreased activity
when there were no priors.










Pseudo r 2 0.14 0.273
Bayesian information criterion value (BIC), Log likelihood, and the pseudo r 2 suggest that the Prior% and Prior"
expectations TD learning model fits the observed behavior better the other TD learning models.
Table 2. Averaged best-fitting parameter estimates (across subjects) SE
Parameter estimate for best behavioral model, depicted as mean& SE
Mean SE
Learning rate Prior condition!P 0.3373 & 0.0456
Estimates for Cooperative counterparts 0.327 & 0.0424
Estimates for Individualistic counterparts 0.3475 & 0.0398
Learning rate No Prior condition!NP 0.5075 & 0.0689
Estimates for Cooperative counterparts 0.4686 & 0.0701
Estimates for Individualisti counterparts 0.539 & 0.0599
Estimates learning rates for Invest trials (participants shared) 0.3845 & 0.0459
Estimates learning rates for Non-Invest trials (participan s kept) 0.4603 & 0.0476
Softmax inv. Temp Betha" 4.7769 & 0.3149
Initial value Cooperative Prior condition, QP%(0) 1.3814 & 0.1031
Initial value Individualistic Prior condition, QP"(0) 0.9838 & 0.1055
Initial value No Prior condition QNP(0) 1.0641 & 0.126
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further	  revealed	  percentage	  signal	  changes	  in	  the	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  MNI	  (0,	  62,	  31).	  The	  figure	  shows	  an	  increased	  activity	  when	  priors	  were	  present,	  regardless	  of	  their	  type,	  and	  decreased	  activity	  when	  there	  were	  no	  priors.	  	  
	  
Effect	  of	  prior	  at	  RTG	  choice	  
Applying	  parametric	  analysis	  (see	  GLM	  2)	  to	  the	  functional	  MRI	  data,	  we	  focused	  on	  trial-­‐to-­‐trial	  weights	  on	  decision	  values	  as	  represented	  by	  per-­‐trial	  Qt	  estimate	  amplitude.	  We	  found	   that	   decision	   value	   estimates	   were	   correlated	   with	   neural	   activity	   in	   a	   network	  consisting	  of	  the	  mPFC	  (-­‐2,	  64,	  10)	  and	  the	  dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (dLPFC)	  (-­‐38,	  38,	  32),	   surviving	   p	   <	   0.05	   FWE	   corrected	   (see	   Fig.	   4A	   and	   Table	   3).	   These	   two	   regions	  reflected	   the	   contributions	   of	   prior’s	   valence	   (positive	   or	   negative)	   to	   the	   pattern	   of	  activity	  related	  to	  the	  decision	  to	  trust	  (see	  Fig.	  4B).	  Moreover,	  the	  difference	  at	  a	  neural	  level	  between	  prior	  and	  no	  prior	  condition	  was	  greater	  when	  playing	  with	  a	  cooperative	  counterpart	   compared	   with	   an	   individualistic	   counterpart.	   This	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	  observed	   behavioral	   asymmetry	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   priors	   between	   cooperative	   and	  individualistic	  conditions	  (see	  Fig	  2B).	  
reputation priors, even when their
counterpart’s behavior was inconsistent
with it. As a consequence, and since pri-
ors were accurate predictors of trust-
worthiness in our study, players earned
more when reputational cues were
available than when they were not.
mPFC encod s reputatio al prior
From a neural point of view, our fMRI
results revealed that the presentation of a
new counterpart yielded enhanced activa-
tion in the mPFC when accompanied by a
prior (regardless of it signaling a positive
or negative reputation). We suggest that
the enhanced mPFC activity may reflect
the fact the prior information reduced the
uncertainty about the behavior of the other
faced by participants when beginning a new
RTG. Indeed, this region has been previ-
ously implicated in uncertainty resolution
in interactive contexts (Yoshida and Ishii,
2006). This is furthermore consistent with
the inverse activation pattern observed in
the insula, which showed stronger activity
when priors were not available, consistently
with previous findings reporting a role for
this region in tracking increaseduncertainty
(Preuschoff et al., 2008).
mPFC and dLPFC encode the value of
reputation priors
At time of choice, the valence of priors
elicited dissociable activation patternswhen
integrated with the behaviorally estimated
(from the prior-based RL model) option
values (Qt). Specifically, the mPFC and
dLPFC differentially responded to cooper-
ative versus individualistic counterparts,
however, only when priors were available.
Figure 5. Brain regions parametrically correlated with the estimated prediction error of the best-fitting RL model. A, Random
effect fMRI analysis: Activity of the caudate showed significant correlation to the estimated prediction error signal in the no-prior
condition ( p!0.05FWEcorrected). Suchactivitieswerenot observed in this brain area in theprior condition. Peak coordinates are
given inMNI space. Color bars indicate T values.B, Parameter estimates were extracted from the left caudate ("12, 20, 8) for the
direct comparisonbetweenprior andno-prior conditions. Caudate activity correlateswithprediction error in theno-prior condition
only.
Table 3. Activations correlated with contrasts of interest
MNI coordinates (mm)
Analysis/Location BA Side Cluster size T p value FWE cor. X Y Z
Prior# No Prior (GLM 1)
mPFC 10 95 8.26 6.8$ 10"06 0 62 31
VTA — 14 3.177 0.0032 unc. 0 "1 "5
No Prior# Prior (GLM 1)
Anterior insula 44 Left 106 3.912 0.0009 unc. "36 "4 15
Anterior insula 44 Right 55 3.450 0.0017 unc. 38 3 10
Parametric regression of Choice (GLM 2)
mPFC 10 — 87 6.562 2.7$ 10"06 "2 64 10
Lateral PFC 46 Left 122 5.987 7.8$ 10"05 "38 38 32
Lateral PFC 46 Right 109 6.342 2.1$ 10"06 30 38 34
Superior parietal lobule 48 Left 43 5.01 6.7$ 10"04 "38 6 24
Parametric regression at Outcome for the No
Prior condition (GLM 2)
Caudate nucleus — Left 77 7.091 8.9$ 10"06 "14 20 2
Caudate nucleus — Right 56 8.298 7.9$ 10"06 12 16 8
Violation of rust in the Prior condition
(GLM 3, Cons# Incons)
Caudate nucleus — Left 82 6.78 2.8$ 10"06 "10 18 11
Caudate nucleus — Right 56 6.34 2.4$ 10"06 12 21 5
Note: BA, Brodmann area; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
Figure 4. Brain regions parametrically correlated with the estimated “optimistic” and “pessimistic” decision value from the
Prior model. A, Random effect fMRI analysis. To look for neural correlates of value signals (Qt) at time of choice, we entered the
trial-by-trial estimates of the values of the two stimuli (Share and Keep) into a regression analysis against the fMRI data.We found
enhanced activation inmPFC anddLPFC, surviving FWE correction, p! 0.05.B, Functional ROI analysis inmPFC. Percentage signal
change by condition in the mPFC area represented in A. A similar pattern of activity was found in the dLPFC (not reported). These
regions encoded prior valence (positive and negative) that guided decision to trust at time of choice. Error bars indicate SE.
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Figure	   4.	   Brain	   regions	   parametrically	   correlated	  with	   the	   estimated	   “optimistic”	  
and	   “pessimistic”	   decision	   value	   from	   the	   Prior	   model.	   A.	   Random	   effect	   fMRI	  
analysis.	  To	  look	  for	  neural	  correlates	  of	  value	  signals	  (Qt)	  at	  time	  of	  choice,	  we	  entered	  the	   trial-­‐by-­‐trial	   estimates	   of	   the	   values	   of	   the	   two	   stimuli	   (“Share”	   and	   “Keep”)	   into	   a	  regression	   analysis	   against	   the	   fMRI	   data.	  We	   found	   enhanced	   activation	   in	   mPFC	   and	  dLPFC,	  surviving	  FWE	  correction,	  p<0.05.	  B.	  Functional	  ROI	  analysis	   in	  mPFC.	  Percent	  signal	  change	  by	  condition	  in	  the	  mPFC	  area	  represented	  in	  (A).	  Similar	  pattern	  of	  activity	  was	  found	  in	  the	  dlPFC	  (not	  reported).	  These	  regions	  encoded	  prior	  valence	  (positive	  and	  negative)	  that	  guided	  decision	  to	  trust	  at	  time	  of	  choice.	  Error	  bars	  represent	  SE.	  	  
Effect	  of	  prior	  at	  RTG	  outcome	  
Across	  all	  RTGs,	  during	  the	  outcome	  phase	  of	  the	  game	  (see	  GLM2),	  individually	  estimated	  trial-­‐wise	  prediction	  errors	  (positive	  and	  negative	  combined)	  correlated	  significantly	  with	  BOLD	  responses	   in	   the	  bilateral	  caudate	   in	   the	  No	  Prior	   trials	  only	  (p	  <	  0.05	  FWE),	   (see	  
Fig.	   5A	   and	  Table	   3).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   striatal	   activity	   appeared	   to	   track	   estimated	  prediction	   errors	   in	   a	   more	   blunted	   fashion	   when	   priors	   were	   provided	   (see	   Fig.	   5A).	  
reputation priors, even when their
counterpart’s behavior was inconsistent
with it. As a consequence, and since pri-
ors were accurate predictors of trust-
worthiness in our study, players earned
more when reputational cues were
available than when they were not.
mPFC encodes reputational priors
From a neural point of view, our fMRI
results revealed that the presentation of a
new counterpart yielded enhanced activa-
tion in the mPFC when accompanied by a
prior (regardless of it signaling a positive
or negative reputation). We suggest that
the enhanced mPFC activity may reflect
the fact the prior information reduced the
uncertainty about the behavior of the other
faced by participants when beginning a new
RTG. Indeed, this region has been previ-
ously implicated in uncertainty resolution
in interactive contexts (Yoshida and Ishii,
2006). This is furthermore consistent with
the inverse activation pattern observed in
the insula, which showed stronger activity
when priors were not available, consistently
with previous findings reporting a role for
this region in tracking increaseduncertainty
(Preuschoff et al., 2008).
mPFC and dLPFC encode the value of
reputation priors
At time of choice, the valence of priors
elicited dissociable activation patternswhen
integrated with the behaviorally estimated
(from the prior-based RL model) option
values (Qt). Specifically, the mPFC and
dLPFC differentially responded to cooper-
ative versus individualistic counterparts,
however, only when priors were available.
Figure 5. Brain regions parametrically correlated with the estimated prediction error of the best-fitting RL model. A, Random
effect fMRI analysis: Activity of the caudate showed significant correlation to the estimated prediction error signal in the no-prior
condition ( p!0.05FWEcorrected). Suchactivitieswerenot observed in this brain area in theprior condition. Peak coordinates are
given inMNI space. Color bars indicate T values.B, Parameter estimates were extracted from the left caudate ("12, 20, 8) for the
direct comparisonbetweenprior andno-prior conditions. Caudate activity correlateswithprediction error in theno-prior condition
only.
Table 3. Activations correlated with contrasts of interest
MNI coordinates (mm)
Analysis/Location BA Side Cluster size T p value FWE cor. X Y Z
Prior# No Prior (GLM 1)
mPFC 10 95 8.26 6.8$ 10"06 0 62 31
VTA — 14 3.177 0.0032 unc. 0 "1 "5
No Prior# Prior (GLM 1)
Anterior insula 44 Left 106 3.912 0.0009 unc. "36 "4 15
Anterior insula 44 Right 55 3.450 0.0017 unc. 38 3 10
Parametric regression of Choice (GLM 2)
mPFC 10 — 87 6.562 2.7$ 10"06 "2 64 10
Lateral PFC 46 Left 122 5.987 7.8$ 10"05 "38 38 32
Lateral PFC 46 Right 109 6.342 2.1$ 10"06 30 38 34
Superior parietal lobule 48 Left 43 5.01 6.7$ 10"04 "38 6 24
Parametric regression at Outcome for the No
Prior condition (GLM 2)
Caudate nucleus — Left 77 7.091 8.9$ 10"06 "14 20 2
Caudate nucleus — Right 56 8.298 7.9$ 10"06 12 16 8
Violation of rust in the Prior condition
(GLM 3, Cons# Incons)
Caudate nucleus — Left 82 6.78 2.8$ 10"06 "10 18 11
Caudate nucleus — Right 56 6.34 2.4$ 10"06 12 21 5
Note: BA, Brodmann area; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
Figure 4. Brain regions parametrically correlated with the estimated “optimistic” and “pessimistic” decision value from the
Prior model. A, Random effect fMRI analysis. To look for neural correlates of value signals (Qt) at time of choice, we entered the
trial-by-trial estimates of the values of the two stimuli (Share and Keep) into a regression analysis against the fMRI data.We found
enhanced activation inmPFC anddLPFC, surviving FWE correction, p! 0.05.B, Functional ROI analysis inmPFC. Percentage signal
change by condition in the mPFC area represented in A. A similar pattern of activity was found in the dLPFC (not reported). These
regions encoded prior valence (positive and negative) that guided decision to trust at time of choice. Error bars indicate SE.
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Moreover,	  from	  a	  direct	  comparison	  between	  the	  no	  prior	  and	  prior	  conditions,	  we	  found	  higher	  activity	  in	  the	  left	  caudate	  for	  the	  no	  prior	  condition	  compare	  to	  the	  prior	  condition	  with	  a	  group	  peak	  MNI	  coordinates	  at	  -­‐12,	  20,	  8	  (see	  Fig.	  5B).	  
	  
Figure	   5.	   Brain	   regions	   parametrically	   correlated	   with	   the	   estimated	   Prediction	  
Error	   of	   the	   best	   fitting	   RL	   model.	   A.	   Random	   effect	   fMRI	   analysis:	   Activity	   of	   the	  caudate	  showed	  significant	  correlation	  to	  the	  estimated	  PE	  signal	  in	  the	  no	  prior	  condition	  (p	   <	   0.05	   FWE	   cor.).	   Such	   activities	   were	   not	   observed	   in	   this	   brain	   area	   in	   the	   prior	  condition.	   Peak	   coordinates	   are	   given	   in	   MNI	   space.	   Colour	   bars	   indicate	   T-­‐values.	   B.	  Parameter	   estimates	   were	   extracted	   from	   the	   left	   caudate	   (-­‐12,	   20,	   8)	   for	   the	   direct	  comparison	  between	  prior	  and	  no-­‐prior	  conditions.	  Caudate	  activity	  correlates	  with	  PE	  in	  the	  no-­‐prior	  condition	  only.	  
Pattern	  of	  activity	  related	  to	  violation	  of	  trust:	  functional	  connectivity	  analysis	  
Finally,	   we	   specified	   the	   changes	   in	   activity	   in	   the	   caudate	   related	   to	   the	   effects	   of	  violation	  of	  trust	  (e.g.	  the	  decisions	  to	  keep	  of	  a	  cooperative	  counterpart	  in	  response	  to	  a	  decision	  to	  trust	  of	  a	  participant)	  in	  the	  prior	  and	  no-­‐prior	  condition	  (analysis	  from	  GLM3,	  
Table	   3).	   This	   analysis	   showed	   a	   stronger	   deactivation	   of	   the	   caudate	   in	   the	   prior	  condition	  compared	  to	  the	  no-­‐prior	  condition	  (t	  =	  6.78;	  see	  Fig.	  6A	  and	  Fig.	  6C).	  However,	  
reputation priors, even when their
counterpart’s behavior was inconsistent
with it. As a consequence, and since pri-
ors were accurate predictors of trust-
worthiness in our study, players earned
more when reputational cues were
available than when they were not.
mPFC encodes reputational priors
From a neural point of view, our fMRI
results revealed that the presentation of a
new counterpart yielded enhanced activa-
tion in the mPFC when accompanied by a
prior (regardless of it signaling a positive
or negative reputation). We suggest that
the enhanced mPFC activity may reflect
the fact the prior information reduced the
uncertainty about the behavior of the other
faced by participants when beginning a new
RTG. Indeed, this region has been previ-
ously implicated in uncertainty resolution
in interactive contexts (Yoshida and Ishii,
2006). This is furthermore consistent with
the inverse activation pattern observed in
the insula, which showed stronger activity
when priors were not available, consistently
with previous findings reporting a role for
this region in tracking increaseduncertainty
(Preuschoff et al., 2008).
mPFC and dLPFC encode the value of
reputation priors
At time of choice, the valence of priors
elicited dissociable activation patternswhen
integrated with the behaviorally estimated
(from the prior-based RL model) option
values (Qt). Specifically, the mPFC and
dLPFC differentially responded to cooper-
ative versus individualistic counterparts,
however, only when priors were available.
Figure 5. Brain regions parametrically correlated with the estimated prediction error of the best-fitting RL model. A, Random
effect fMRI analysis: Activity of the caudate showed significant correlation to the estimated prediction error signal in the no-prior
condition ( p!0.05FWEcorrected). Suchactivitieswerenot observed in this brain area in theprior condition. Peak coordinates are
given inMNI space. Color bars indicate T values.B, Parameter estimates were extracted from the left caudate ("12, 20, 8) for the
direct comparisonbetweenprior andno-prior conditions. Caudate activity correlateswithprediction error in theno-prior condition
only.
Table 3. Activations correlated with contrasts of interest
MNI coordinates (mm)
Analysis/Location BA Side Cluster size T p value FWE cor. X Y Z
Prior# No Prior (GLM 1)
mPFC 10 95 8.26 6.8$ 10"06 0 62 31
VTA — 14 3.177 0.0032 unc. 0 "1 "5
No Prior# Prior (GLM 1)
Anterior insula 44 Left 106 3.912 0.0009 unc. "36 "4 15
Anterior insula 44 Right 55 3.450 0.0017 unc. 38 3 10
Parametric regression of Choice (GLM 2)
mPFC 10 — 87 6.562 2.7$ 10"06 "2 64 10
Lateral PFC 46 Left 122 5.987 7.8$ 10"05 "38 38 32
Lateral PFC 46 Right 109 6.342 2.1$ 10"06 30 38 34
Superior parietal lobule 48 Left 43 5.01 6.7$ 10"04 "38 6 24
Parametric regression at Outcome for the No
Prior condition (GLM 2)
Caudate nucleus — Left 77 7.091 8.9$ 10"06 "14 20 2
Caudate nucleus — Right 56 8.298 7.9$ 10"06 12 16 8
Violation of rust in the Prior condition
(GLM 3, Cons# Incons)
Caudate nucleus — Left 82 6.78 2.8$ 10"06 "10 18 11
Caudate nucleus — Right 56 6.34 2.4$ 10"06 12 21 5
Note: BA, Brodmann area; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
Figure 4. Brain regions parametrically correlated with the estimated “optimistic” and “pessimistic” decision value from the
Prior model. A, Random effect fMRI analysis. To look for neural correlates of value signals (Qt) at time of choice, we entered the
trial-by-trial estimates of the values of the two stimuli (Share and Keep) into a regression analysis against the fMRI data.We found
enhanced activation inmPFC anddLPFC, surviving FWE correction, p! 0.05.B, Functional ROI analysis inmPFC. Percentage signal
change by condition in the mPFC area represented in A. A similar pattern of activity was found in the dLPFC (not reported). These
regions encoded prior valence (positive and negative) that guided decision to trust at time of choice. Error bars indicate SE.
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in	  contrast	  with	  the	  no	  prior	  condition,	  striatal	  deactivations	  to	  violation	  of	  trust	  were	  not	  reflected	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  our	  participants.	  Indeed,	  the	  pattern	  of	  striatal	  activity	  related	  to	   violation	   of	   trust	   did	   correlate	   with	   individual	   learning	   rates	   only	   in	   the	   no	   prior	  condition	  (from	  the	  model	  2:	  r	  =	  -­‐	  0.687,	  p	  <	  0.001;	  see	  Fig.	  6D).	  No	  such	  correlation	  was	  found	  in	  the	  Prior	  condition	  (see	  Fig.	  6D).	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  Functional	  connectivity	  between	  the	  caudate	  nucleus	  and	  vLPFC	  correlates	  
with	   the	   choice	   to	   retaliate	   after	   violation	   of	   trust	   in	   the	   prior	   condition.	   A.	   PPI	  
analysis.	   With	   a	   caudate	   seed,	   bilateral	   vLPFC	   shows	   stronger	   connectivity	   with	   this	  region	  in	  the	  prior	  compare	  to	  the	  no	  prior	  conditions.	  B.	  vLPFC	  prevents	  retaliation	  to	  
violation	  of	   trust	   in	   the	  prior	  condition.	  vLPFC	  anti-­‐correlates	  with	  retaliation	  rate	  in	  the	  Prior	  condition	  after	  participants	  experimented	  violation	  of	  trust	   from	  a	  cooperative	  counterpart.	   Spearman	   r	   =	   -­‐0.6,	   p	   <	   0.009.	   C.	   Reputational	   priors	   magnify	   striatal	  
As reported in previous studies, our results suggest that this brain
network keeps track of contextuallymodulated decision values over
trials, and doing so improves participants’ performance (Wunder-
lich et al., 2009).
As reputational priors conveyed information on the social
attitudes of counterparts in our study, this activation is also con-
sistent with a well established role of the mPFC in ascribing atti-
tudes to others (Mitchell, 2009), and anticipating their choices
(Krueger et al., 2007; Hampton et al., 2008; Coricelli and Nagel,
2009). Thus themPFC is encoding a first response to reputational
priors as well as the effect of priors during subsequent interac-
tions. This is in accordancewith findings fromhumans (Rilling et
al., 2002; Hampton et al., 2008) and nonhuman primates (Barra-
clough et al. 2004) on the role of the PFC in encoding value-
related signals in repeated interactions.
Caudate nucleus encodes reward prediction errors only when
prior information is not provided
Consistent with previous studies, trial-by-trial prediction errors
estimated by RL models correlated with activity in the striatum
(McClure et al., 2003; Bunge et al., 2004; O’Doherty et al., 2004;
King-Casas et al., 2005; Scho¨nberg et al., 2007), but, critically,
only when no priors were available. This confirms a role for the
caudate in tracking the difference between expected and obtained
outcomes in RTGs, triggering learning. However, when priors
were available they appeared to prevent participants from
reinforcement-based learning, whichwas reflected in the reduced
covariance between caudate responses and estimated prediction
errors.
Priors magnify reward prediction error signals in the
caudate nucleus
As regards the striatal activation patterns, these are well aligned
with an established role of the striatum in tracking reward con-
ti gencies, in both nonsocial (O’Doh rty et al., 2004) and social
domains (Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Jones et al.,
2011). More specifically, the observed patterns are consistent
with the idea that the caudatemediates the neural computation of
reward prediction error (RPE). Indeed, we observed RPE-pliant
signals in the caudate only when no priors were provided, while
the same signals appeared blunted when priors were available.
Previous studies on nonsocial tasks (Doll et al., 2009, 2011; Li et
al., 2011) and social tasks (Delgado et al., 2005; Biele et al., 2011;
Fareri et al., 2012) have shown that, when priors are available,
participants tended to hinge on to them, and to relatively dis-
count the impact of the outcomes of their past decisions.
However, in addition to the previous studies, our results show
that the presence of priors magnifies striatal deactivation to vio-
lations of trust (i.e., when a counterpart with positive reputation,
as opposed to no reputation, violated trust), rather than blunting
their response.Why previous studies did not find suchmagnified
response due to violation of priors requires further investigation,
though several hypotheses are possible. For instance, two studies
(Delgado et al., 2005; Fareri et al., 2012) focused on the subset of
unreliable priors, that is, on priors that carried no information on
trustees’ actual choices; it is likely that, in such a scenario, partic-
ipants were gradually learning to disregard such priors, converg-
ing toward their extinction rather than exploitation. On the other
hand, the opposite may have occurred in a more recent study on
Figure 6. Functional connectivity between the caudate nucleus and vLPFC correlateswith the choice to retaliate after violation of trust in the prior condition.A, PPI analysis.With a caudate seed,
bilateral vLPFC shows stronger connectivity with this region in the prior compared with the no-prior conditions. B, vLPFC prevents retaliation to violation of trust in the prior condition. vLPFC
anticorrelates with retaliation rate in the prior condition after participants experimented violation of trust from a cooperative counterpart. Spearman r!"0.6, p# 0.009. C, Reputational priors
magnify striatal response to violation of trust. The caudate shows a stronger deactivation to violation of trust from a cooperative counterpart in the prior condition compared with the no-prior
condition. D, Striatal responses to violation of trust and learning rates. The correlation between caudate and learning rates is significant only in the no-prior condition, thus striatal responses to
violation of trust in the prior condition are not reflected in learning.
Fouragnan et al. • Neural Basis of Reputational Priors J. Neurosci., February 20, 2013 • 33(8):3602–3611 • 3609
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response	  to	  violation	  of	  trust.	  The	  caudate	  shows	  a	  stronger	  deactivation	  to	  violation	  of	  trust	   from	   a	   cooperative	   counterpart	   in	   the	   prior	   condition	   compare	   to	   the	   no	   prior	  condition.	   D.	   Striatal	   responses	   to	   violation	   of	   trust	   and	   learning	   rates.	   The	  correlation	   between	   caudate	   and	   learning	   rates	   is	   significant	   only	   in	   the	   no-­‐prior	  condition,	   thus	   striatal	   responses	   to	   violation	   of	   trust	   in	   the	   prior	   condition	   are	   not	  reflected	  in	  learning.	  
We	   used	   Functional	   connectivity	   analysis	   to	   search	   (see	   Methods	   Connectivity	  
analysis)	   for	   brain	   areas	   that	   could	   have	   mediated	   such	   striatal	   responses	   when	  reputation	   priors	   were	   provided.	   We	   found	   that	   left	   and	   right	   vLPFC	   showed	   strong	  functional	   connectivity	  with	   the	   caudate	   seed	   region	  after	   violation	  of	   trust	   in	   the	  Prior	  compared	  to	  no	  prior	  conditions;	  vLPFC,	  left	  (-­‐40,	  42,	  4),	  t	  =	  3.73;	  and;	  right	  (38,	  46,	  4),	  t	  =	  6.37,	  p	  <	  0.05	  cor.	  SVC;	  see	  Fig.	   6A	  and	  Table	   3).	  Finally,	  we	   found	  that	   the	  strength	  of	  connectivity	   between	   caudate-­‐vLPFC	  was	   anti-­‐correlated	  with	   participants’	   decisions	   to	  keep	   following	  violation	  of	   trust	  (Spearman	  correlation	  r	  =	   -­‐	  0.67,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  Moreover,	  we	   found	   that	   the	   activity	   in	   the	   vLPFC	   was	   inversely	   correlated	   with	   individual	  retaliation	  rates	  (computed	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  Keep	  over	  Share	  choices)	  after	  violations	  of	  trust	  (r	  =	  -­‐	  0.6,	  p	  <	  0.009,	  see	  Fig.	  6B).	  
	  
Discussion	  Reputation-­‐based	  social	  decision-­‐making	  has	  been	  investigated	  both	  by	  theoretical	  and	   empirical	   studies	   (Boero	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Camerer	   &	   Weigelt,	   1988;	   Fudenberg	   et	   al.,	  1990),	   however	   research	   on	   its	   neurocognitive	   bases	   is	   still	   in	   its	   infancy.	   Though	   it	   is	  rather	   unlikely	   that,	   in	   daily	   decisions,	   people	   possess	   absolutely	   no	   prior/contextual	  information	  on	  who	  they	  interact	  with,	  the	  growing	  literature	  using	  RTGs	  in	  fMRI	  focused	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mainly	  on	  situations	   in	  which	  strictly	  no	  priors	  are	  available	  (McCabe	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  King-­‐Casas	   et	   al.,	   2005;	  Krueger	   et	   al.,	   2007).	  Only	   two	   recent	   fMRI	   studies	   investigated	  how	  social	  priors	  (i.e.	  the	  moral	  character	  of	  their	  counterparts)	  affect	  the	  way	  people	  engage	  in	   RTGs	   (Delgado	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Fareri	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   These	   studies	   however	   did	   not	  completely	  isolate	  the	  effect	  of	  priors	  on	  trust	  (prior-­‐based	  trust)	  by	  confronting	  them	  to	  identical	  conditions	  with	  no	  priors	  (interaction-­‐based	  trust).	  Our	  experimental	  setting	   is	  the	   first	   to	   allow	   this	   direct	   comparison.	   The	  main	   goal	   of	   our	   study	  was	   to	   determine	  whether,	   and	   how,	   reliable	   reputational	   priors	   affect	   initial	   decisions	   and	   subsequent	  learning	  mechanisms	  at	  both	  the	  behavioral	  and	  neural	  level.	  
From	  a	  behavioral	  point	  of	  view,	  we	  show	  that	  priors	  affect	  decisions	  to	  trust	  in	  at	  least	  2	  ways:	  1)	   in	   initial	   stages	  of	   the	   interaction,	  participants	   clearly	   chose	   to	   trust	  or	  distrust	   according	   to	   the	   positive	   or	   negative	   reputation	   of	   their	   counterparts;	  furthermore,	   2)	   players	   tend	   to	   keep	   relying	   on	   reputation	   priors,	   even	   when	   their	  counterpart’s	  behavior	  was	  inconsistent	  with	  it.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  and	  since	  priors	  were	  accurate	   predictors	   of	   trustworthiness	   in	   our	   study,	   players	   earned	   more	   when	  reputational	  cues	  were	  available	  than	  when	  they	  were	  not.	  
mPFC	  encodes	  reputational	  priors	  
From	   a	   neural	   point	   of	   view,	   our	   fMRI	   results	   revealed	   that	   the	   presentation	   of	   a	   new	  counterpart	   yielded	   enhanced	   activation	   in	   the	   mPFC	   when	   accompanied	   by	   a	   prior	  (irrespective	   of	   it	   signaling	   a	   positive	   or	   negative	   reputation).	   We	   suggest	   that	   the	  enhanced	  mPFC	  activity	  may	  reflect	  the	  fact	  the	  prior	  information	  reduced	  the	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  other	  faced	  by	  participants	  when	  beginning	  a	  new	  RTG.	  Indeed,	  this	   region	   has	   been	   previously	   implicated	   in	   uncertainty	   resolution	   in	   interactive	  contexts	   (Yoshida	   &	   Ishii,	   2006)
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activation	   pattern	   observed	   in	   the	   insula,	   which	   showed	   stronger	   activity	   when	   priors	  were	  not	  available,	  consistently	  with	  previous	  findings	  reporting	  a	  role	  for	  this	  region	  in	  tracking	  increased	  uncertainty	  (Preuschoff	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
mPFC	  and	  dlPFC	  encode	  the	  value	  of	  reputation	  priors	  
At	   time	   of	   choice,	   the	   valence	   of	   priors	   elicited	   dissociable	   activation	   patterns	   when	  integrated	  with	  the	  behaviorally	  estimated	  (from	  the	  prior-­‐based	  RL	  model)	  option	  values	  (Qt).	   Specifically,	   the	   mPFC	   and	   dlPFC	   differentially	   responded	   to	   cooperative	   vs.	  individualistic	   counterparts,	   however	   only	   when	   priors	   were	   available.	   As	   reported	   in	  previous	  studies,	  our	  results	  suggest	  that	  this	  brain	  network	  keeps	  track	  of	  contextually-­‐modulated	  decision	  values	  over	   trials,	   and	  doing	   so	   improves	  participants’	  performance	  (Wunderlich	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  
As	  reputational	  priors	  conveyed	  information	  on	  the	  social	  attitudes	  of	  counterparts	  in	  our	  study,	  this	  activation	  is	  also	  consistent	  with	  a	  well-­‐established	  role	  of	  the	  mPFC	  in	  ascribing	  attitudes	  to	  others	  (Mitchell,	  2009),	  and	  anticipating	  their	  choices	  (Coricelli	  and	  Nagel,	  2009;	  Hampton	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Krueger	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Thus	  the	  mPFC	  is	  encoding	  a	  first	  response	   to	   reputational	   priors	   as	   well	   as	   the	   effect	   of	   priors	   during	   subsequent	  interactions.	   This	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   findings	   from	   humans	   (Hampton	   et	   al.,	   2008;	  Rilling	  et	  al.,	  2002)	  and	  non-­‐human	  primates	  (Barraclough,	  Conroy,	  &	  Lee,	  2004)	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  PFC	  in	  encoding	  value-­‐related	  signals	  in	  repeated	  interactions.	  
Caudate	  nucleus	  encodes	  reward	  PE	  only	  when	  prior	  information	  is	  not	  provided	  
Consistent	  with	  previous	  studies,	   trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  prediction	  errors	  estimated	  by	  RL	  models	  correlated	  with	  activity	  in	  the	  striatum	  (Bunge	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  McClure	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  O'Doherty	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  King-­‐Casas	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Schonberg	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  but,	   critically,	  only	  when	  no	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priors	   were	   available.	   This	   confirms	   a	   role	   for	   the	   caudate	   in	   tracking	   the	   difference	  between	   expected	   and	   obtained	   outcomes	   in	   RTGs,	   triggering	   learning.	   However,	  when	  priors	   were	   available	   they	   appeared	   to	   prevent	   participants	   from	   reinforcement-­‐based	  learning,	  which	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  reduced	  covariance	  between	  caudate	  responses	  and	  estimated	  prediction	  errors.	  
Priors	  magnify	  reward-­‐prediction	  error	  signals	  in	  the	  caudate	  nucleus	  	  
As	  regards	  the	  striatal	  activation	  patterns,	  these	  are	  well-­‐aligned	  with	  an	  established	  role	  of	   the	   striatum	   in	   tracking	   reward	   contingencies,	   in	   both	   non-­‐social	   (O’Doherty	   et	   al.,	  2004)	  and	  social	  domains	  (Delgado	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  King-­‐Casas	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Jones	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  More	   specifically,	   the	   observed	   patterns	   are	   consistent	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   caudate	  mediates	  the	  neural	  computation	  of	  reward	  prediction	  error	  (RPE).	  Indeed,	  we	  observed	  RPE-­‐pliant	   signals	   in	   the	   caudate	   only	   when	   no	   priors	   were	   provided,	   while	   the	   same	  signals	  appeared	  blunted	  when	  priors	  were	  available.	  Previous	  studies	  on	  non-­‐social	  tasks	  (Doll	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Doll	   et	   al.	   2011;	   Li	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   and	   social	   tasks	   (Biele	   et	   al.,	   2011;	  Delgado	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Fareri	   et	   al.,	   2012)	   have	   shown	   that,	   when	   priors	   are	   available,	  participants	   tended	   to	   hinge	   on	   to	   them,	   and	   to	   relatively	   discount	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  outcomes	  of	  their	  past	  decisions.	  
However,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  previous	  studies,	  our	  results	  show	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  priors	  magnifies	   striatal	  deactivation	   to	  violations	  of	   trust	   (i.e.	  when	  a	  counterpart	  with	  positive	  reputation,	  as	  opposed	  to	  no	  reputation,	  violated	  trust),	  rather	  than	  blunting	  their	  response.	  Why	  previous	   studies	   didn’t	   find	   such	  magnified	   response	  due	   to	   violation	   of	  priors	   requires	   further	   investigation,	   though	   several	   hypotheses	   are	   possible.	   For	  instance,	   two	   studies	   (Delgado	  et	   al.,	   2005;	  Fareri	   et	   al.,	   2012)	   focused	  on	   the	   subset	  of	  unreliable	  priors,	  that	  is,	  on	  priors	  that	  carried	  no	  information	  on	  trustees’	  actual	  choices;	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it	  is	  likely	  that,	  in	  such	  a	  scenario,	  participants	  were	  gradually	  learning	  to	  disregard	  such	  priors,	   converging	   towards	   their	   extinction	   rather	   than	  exploitation.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  the	  opposite	  may	  have	  occurred	  in	  a	  more	  recent	  study	  on	  the	  non-­‐social	  domain	  (Li	  et	  al.,	  2010),	   in	   which	   priors	   were	   perhaps	   too	   reliable.	   Indeed,	   in	   that	   study,	   agents	   were	  explicitly	   instructed	   on	   the	   precise	   probabilities	   of	   outcomes,	  which	  may	   have	   reduced	  their	  surprise	  when	  infrequent,	  though	  anticipated	  losses	  occurred.	  In	  both	  these	  previous	  studies,	   the	  space	   for	   learning	  via	  priors	  may	  have	  been	  reduced,	  as	   the	  actual	  prior-­‐to-­‐reward	   contingencies	   appeared	   either	   non-­‐existent	   (Delgado	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Fareri	   et	   al.,	  2012),	  or	  already	  completely	  exploited	  (Li	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  different	  methods	   used	   to	   instil	   priors	   tapped	   on	   different	   neural	   mechanisms:	   Delgado	   and	  colleagues	   (2005)	   provided	   short	   descriptions	   of	   the	   “moral	   character”	   of	   counterparts,	  whereas	  Fareri	  and	  colleagues	  (2012)	  used	  direct	  evidence	  from	  previous	  experience	  (i.e.	  playing	   a	   ball	   task).	   Such	   methods	   of	   instilling	   priors	   may	   have	   also	   made	   them	  more	  salient	  or	  intuitive	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  harder	  to	  extinguish	  in	  spite	  of	  conflicting	  evidence.	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   our	   task	   reported	   on	   characteristics	   of	   counterparts	   that	  were	   possibly	  more	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  main	  task	  (i.e.	  the	  priors	  were	  based	  on	  results	  indicating	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  one	  cares	  about	  his	  own	  payoffs	  and	  that	  of	  others	   	  -­‐	  SVO	  task).	  Further	  investigation	  specifically	  manipulating	  prior	  reliability	  should	  clarify	  some	  of	  the	  points	  of	  divergence.	   Until	   then,	   the	   open	   question	   in	   our	   study	   regarded	   the	   reason	   as	   to	   why	  striatal	  deactivations	  to	  trust	  violations	  were	  not	  leading	  to	  behavioral	  adjustments	  when	  priors	  were	  available.	  
VLPFC	  -­‐	  Caudate	  stronger	  functional	  connectivity	  preventing	  retaliation	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   when	   priors	   were	   present,	   we	   suggest	   that	   the	   impact	   on	  learning	   of	   the	   striatal	   deactivations	   to	   violations	   of	   trust	  may	   have	   been	   disrupted	   by	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other	  brain	  areas.	  Our	  results	  are	  in	  line	  with	  attributing	  this	  role	  to	  the	  vLPFC,	  which	  we	  found	  to	  functionally	  correlate	  with	  such	  striatal	  deactivations.	  In	  particular,	  the	  strength	  of	  connectivity	  between	  caudate	  and	  vLPFC	  was	  stronger	  in	  the	  prior	  compared	  to	  the	  no	  prior	   condition.	   We	   thus	   propose	   that	   the	   vLPFC	   contributes	   in	   maintaining	   choices	  aligned	   with	   the	   reliable	   prior	   beliefs,	   when	   beliefs	   momentarily	   conflict	   with	  observations.	   This	  might	   occur	   by	   compensating	   for	   the	   relatively	   automatic	   behavioral	  changes	   to	   reward	   prediction	   error	   signals.	   In	   line	   with	   this	   interpretation	   previous	  literature	  has	  implicated	  the	  vLPFC	  in	  top-­‐down	  cognitive	  control	  by	  biasing	  processing	  in	  other	  brain	  regions	  towards	  contextually	  appropriate	  representations	  (Cohen	  et	  al.,	  1990;	  Millet	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  Furthermore,	  not	  only	  the	  vLPFC	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  modulating	  bottom-­‐up	  fashion	   cognition	   processes,	   but	   this	   area	   has	   also	   been	   found	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   goal-­‐directed	  behavior	  (Souza	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Valentin	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
In	   conclusion,	   our	   study	   integrates	   theories	   and	   methods	   from	   cognitive	  neuroscience,	  economics,	  and	  reinforcement	   learning	   to	  gain	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  how	   reputation	   priors	   are	   encoded	   in	   the	   brain	   and	   how	   they	   affect	   learning	   to	   trust	  anonymous	  others.	  Our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  priors	  influence	  both	  initial	  decisions	  to	  trust	  and	  the	  following	  learning	  mechanisms	  involved	  in	  repeated	  interactions.	  Specifically,	  the	  present	  study	  showed	  that	  reputational	  priors	  magnify	  striatal	  responses	  to	  violations	  of	  trust.	   However,	   when	   such	   priors	   are	   reliable,	   other	   phylogenetically	   younger	   brain	  regions	  involved	  in	  higher	  cognition	  may	  contribute	  to	  keep	  decisions	  anchored	  to	  those	  priors,	   thus	   relatively	   discounting	   the	   weight	   of	   conflicting	   evidence.	   The	   interplay	  between	   striatum	   and	   lateral	   orbitofrontal	   cortex	   may	   prevent	   unnecessary	   retaliation	  when	  others	  violate	  our	  trust,	  and	  thus	  constitute	  an	  important	  neuro-­‐cognive	  mechanism	  that	  favors	  social	  stability.	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Book	  Chapter	  The	  Neuroeconomics	  of	  Cognitive	  Control	  	   Gabriele	  Chierchia	  and	  Giorgio	  Coricelli	  	  	  
Introduction	  	  In	  cognitive	  (neuro)science	  cognitive	  control	  broadly	  refers	  to	  our	  capacity	  to	  go	  beyond	  relatively	  reflexive	  reactions	  to	  salient	  stimuli	  in	  accordance	  to	  internal	  often	  far-­‐removed	  goals	  (Miller,	  2000).	  	  This	  idea	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  economics:	  even	  economist	  Vilfredo	  Pareto,	  among	  the	  first	  and	  strongest	  advocates	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  economics	  and	  psychology	  (a	  position	   similar	   to	   that	   held	   today	   by	   many	   economists	   with	   regard	   to	   neuroscience	  (Gul&Pesendorfer,	   2007)),	   felt	   the	   need	   to	   distinguish	   between	   choice-­‐guided	   versus	  routine-­‐guided	  behaviors,	  such	  as	  “a	  man	  removing	  his	  hat	  whenever	  he	  enters	  a	  drawing	  room	  or	  [perhaps	  provocatively]	  a	  Catholic	  who	  regularly	  attends	  mass.”	  (Bruni&Sugden,	  2007).	  	  	  Indeed,	  cognitive	  control	  is	  deeply	  connected	  to	  decision	  making,	  and	  at	  least	  three	  related	  lines	  of	  evidence	  suggest	  this:	  (1)	  The	  factors	  that	  are	  held	  to	  trigger	  cognitive	  control	  are	  also	   implicated	   in	   the	   economic	   notion	   of	   utility;	   (2)	   cognitive	   skills	   correlate	   with	  decision-­‐making	  tendencies;	  and	  (3)	  cognitive	  “loads”	  can	  impact	  on	  decision	  making.	  Let	  us	  briefly	  illustrate	  these	  points	  separately.	  	  	  1.	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  think	  of	  and	  subdivide	  the	  environmental	  or	  cognitive	  factors	  that	  recruit	  cognitive	  control.	  Norman	  and	  Shallice	  (Shallice,	  2000)	  propose	  that	  there	  are	  five	  general	  classes	  of	  them;	  among	  which	  are	  novelty	  or	  complexity	  of	  the	  environments	  or	   tasks,	   performance	   error,	   and	   uncertainty	   and	   conflict.	   Ridderinkhof	   (2004)	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synthesizes	  these	  well	  as	  situations	  in	  which	  actions	  need	  to	  be	  adjusted	  to	  goals.	  In	  what	  follows	   we	   give	   some	   examples	   of	   why	   the	   same	   factors	   are	   fundamental	   in	   decision-­‐making	   and	   how,	   in	   particular,	   they	   appear	   to	   be	   connected	   to	   the	   economic	   notion	   of	  utility.	  	  For	   instance,	   regrding	   conflict	   and	   uncertainty,	   imagine	   we	   were	   offered	   to	   choose	  between	  the	  following	  options:	  a)	  $10	  dollars	  for	  sure,	  or	  b)	  a	  bet	  on	  a	  fair	  coin	  flip	  such	  that	   you	   win	   $11	   for	   “heads”	   and	   $0	   otherwise.	   It	   probably	   wouldn't	   take	   us	   much	   to	  decide	  and	  our	  responses	  would	  	  be	  rather	  automatic	  (fast)	  and	  stereotyped	  (constant	  in	  time,	  within	  and	  between	  subjects).	  However,	  imagine	  now	  that	  we	  changed	  the	  value	  of	  the	   uncertain	   payoff	   to	   $21,	   keeping	   the	   sure	   payoff	   fixed	   at	   $10,	   This	  would	   probably	  elicit	  much	  more	  variability	  in	  responses	  and	  slower	  response	  times,	  which	  are	  one	  of	  the	  behavioral	   signs	   of	   cognitive	   control.	   Specifically,	   what	   happened	   between	   the	   two	  decision	  proposals	  is	  that	  we	  modulated	  the	  desirability,	  henceforth,	  the	  utility,	  of	  one	  of	  the	   options,	   thus	   generating	  higher	   conflict	   and	  uncertainty;	   two	   factors,	  which	   in	   turn,	  signal	  that	  higher	  cognitive	  control	  is	  required.	  	  	  Similar	   reasoning	   holds	   for	   other	   factors	   proposed	   by	   Norman	   and	   Shallice,	   such	   as	  complexity.	   To	   give	   one	   example	   of	   a	   topic	   that	   will	   be	   treated	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	  economists	  have	  shown	  that	   if	  an	  option	   is	  presented	   in	  an	  ambiguous	  manner	   this	  will	  decrease	  its	  perceived	  utility	  (see	  Theme	  4).	  To	  keep	  the	  example	  above,	  in	  which	  we	  win	  $21	   if	   heads	   comes	   out	   on	   a	   coin	   flip,	   lets	   imagine	   now	   that	  we	  were	   offered	   the	   same	  option	   but	  we	   are	   also	   told	   that	   the	   coin	   actually	   isn’t	   fair,	   and	   is	   unbalanced	   towards	  either	  heads	  or	  tails.	  Though	  it	  is	  intuitive	  how	  this	  might	  decrease	  the	  appeal	  of	  the	  coin-­‐flip	  bet,	   relative	   to	   the	  10$	   sure	  payoff,	   it	   isn’t	   clear	   that	   committing	   to	   this	   impression	  would	  be	   the	  best	  choice.	   Indeed,	   from	  what	  we	  know,	   the	  coin	  has	  equal	  chances	   to	  be	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unbalanced	  towards	  the	  winning	  outcome	  (heads)	  as	  it	  does	  towards	  the	  losing	  one.	  Thus,	  ultimately,	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  the	  betting	  option	  is	  the	  same	  as	  before,	  when	  we	  knew	  the	   outcome	   probabilities.	   What	   changed	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   resolving	   ambiguity	   requires	  second-­‐order	  probability	  estimations	  (inferring	  the	  probability	  of	  outcome	  probabilities),	  which	   are	   clearly	   more	   complex	   than	   reasoning	   on	   established	   outcome	   probabilities.	  Thus,	  aversion	  to	  ambiguity	  in	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  could	  easily	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  increased	  complexity	  of	  ambiguously	  described	  options	  requires	  more	  cognitive	  control,	  which	  is	  costly,	  and	  subjects	  might	  then	  avoid	  ambiguity	  to	  not	  incur	  such	  costs.	  	  Though	  we	   don’t	   go	   over	   all	   of	   Norman	   and	   Shallice’s	   factors	   for	   reasons	   of	   space,	   the	  above	  examples	  should	  give	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  such	  factors	  share	  intricate	  connections	  with	  those	  thought	  to	  shape	  the	  utility	  of	  options.	  The	  following	  two	  points	  provide	  two	  general	  lines	  of	  empirical	  support	  for	  this	  idea.	  	  	  2.	   There	   is	   behavioral	   evidence	   linking	   cognitive	   skills	   to	   decision	   preferences.	   For	  instance,	  early	  studies	  showed	  that	  children	  who	  are	  better	  at	  postponing	  an	   immediate	  gratification	  for	  a	  later	  larger	  one	  (Theme	  3)	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  develop	  better	  social	  and	  cognitive	   competences	   as	   adolescents	   (Mischel	   et	   al.,	   1989).	  Along	   the	   same	   line,	   adults	  who	   obtain	   higher	   scores	   on	   IQ	   tests	   are	   also	   less	   susceptible	   to	   risk	  when	   deciding	   in	  uncertain	  contexts	  (Benjamin	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  where,	  on	  average,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  risk	  affects	  people	  more	  than	  it	  should	  (Binswanger,	  1980)	  (Theme	  2)).	  Subjects	  with	  higher	  IQ	  scores	  are	  also	  more	  patient	  in	  postponing	  gratification	  and,	  in	  social	  decision	  contexts,	  are	  more	  generous	  and	  cooperative,	  as	  well	  as	  readier	   to	  retaliate	   if	  counterparts	   fail	   to	  reciprocate	  (Rustichini,	  2008).	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3.	  Another	  eloquent	  example	  of	  how	  (value-­‐unrelated)	  cognitive	  processes	  are	   linked	   to	  decision	  preferences	  is	  given	  in	  “cake	  versus	  fruit	  experiments.”	  (Shiv&Fedorkhin,	  1999).	  In	   such	  experiments,	   subjects	  were	  divided	   into	   two	  groups,	  one	  of	  which	  was	  asked	   to	  remember	   seven	   digits,	   the	   other	   only	   two.	   Both	   groups	   were	   subsequently	   asked	   to	  choose	  between	   a	   slice	   of	   chocolate	   cake	   and	   a	   bowl	   of	   fruit	   (both	   equally	   priced).	   The	  “seven-­‐digit	   group”	  was	   shown	   to	  more	   frequently	   choose	   the	  unhealthier	  but	  probably	  more	  gratifying	  chocolate	  cake.	  These	  data	  were	  taken	  to	  suggest	  that	  both	  memorization	  and	  decisions	   tap	   the	   related	   cognitive	  processes.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   seven-­‐digit	   group	  had	  to	  process	  a	   larger	  “cognitive	   load,”	   leaving	   it	  with	   less	  cognitive	  resources	  to	  resist	  the	  more	  tempting	  option.	  In	  summary,	  cognitive	  control	  and	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  are	  deeply	  entangled	  areas	  of	   cognition,	   thus	   one	  way	   to	   recruit,	   and	   study,	   cognitive	   control	   is	   to	  make	   decisions	  harder,	  or	  as	  some	  say	  more	   interesting	  (Rustichini,	  2008).	  To	  do	  so,in	  turn,	  we	  need	  to	  manipulate	  the	  factors	  that	  determine	  the	  utility	  of	  options.	  In	  what	  follows	  we	  illustrate	  several	   of	   them	   in	   respective	   themes	   (Themes	   1–5),	   first	   giving	   an	   example	   and	   then	   a	  definition.	   We	   will	   then	   proceed	   by	   attempting	   to	   draw	   the	   borders	   between	   broad	  opposing	   tendencies	   in	   the	   neurocognitive	   explanations	   of	   cognitive	   control	   in	   decision	  making.	   In	   particular,	   we	   focus	   on	   a	   dual	   versus	   unitary	   framework	   (Rustichini,	   2008)	  which	  has	  been	  very	  prevalent	   in	  neuroeconomic	   research.	  The	   “battlegrounds”	  of	   such	  opposing	   views	   are	   the	   neuroeconomic	   data,	   which	   we	   illustrate	   using	   the	   factors	  mentioned	   in	   Themes	   1	   through	   5.	   Throughout,	  we	  will	   argue	   that,	   at	   present,	   none	   of	  such	  broad	  models	  fully	  accounts	  for	  the	  growing	  corpus	  of	  neuroeconomic	  data.	  Finally,	  we	   discuss	   recent	   neuroeconomic	   studies	   that	   stress	   a	   more	   interdependent	   nature	   of	  controlled	  and	  controlling	  processes	  in	  the	  brain.	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  Theme	  1:	  Loss	  Aversion	  (Kahneman&Tversky,	  1979)	  	  Imagine	  you	  are	  invited	  to	  either	  accept	  or	  reject	  the	  following	  coin	  flip	  bet:	  heads	  you	  win	  $50,	   tails	   you	   lose	   $30.	   If	   you	   feel	   some	   struggle,	   that’s	   the	   grip	   of	   loss	   aversion.	  Theoretically,	  winning	  $50	  should	  attract	  you	  more	   than	   losing	   the	  same	  amount	  scares	  you.	   However,	   in	   a	   number	   of	   experimental	   settings,	   people	   (as	  well	   as	   young	   children	  (Harbaugh	   et	   al.,	   2001)	   and	   nonhuman	   primates	   (Chen	   et	   al.,	   2006))	   tend	   to	   refuse	  similarly	   structured	   bets.	   Normally,	   they	   require	   that	   potential	   gains	   nearly	   double	  potential	  losses	  to	  take	  the	  risk.	  To	  account	  for	  this,	  it	  has	  thus	  been	  proposed	  that	  losses	  are	  weighted	  differently	  from	  gains.	  Theme	  2:	  Risk	  Aversion	  (Bernoulli,	  1954)	  	  	  Imagine	   being	   proposed	   the	   following	   choice	   between	   (a)	   $100	   for	   sure,	   or	   (b)	   $200	   if	  heads	   comes	   up	   on	   a	   fair	   coin	   flip.	   If	   you	   choose	   b,	   you	   are	   susceptible	   to	   risk.	   One	  definition	  of	   risk	   is	   variance	  of	   outcomes;	   the	   two	  gambles	  here,	   indeed,	  have	   the	   same	  mean,	   or	   expected	   value,	   but	   different	   variance.	   On	   average,	   people	   are	   risk	   averse	  (Binswanger,	   1980)	   (they	   tend	   to	   go	   for	   option	   a);	   however,	   there	   is	   also	   much	  interindividual	  variability.	  	  Theme	  3:	  Temporal	  Discounting	  (Samuelson,	  1937)	  	  Do	  you	  prefer	  (a)	  $10	  right	  now	  or	  (b)	  $11	  next	  month?	  If	  you	  chose	  b—that	  is,	  you	  are	  patient—try	  increasing	  the	  time	  of	  payoff	  receipt	  in	  b	  by,	  say,	  an	  extra	  month.	  If	  you	  keep	  repeating	  this,	  at	  some	  point	  you	  are	  likely	  to	  pick	  option	  a,	  no	  matter	  how	  patient	  you	  are.	  Indeed,	  even	  though	  we	  may	  expect	  different	  people	  to	  give	  different	  answers	  on	  options	  with	  specific	  values,	  the	  tendency	  remains:	  people	  (and	  nonhuman	  animals,	  from	  pigeons	  to	  macaques),	   appear	   to	   discount	   the	   value	   of	   goods,	   in	   our	   case	  money,	   as	   the	   time	   to	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their	   receipt	   increases.	   Much	   of	   this	   behavior	   can	   be	   accounted	   for	   by	   exponential	  discounting,	  which	  decreases	  the	  value	  of	  goods	  constantly	  across	  time.	  However,	  choose	  between	  the	  following:	  (c)	  $10	  in	  12	  months,	  or	  (d)	  $11	  in	  13	  months.	  This	  choice	  should	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  former,	  as	  we	  only	  added	  one	  year	  to	  both	  options	  (a)	  and	  (b).	  However,	  subjects	  tend	  to	  switch	  their	  preferences,	  from	  the	  nearer	  payoff	  to	  the	  farther	  one	  when	  both	  far	  and	  near	  payoffs	  are	  delayed.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  discount	  goods	  in	  a	  constant	  fashion	  (e.g.,	  exponentially),	  such	  reversals	  shouldn’t	  occur.	  One	  way	  to	  account	  for	  this	  behavior	  is	   to	   hypothesize	   that	   discounting	   is	   stronger	   when	   immediate	   payoffs	   are	   involved,	  whereas	  it	  decreases	  when	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  to	  act	  immediately.	  	  	  Theme	  4:	  Ambiguity	  Effect	  (Ellsberg,	  1961)	  	  Imagine	  a	  game	  host	  offers	  you	  two	  extraction-­‐type	  lotteries,	  presented	  as	  two	  boxes,	  to	  bet	  on.	  For	  either	  box,	  you	  win	  $50	  if	  a	  red	  ball	  is	  extracted.	  In	  box	  1	  is	  one	  red	  ball	  and	  one	  blue	  ball.	   In	  box	  2,	   the	  game	  host	   initially	  put	   two	  red	  balls	   and	   two	  blue	  balls	   and	  subsequently	  extracted	  two	  balls	  but	  didn’t	  show	  their	  colors.	  Thus,	  in	  box	  2	  there	  could	  be	  either	  two	  balls	  of	  the	  same	  color	  (either	  red	  or	  blue)	  or	  one	  ball	  of	  each	  color.	  Which	  box	  do	  you	  prefer	  to	  bet	  on?	  If	  you	  choose	  box	  1	  you	  are	  susceptible	  to	  ambiguity.	  Indeed,	  the	  two	  boxes	  offer	  the	  same	  chances	  of	  winning	  (the	  same	  expected	  value).	  The	  simplest	  definition	  of	  ambiguity	  is	  that	  outcome	  probabilities	  are	  unknown	  to	  the	  subject.	  	  Theme	  5:	  Framing	  Effects	  (Kahneman&Tversky,	  1958;	  Tversky&Kahneman,	  1981)	  You	  are	  offered	  100	  euros	  to	  make	  two	  separate	  choices,	  50	  prior	  to	  each:	  in	  choice	  1,	  you	  are	  offered	  to	  decide	  between	  (A)	  keeping	  20	  of	  your	  50	  euros	  and	  (B)	  betting	  everything	  on	  a	  “wheel	  of	   fortune”	  type	  lottery	  with	  a	  65%	  chance	  to	  keep	  all	  and	  a	  35%	  chance	  to	  lose	  all.	  Now,	  suppose	  you	  are	  offered	  decision	  2,	  between	  (C)	  losing	  30	  of	  your	  50	  euros	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and	  (D)	  betting	  everything	  on	  the	  same	  lottery	  above.	  If	  you	  chose	  A	  and	  D,	  you	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  subjects;	  alternatively,	  you	  might	  have	  realized	  that	  the	  two	  decisions	  are	  equivalent.	  In	  fact,	  B	  =	  D,	  but	  also	  A	  =	  C,	  since	  in	  one	  case	  you	  keep	  20,	  in	  the	  other	  you	  lose	  30	  from	  the	  originally	  endowed	  50	  euros.	  Indeed,	  it	  all	  boils	  down	  to	  preferring	  a	  half	  empty	  glass	  or	  a	  half	   full	  one:	   the	   two	  glasses	   refer	   to	   the	   same	  object,	   that	   is,	   they	  are	  extensionally	   equivalent,	   as	   are	   the	   preceding	   prospects;	   however,	   subjects	   tend	   to	  reverse	  their	  choices	  according	  to	  how	  the	  options	  are	  framed.	  	  
Cognitive	  Control	  and	  Emotions	  in	  Economic	  Decision	  Making	  	  Let	  us	  think	  in	  extremes:	  perhaps	  the	  largest	  doubt	  one	  can	  have	  about	  cognitive	  control	  is	  whether	  it	  exists	  at	  all	  as	  a	  dissociable	  anatomical	  and	  functional	  system.	  At	  the	  opposite	  extreme,	  cognitive	  control	  could	  be	  completely	  integrated	  with	  other	  structures/functions	  unrelated	   to	   control,	   perhaps	   functionally	   emerging	   from	   a	   more	   distributed	   network.	  This	   schematization	   lends	   itself	   to	  a	  very	  broad	  and	  yet	  open-­‐ended	  debate	   in	  cognitive	  (neuro)science	  regarding	  the	  relatively	  dualistic	  or	  unitary	  nature	  of	  decision	  processes.	  This	   issue	   is	   more	   specific	   to	   economics	   and	   decision	   making,	   as	   similar	   debates	   in	  economics	  (i.e.,	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  emotions	  on	  decisions)	  predate	  brain	  studies,	   to	  the	   point	   that	   some	   hope	   that	   neuroscience	   could	   help	   resolve	   some	   of	   the	   lingering	  problems	  of	  economics	  (Camerer	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  Dual	  models	  stress	  the	  relative	  “independence”	  of	  “decision	  subsystems,”	  that	  is,	  systems	  that	  can	  independently	  generate	  a	  decision,	  “as	  if”	  we	  had	  different	  “selves”	  competing	  for	  different	  options	  (Laibson,	  1997).	  The	  unitary	  approach,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  also	  predicts	  the	   involvement	   of	   a	   number	   of	   “subsystems,”	   however,	   none	   of	   these	   can	   generate	   an	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independent	   decision.	   From	   a	   neuroscientific	   viewpoint,	   dual	   models	   predict	   that	   a	  dissociable	   neuroanatomical	   network	   subserves	   cognitive	   control,	   whereas	   in	   a	   unitary	  framework	   there	   is	   no	   need	   for	   a	   functionally	   or	   anatomically	   distinguishable	   control	  system.	  The	   distinction	   between	   different	   subsystems	   apparent	   in	   the	   dual	   models	   often	   runs	  parallel	  to	  the	  one	  between	  emotional	  and	  deliberative	  processes	  (Ochsner&Gross,	  2005)	  (or	  between	  variously	  labeled	  fast	  and	  frugal,	  automatic/effortless,	  intuitive,	  experiential	  or	   hot	   processes,	   on	   one	   hand,	   versus	   effortful,	   analytic,	   rule-­‐based,	   verbal,	   cool,	   or	  rational	  processes,	  on	  the	  other)	  (Mukherjee,	  2010).	  Broadly	   speaking,	   both	   unitary	   and	   dual	   frameworks	   have	   apparent	   strong	   and	   weak	  points.	   For	   instance,	   it	   is	   nearly	   a	   truism	   that	   the	   unitary	   approach	   is	   simpler,	   as	   it	  explains	  decision	  phenomena	  with	  one	  rather	  than	  two	  systems.	  The	  dual	  system	  on	  the	  other	   hand	   appears	   particularly	   appealing	   for	   explaining	   “inconsistencies”	   observed	   in	  decision	   behavior.	   In	   what	   follows,	   we	   explain	   why	   this	   is	   so,	   reviewing	   the	  neuroeconomic	  literature	  that	  has	  focused	  on	  a	  number	  of	  such	  behavioral	  inconsistencies	  (see	   Themes).	   We	   show,	   however,	   that	   in	   many	   cases	   unitary	   frameworks	   can	   also	  accommodate	   the	   data.	   Throughout,	   we	   argue	   that	   both	   models	   fail	   to	   capture	   some	  important	  aspects	  of	  how	  the	  brain	  processes	  decisions.	  	  
Loss	  Aversion	  (Theme	  1)	  	  There	   is	   an	   intuitive	   appeal	   in	   hypothesizing	   that	   the	   different	   impacts	   that	   gains	   and	  losses	   have	   on	   behavior	   could	   be	   explained	   by	   different	   underlying	   neurocognitive	  systems.	  In	  particular,	   it	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  a	  dual	  approach	  to	  predict	  that	   losses	  might	   have	   a	   greater	   impact	   on	   behavior	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   being	   processed	   in	   more	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emotion-­‐related	   cortical	   regions.	   An	   alternative	   explanation	   more	   consistent	   with	   the	  unitary	  approach,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  same	  neural	  network	  is	  differentially	  recruited	  by	  the	  processing	  of	  both	  gains	  and	  losses.	  Neuroimaging	  evidence	  on	  healthy	  decision	  makers	  appeared	  to	  support	  the	  dual	  systems	  hypothesis,	   as	   the	   anticipation	   and	   experience	   of	   economic	   losses	   has	   been	   repeatedly	  associated	   with	   activity	   in	   structures	   strongly	   associated	   with	   affective	   and	   autonomic	  processing,	   such	   as	   the	   amygdala	   and	   the	   anterior	   insula	   (Knutson&Bossaerts,	   2007).	  With	  some	  exceptions	  (Smith	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Yacubian	  et	  al.,	  2006),	   the	  same	  regions	  were	  not	  sensitive	  to	  gains,	  which	  have	  instead	  been	  shown	  to	  recruit	  a	  system	  centered	  on	  the	  midbrain	  and	  the	  striatum,	  branching	  to	  various	  regions	  of	  the	  PFC	  (Schultz,	  2006).	  Only	  one	   study,	   by	   Tom	   and	   colleagues	   (Tom	   et	   al.,	   2007),	   showed	   that	   increasing	   potential	  losses	  and	  gains	  recruited	  a	  same	  network,	  which	  was	  activated	  by	  gains	  and	  deactivated	  by	   losses.	   However,	   a	   study	   that	   included	   a	   task	   very	   similar	   to	   that	   used	   by	   Tom	   and	  colleagues	   was	   unable	   to	   replicate	   their	   results	   (Canessea	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   Recently,	   De	  Martino	   and	   colleagues	   (2010)	   showed	   that	   patients	  with	   circumscribed	   damage	   to	   the	  amygdala	   clearly	   dissociated	   from	   their	   matched	   controls,	   as	   they	   didn’t	   exhibit	   loss	  aversion.	   Overall,	   though	   studies	   employing	   different	   tasks	   show	   that	   the	   amygdala	   is	  sensitive	   to	   both	   positively	   and	   negatively	   valenced	   cue,	   (Hamann&Mao,	   2002)	   studies	  specifically	  focusing	  on	  loss	  aversion	  seem	  to	  tilt	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  dual	  view.	  	  
Risk	  (Theme	  2)	  	  In	   a	   dual	   view,	   risk	   attitudes	   could	   be	   the	   result	   of	   emotions	   (and	   emotion-­‐related	  cortices),	  which	  would	  be	  modulated	  by	  cognitive	  control	  in	  risk-­‐neutral	  subjects.	  There	  is	  evidence	   that	   corroborates	   this	   hypothesis.	   Patients	   with	   lesions	   in	   areas	   thought	   to	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integrate	  emotion	  and	  cognition,	  such	  as	  the	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  (OFC)	  (Damasio,	  1994)	  exhibit	   risk-­‐neutral	   behavior,	   (Kable&Glimcher,	   2007)	   paradoxically,	   as	   do	   high-­‐scoring	  subjects	   on	   IQ	   tests	   (Benjamin,	   2006).	   Moreover,	   imaging	   studies	   revealed	   that	   areas	  previously	   associated	   with	   cognitive	   control,	   such	   as	   the	   lateral	   prefrontal	   cortex	   lPFC	  (Tobler	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  (in	  particular,	  the	  ventrolateral	  PFC)	  play	  a	  role	  in	  mediating	  aversion	  to	   risk	   (Tobler	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   These	   findings	   are	   consistent	   with	   transcranial	   magnetic	  stimulation	  (TMS)	  studies	  showing	  the	  causal	  regulatory	  link	  between	  the	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   (IFG)	   and	   risky	  behavior,	   by	  which	   interference	  with	   IFG	   activity	   using	   repetitive	  TMS	  (rTMS)	  decreases	  risk	  aversion	  (Knowch	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  latter	  study	  propose	   that,	   when	   facing	   choices	   between	   options	   with	   different	   levels	   of	   risk	   (i.e.,	  choose	   between	   (a)	   winning	   $20	   with	   an	   80%	   chance	   or	   lose	   -­‐$20	   otherwise,	   and	   (b)	  winning	  $80	  with	  a	  20%	  chance	  or	  lose	  -­‐$80	  otherwise),	  the	  risky	  option	  is	  more	  salient	  and	  attractive,	  as	  it	  usually	  features	  a	  greater	  outcome.	  This	  automatic	  attraction	  toward	  higher-­‐paying	   outcomes	   would	   require	   the	   intervention	   of	   control	   processes,	   which,	   in	  turn,	  would	  support	  a	  more	  analytical	  assessment	  of	  the	  options,	  that	  is,	  enabling	  one	  to	  weigh	   the	   higher-­‐paying	   option	   by	   its	   probability,	   making	   it	   overall	   less	   attractive.	  However,	   Rustichini	   (2008)	   stresses	   that	   the	   same	   data	   are	   compatible	   with	   a	   unitary	  view,	  as	  the	  IFG	  may	  subserve	  general	  information	  processing,	  thus	  its	  disruption	  leads	  to	  the	   failure	   of	   integrating	   reward	   magnitude	   and	   probability.	   Moreover,	   although	   some	  subcortical	   and	  PFC	   regions	   appear	   to	   code	   risk	   and	   expected	   value	   separately	   (Phelps,	  1968;	   Seymour	   et	   al.,	   2007),	   others	   dissociate	   between	   the	   measures	   through	   distinct	  temporal	  dynamics,	  rather	  than	  regional	  segregation	  (such	  as	  dopamine	  neurons	  –	  Fiorillo	  et	  al.,	  2003).	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Temporal	  Discounting	  (Theme	  3)	  	  Models	  to	  account	  for	  preference	  reversals	  have	  been	  proposed	  within	  both	  (a)	  dual	  and	  (b)	   unitary	   models	   (Rustichini,	   2008).	   Dual	   type	   explanations	   hinge	   on	   the	   idea	   that	  competition	   for	  guiding	  behavior	  occurs	  between	  an	  “impulsive”	  and	  a	  “patient”	  system.	  To	   represent	   this,	   Phelps	   and	   Pollak	   proposed	   (Phelps&Pollak,	   1968)	   a	   model	   that	  employs	  two	  parameters	  in	  a	  temporal	  discounting	  function.	  One,	  “delta,”	  discounts	  evenly	  across	  different	  time	  points—and	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  previous	  exponential	  discounting	  (see	   Theme	   3)—the	   other,	   “beta,”	   gives	   the	   function	   a	   steep	   curvature	   for	   immediate	  rewards.	   In	   contrast	   to	   this,	   supporters	   of	   the	   unitary	   view	   have	   often	   taken	   from	  psychophysics,	   stressing	   parallelisms	   with	   better-­‐understood	   perceptual	   systems	  (Rustichini,	  2008).	  A	  third	  line	  of	  research	  has	  proposed	  that	  hyperbolic	  discounting	  (i.e.,	  preference	   reversals)	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   a	   logarithmic	   perception	   of	   time	   and	  exponential	  time	  discounting	  (Takahashi,	  2005).	  Incidentally,	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  neuropsychological	  study	  showing	  that	  ventromedial	  PFC	  (vmPFC)	  patients	  behaved	  comparably	   to	   controls	   on	   intertemporal	   decisions	   but	   were	   impaired	   in	   a	   task	   that	  assessed	   their	   ability	   to	   consistently	   focus	   on	   different	   time	   horizons	   (Fellows&Farah,	  2005).	   Therefore,	   even	   if	   discounting	   behaviors	   can	   be	   described	   as	   a	   result	   of	   two	  processes	   (i.e.,	   patient	   vs.	   impatient),	   they	   seem	   to	   presently	   leave	   open	   a	   number	   of	  possible	  subfunction	  combinations.	  	  Taking	   the	   “unitary	   versus	   dual”	   dispute	   into	   the	   brain	   doesn’t	   simplify	   the	   scenario	  foreshadowed	   by	   the	   preceding	   behavioral	   debates.	   A	   first	   study	   by	   McClure	   and	  colleagues	   (McCLure	   et	   al.,	   2004)	  was	   able	   to	   dissociate	   between	  beta-­‐	   and	  delta-­‐pliant	  systems;	  a	  second	  study	  by	  Kable	  and	  Glimcher	  (Kable&Glimcher,	  2007)	  however,	  showed	  a	  unitary	   set	  of	   reward-­‐related	   regions	  modulated	  by	  near	  and	   far	   rewards,	   and	  a	   third	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one	   by	   Ballard	   and	   Knutson	   (2009)	  was	   partially	   consistent	  with	   both	   studies.	   Overall,	  while	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  some	  “dualisms”	  in	  the	  brain,	  they	  don’t	  align	  well	  to	  those	  of	  a	  typical	   dual	   model.	   For	   instance,	   dual	   models	   predict	   that	   a	   neural	   system	   would	   be	  preferentially	  activated	  by	  immediate	  as	  opposed	  to	  future	  rewards;	  however,	  Ballard	  and	  Knutson’s	  study	  suggests	  that	  a	  key	  dissociation	  might	  be	  between	  reward	  magnitude	  and	  reward	   delay,	  which	   is	   compatible	  with	   Kable	   and	   Glimcher’s	   results.	   Overall,	   the	  most	  consistent	   result	   appears	   that	   of	   an	   lPFC	   involvement	   in	   the	   processing	   of	   the	   delay	   of	  rewards,	  as	  this	  is	  confirmed	  by	  two	  of	  the	  preceding	  studies	  (Ballard&Knutson;	  McClure	  et	   al.,	   2004)	   an	   electrophysiological	   study	   on	   monkeys	   (Kim	   et	   al.,	   2008),	   and	   several	  patient	  and	  imaging	  studies	  in	  different	  but	  related	  tasks	  (Knoch&Fehr,	  2007).Moreover,	  this	   idea	   is	   not	   in	   conflict	   with	   Kable	   and	   Glimcher’s	   findings,	   as	   this	   could	   not	  differentiate	   well	   between	   reward	   magnitude	   and	   delay	   (Ballard&Knutons,	   2009).	   The	  lPFC’s	  involvement	  for	  processing	  rewards	  that	  are	  delayed	  in	  time	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  this	  region	  is	  needed	  to	  override	  prepotent	  responses	  such	  as	  those	  that	  could	  derive	  from	  the	  temptation	  to	  accept	  immediate	  payoffs.	  	  
Decisions	  under	  Ambiguity	  (Theme	  4)	  	  It	  could	  be	  tempting	  to	  explain	  ambiguity	  aversion	  within	  a	  dual	  framework.	  Not	  knowing	  the	   contingencies	   of	   our	   decision	   environments	   could	   easily	   “frighten”	   us,	   perhaps	   so	  quickly	  and	  automatically	   that	  we	  don’t	  give	  ourselves	   the	   time	  to	  consider	   the	  possible	  situations	   and	  make	   a	   balanced	   choice.	   The	   first	   neuroimaging	   research	  by	  Huettel	   and	  colleagues	   (Huetttel	   et	   al.,	   2006)	   to	   directly	   confront	   neural	   responses	   to	   risk	   versus	  ambiguity	  showed	  that	  subjects	  that	  chose	  the	  ambiguous	  lotteries	  more	  often	  (see	  Theme	  4)	  exhibited	  enhanced	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	  (IFG)	  activity	  in	  response	  to	  ambiguity.	  Such	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activity	  was	   interpreted	   to	  be	  a	   signature	  of	   cognitive	  control,	  which	  could	  override	   the	  impulsive	  decision	  of	   automatically	   avoiding	  ambiguity	   and	  plausibly	  mobilize	   cognitive	  resources	   to	   explore	   the	   ambiguous	   scenario	   (i.e.,	   considering	   the	   various	   alternatives	  underlying	  the	  ambiguously	  described	  probabilities).	  A	  second	  study,	  by	  Hsu	  et	  al.	  (Hsu	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  was	  particularly	  consistent	  with	  dual	  models,	  as	  it	  showed	  that	  emotion-­‐related	  cortices,	  among	  which,	  the	  amygdala	  and	  the	  OFC,	  responded	  preferentially	  to	  ambiguity	  and	  that	  striatal	  responses	  were	  more	  sensitive	  to	  risk.	  The	  two	  types	  of	  responses	  also	  differed	   in	   timing,	   as	   the	   amygdala	   was	   activated	   seconds	   earlier	   than	   the	   striatum.	  Moreover,	   the	   causal	   role	   of	   the	  OFC	   in	   ambiguity	  processing	  was	  demonstrated	  by	   the	  observation	   that	  patients	  with	   lesions	   in	   this	  area	  were	   less	   sensitive,	  and	  even	  became	  prone	   to	   both	   ambiguity	   and	   risk,	   relative	   to	   their	   matched	   controls.	   Together,	   the	  functional	  magnetic	  resonance	  imaging	  (fMRI)	  and	  lesion	  data	  leaded	  the	  authors	  to	  speak	  of	   an	   amygdala-­‐OFC	   centered	   vigilance-­‐evaluation	   system	   (requiring	   regulation,	   via	   the	  dorsomedial	  PFC,	  or	  dmPFC)	   that	  quickly	   tracks	  salient	  aspects	  of	   the	  stimuli	   that	  carry	  uncertainty-­‐related	  information	  (i.e.,	  signaling	  that	  information	  is	  missing).	  	  Though	  Hsu	  and	  colleagues’	  results	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  risk	  and	  ambiguity	  are	  processed	   by	   distinct	   mechanisms	   in	   the	   brain,	   their	   neuropsychological	   results	   also	  suggested	  that	  ambiguity	  and	  risk	  tendencies	  are	  connected,	  as	  they	  seemed	  to	  correlate	  in	  both	  the	  control	  and	  patient	  samples	  (which	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  previous	  study	  linking	  ambiguity	   and	   risk	   in	   healthy	   subjects	   (Boassaerts	   et	   all.,	   2010).	   In	   line	   with	   this,	   and	  closer	   to	   a	   unitary	  perspective,	   a	   study	  by	  Levy	   et	   al.	   (Levy	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   found	   that	   the	  activity	  in	  the	  set	  of	  regions,	  including	  the	  medial	  PFC,	  striatum,	  amygdala,	  and	  posterior	  cingulate	   cortex	   (PCC)	   covaried	   with	   subjective	   value	   in	   both	   risky	   and	   ambiguous	  decisions.	  There	  was	  moreover	  evidence	   for	  differential	  activation	  patterns	  (rather	   than	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segregation),	   as	   connectivity	   analysis	   suggested	   that	   connection	   “weights”	   are	   stronger	  between	  the	  amygdala	  and	  the	  striatum	  under	  ambiguous	  than	  risky	  choices.	  It	   is	   hard	   to	   argue	   that	   these	   results	   answer	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   dual	   or	   unitary	  systems	  underlie	  ambiguity.	  	  
Framing	  Effects	  (Theme	  5)	  	  Consistently	  with	  a	  dual	  systems	  approach,	  it	  has	  been	  proposed	  that	  emotional	  processes	  may	  underlie	   subjects’	   susceptibility	   to	   choices	   framed	   either	   as	   losses	   or	   gains.	   Such	   a	  model	  would	  predict	  that	  frame-­‐driven	  behavior	  would	  correlate	  with	  activity	  in	  emotion-­‐related	   regions	   and	   that	   behavioral	   consistency	   across	   frames	   (the	   “rational”	   behavior)	  would	  elicit	  activity	   in	  areas	  associated	  with	  cognitive	  control,	  since	  consistent	  behavior	  across	  different	  contexts	  is	  costly.	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  a	  study	  by	  De	  Martino	  and	  colleagues	  (2006)	   showed	   that	   amygdala	   activity	   correlated	   with	   risk-­‐averse	   behavior	   in	   “gain	  frames”	  and	  risk-­‐seeking	  behavior	   in	  games	   framed	  negatively,	  which	   is	   consistent	  with	  the	   idea	   that	   this	   limbic	   structure	  amplifies	   risk-­‐related	  biases	  by	  processing	  contextual	  cues.	  In	  contrast,	  when	  subjects	  “resisted”	  frames,	  the	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (ACC)	  was	  preferentially	   recruited	   in	   a	   subregion	   later	   associated	   with	   strategic	   control	  (Venkatraman	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Moreover,	   the	   authors	   obtained	   individual	   “rationality”	  indexes	   from	   behavior	   (a	  measure	   of	   their	   subjects’	   degree	   of	   susceptibility	   to	   frames)	  that	   correlated	   with	   medial	   OFC	   (mOFC)	   activity.	   The	   OFC	   is	   considered	   to	   integrate	  emotional	  valence	  and	  goal-­‐oriented	  behavior	  (Damasio,	  1994),	  and	  as	  such	   the	  authors	  suggested	   that	   subjects	  who	  chose	  more	   “rationally”	  had	   richer	   representations	  of	   their	  own	  emotional	  biases,	  enabling	  them	  to	  better	  modify	  their	  behavior.	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Interplay	  between	  Emotions	  and	  Cognitive	  Control:	  A	  Paradigmatic	  Example	  Coricelli	  et	  al	  (2005)	  measured	  brain	  activity	  using	  fMRI	  while	  subjects	  participated	  in	  a	  simple	   gambling	   task.	   The	   experimental	   task	   required	   subjects	   to	   choose	   between	   two	  gambles,	  each	  having	  different	  probabilities	  and	  different	  expected	  outcomes.	  Regret	  was	  induced	   by	   providing	   information	   regarding	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   unchosen	   gamble.	  Increasing	  regret	  was	  correlated	  with	  enhanced	  activity	  in	  the	  medial	  orbitofrontal	  region,	  the	  dorsal	  ACC	  and	  anterior	  hippocampus.	  This	  hippocampal	  activity	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	   that	   a	   cognitive-­‐based	   declarative	   process	   of	   regret	   is	   engaged	   by	   the	   task.	   This	  supports	   a	   modulation	   of	   declarative	   (consciously	   accessible)	   memory	   (Eichenbaum,	  2004;	  Steidl	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  such	  that	  after	  a	  bad	  outcome	  the	  lesson	  to	  be	  learned	  is:	  “In	  the	  future	   pay	  more	   attention	   to	   the	   potential	   consequences	   of	   your	   choice.”	   Furthermore,	  Coricelli	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   showed	   that	   activity	   in	   response	   to	   experiencing	   regret	  (OFC/ACC/medial	   temporal	   cortex)	   is	   distinct	   from	   activity	   seen	   with	   mere	   outcome	  evaluation	  (ventral	  striatum),	  and	  in	  response	  to	  disappointment	  elicited	  by	  the	  mismatch	  between	  actual	  and	  expected	  outcome	  of	  choice.	  Indeed,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  disappointment	  correlated	   with	   enhanced	   activity	   in	   middle	   temporal	   gyrus	   and	   dorsal	   brainstem,	  including	   periaqueductal	   gray	  matter,	   a	   region	   implicated	   in	   processing	   aversive	   signal	  such	  as	  pain.	  This	  suggests	  distinctive	  neural	  substrates	  in	  reward	  processing,	  and	  that	  the	  OFC	   and	   medial	   temporal	   cortex	   areas	   can	   bias	   basic	   dopamine-­‐mediated	   reward	  responses	  (Eichenbaum,	  2004).	  	  Coricelli	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   reported	   that,	   across	   their	   fMRI	   experiment	   subjects	   became	  increasingly	   regret	   aversive,	   a	   cumulative	   effect	   reflected	   in	   enhanced	   activity	   within	  ventromedial	   orbitofrontal	   cortex	   and	   amygdala.	   Under	   these	   circumstances,	   the	   same	  pattern	  of	   activity	   that	  was	  expressed	  with	   the	  experience	  of	   regret	  was	  also	  expressed	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just	  prior	  to	  choice,	  suggesting	  the	  same	  neural	  circuitry	  mediates	  both	  direct	  experience	  of	  regret	  and	  its	  anticipation.	  Thus,	   the	  OFC	  and	  the	  amygdala	  contribute	  to	  this	   form	  of	  high-­‐level	  learning	  based	  on	  past	  emotional	  experience,	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  mirrors	  the	  role	  of	   these	  structures	   in	  acquisition	  of	  value	   in	   low-­‐level	   learning	  contexts	  (Gottfried	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  Moreover,	  and	  of	  particular	  interest	  for	  our	  current	  discussion,	  affective	  consequences	  of	  choice	  can	  induce	  specific	  mechanisms	  of	  cognitive	  control	  (Yarkoni	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Coricelli	  et	  al.	  (Coricelli	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  	  observed	  enhanced	  responses	  in	  right	  dorsolateral	  prefrontal	  cortex,	   right	   lateral	   OFC,	   and	   inferior	   parietal	   lobule	   during	   a	   choice	   phase	   after	   the	  experience	  of	   regret	   (Coricelli	   et	   al.,	  2005)	   ,where	  subsequent	   choice	  processes	   induced	  reinforcement,	   or	   avoidance	   of,	   the	   experienced	   behavior	   (Clark	   et	   al.,	   2004)	  Corroborating	  results	  from	  Simon-­‐Thomas	  et	  al,.	  (2005)	  show	  that	  negative	  emotions	  can	  recruit	   “cognitive”	   right	   hemisphere	   responses.	   Thus,	   negative	   affective	   consequences	  (regret)	   induce	   specific	   mechanisms	   of	   cognitive	   control	   on	   subsequent	   choices.	   These	  data	  suggest	  a	  mechanism	  through	  which	  comparing	  choice	  outcome	  with	  its	  alternatives	  (fictive	   error),	   and	   the	   associated	   feeling	   of	   regret,	   promotes	   behavioral	   flexibility	   and	  exploratory	   strategies	   in	   dynamic	   environments	   so	   as	   to	   minimize	   the	   likelihood	   of	  emotionally	   negative	   outcomes.	   These	   studies	   stress	   a	   more	   interdependent	   nature	   of	  controlled	  and	  controlling	  processes	  in	  the	  brain.	  	  
Brief	  Discussion	  and	  Synthesis	  	  One	  of	   the	  problems	  with	  treating	  cognitive	  control	   in	  economic	  decision	  making	   is	   that	  there	   is	   a	   resilient	   idea	   that	   control	  makes	  behavior	   rational	   and	   that	   emotions	  make	   it	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irrational.	  A	  line	  of	  literature	  coming	  from	  neuropsychological	  observations	  supports	  this	  idea:	  Patients	  with	  lesions	  in	  the	  amygdala	  do	  not	  exhibit	  loss	  aversion	  (De	  Martino	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  patients	  with	  lesions	  in	  the	  OFC/vmPFC	  are	  less	  risk	  and	  ambiguity	  averse,	  and	  are	  close	   to	   neutrality	   in	   both	   domains	   (Hsu	   et	   al.,	   2005),	   they	   are	   also	   utilitarian	   in	  moral	  decision	  making	  (Greene,	  2007)	  and	  are	   less	   influenced	  by	  regret	   in	  economic	  decisions	  (Camille	   et	   al.,	   2004);	   similarly,	   subjects	  with	   autistic	   syndromes	  are	   less	   susceptible	   to	  framing	   effects	   (De	  Martino	   et	   al.,	   2007).	  All	   these	  pathologies	   are	   thus	   associated	  with	  increased	  “economic	  rationality”	  in	  a	  number	  of	  contexts.	  	  This	   interpretation,	  however,	   ignores	   the	  most	  prominent	   and	   consequential	   behavioral	  feature	   of	   these	   patients;	   that	   is,	   they	   are	   also	   severely	   impaired	   in	   everyday	   decision	  making.	  In	  experimental	  tasks,	  this	  is	  suggested	  by	  vmPFC/OFC	  patients’	  inability	  to	  learn	  from	   negative	   decision	   outcomes	   (Damasion,	   1994),	   their	   impairments	   in	   reversal	  learning	   (Fellows&Farah,	   2005),	   their	   violations	   of	   preference	   transitivity	  (Fellows&Farah,	  2007)	  (i.e.,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  exhibit	  inconsistent	  preferences	  of	  the	  type	  A	  >	  B,	  B	  >	  C,	   but	  A	  <	  C)	   and	  abnormal	  decision	  making	   in	   a	  number	  of	   interactive	  choice	   contexts	   (Van	   den	   Bos&Guroglu,	   2009)	   Thus,	   overall,	   emotions	   take	   part	   in	  inconsistent	  and	  consistent/adaptive	  decisions.	  	  This	   has	   implications	   for	   the	   dual	   versus	   unitary	   discussion.	  We	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	  “strong”	  interpretation	  of	  dual	  models	  and	  a	  “weaker”	  one.	  The	  weak	  version	  makes	  only	  the	   first	   of	   the	   following	   two	   claims,	   the	   strong	  one	  makes	  both:	   (1)	   that	   there	   are	   two	  relatively	   distinct	   broad	   systems	   in	   the	   brain,	   one	   that	   preferentially	   takes	   part	   in	   fast,	  effortless,	   emotional,	   and	   context-­‐related	   processes,	   another	   that	   is	   preferentially	  activated	  in	  situations	  requiring	  control	  and	  deliberation;	  and	  (2)	  that	  these	  two	  systems	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make	  separate	  contributions	  to,	  respectively,	  ”rational”	  and	  “irrational”	  economic	  decision	  making.	  The	  stronger	  version	  appears	  at	  odds	  with	  current	  neuroscientific	  evidence.	  Our	  review	  of	  neuroimaging	  evidence	  further	  stresses	  and	  complicates	  this	  point:	  Even	  within	  economic	   categorizations	   of	   behavior,	   which	   depend	   on	   the	   factors	  manipulated	   in	   the	  decision	  environment	  (Themes	  1–5),	  the	  brain	  is	  capable	  of	  responding	  either	  as	  a	  unitary	  or	  as	  a	  dual	  system,	  plausibly	  according	  to	  specific	  differences	  in	  task	  designs	  that	  should	  gradually	   be	   disentangled.	   In	   none	   of	   the	   individual	   factors	   we	   examined	   do	   imaging	  studies	  uniquely	  support	  either	  a	  unitary	  or	  dual	  view:	  in	  some	  designs,	  the	  two	  putative	  neural	   systems	   do	   not	   dissociate	   whereas	   in	   others	   they	   do.	   Thus,	   under	   a	   strict	  falsificationism,	  both	  theories	  are	  falsified.	  	  Our	   impression	   is	   that	   the	   reviewed	   results	   appear	   less	   odd	   outside	   a	   strict	   opposition	  between	  a	  dual	  and	  unitary	  framework;	  although	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  deny	  that	  there	  are	  cortices	  more	   related	   to	   bodily/emotional	   processes	   and	   others	  more	   related	   to	   analytical	   ones	  (something	  close	  to	  the	  weaker	  claim	  above),	  results	  ultimately	  stress	  the	  flexibility	  with	  which	   the	   two	   systems	   seem	   to	   interact,	   thus	   the	  different	   effects	   cognitive	   control	   and	  emotions	  can	  have	  on	  behavior.	  	  Outstanding	  Questions	  •	   What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  cognitive	  control	  and	  the	  reward	  system?	  •	   What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  cognitive	  control	  in	  the	  computations	  underlying	  social	  interaction?	  •	   To	  what	  extent	  do	  we	  need	  cognitive	  control	  to	  behave	  optimally?	  	  Further	  Reading	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Koechlin	  E,	  Hyafil	  A.	  2007.	  Anterior	  prefrontal	  function	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  human	  decision-­‐making.	  Science	  318:594–598.	  In	  scenarios	  in	  which	  goals	  do	  not	  match	  expectations,	  one	  of	  the	  big	  problems	  a	  cognitive	  agent	  faces	  is	  that	  of	  analyzing	  and	  confronting	  a	  number	  of	   possible	   plans	   of	   actions.	  However,	   the	   lPFC	   is	   functionally	   limited,	   and	   only	   serially	  represented	   plans	   can	   be	   processed,	   as	   in	   a	   bottleneck.	   The	   authors	   suggest	   that	  “branching”	   is	   the	   function	   that	   counters	   the	   bottleneck	   problem	   in	   the	   lPFC.	   It	   is	  attributed	   to	   the	   FPC	   (frontopolar	   cortex,	   BA	   10)	   and	   would	   enable	   the	  exploration/execution	  of	  a	   target	   task,	  while	  maintaining	  a	  previously	  selected	   task	   in	  a	  pending	  state	  for	  subsequent	  automatic	  retrieval	  and	  execution.	  	  Venkatraman	  V,	  Alexandra	  GR,	  Taran	  AA,	  Huettel	  SA.	  2009.	  Resolving	  response,	  decision,	  and	   strategic	   control:	   Evidence	   for	   a	   functional	   topography	   in	   dorsomedial	   prefrontal	  cortex.	   J	  Neurosci	  29:13158–13164.	   Several	   studies	  have	   investigated	   further	   functional	  dissociations	  within	  the	  pmPFC,	  reporting	  a	  ventral-­‐dorsal	  gradient	  for	  emotional	  versus	  more	  cognitive	  processes	  as	  well	  social	  relevance.	  This	  recent	  fMRI	  study	  further	  qualifies	  anatomofunctional	  specialization	  of	  cognitive	  control	  in	  the	  mPFC.	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